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In this dissertation, I analyze contemporary American novels via ecocritical and
narratological reading strategies to highlight how novelists approach environmental crises
through various narrative strategies. The novels I analyze allow me to provide several instances
where contemporary American novelists explore environmental crisis with narrative. I argue
that the formal, structural choices contemporary American novelists make depend on the
environmental problems they portray. Furthermore, I argue that each novel uses, to one degree
or another, realist aesthetics—but makes a marked departure from realism to address
environmental concerns. These novels show us how we got to where we are environmentally,
but they also suggest through innovative narrative strategies how we might become more aware
of our own conventions. I use narratology as a method of inquiry because the conventions of
thinking are embedded in the conventions of storytelling and attending closely to the conventions
of storytelling can thus open up new ways of thinking about our roles in environmental crisis. I
draw on several traditions of scholars trying to rethink cultural products’ relationship to the
environment and those who explore the conventions of narrative.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter

Page

I.

Introduction……………………………………………………………...………….……..1

II.

Franzen’s Freedom, Metafiction, and the Realist Eco-Novel………..…………………..13

III.

What’s a Death Worth?: Neoliberalism and Necropolitics in How the Dead Dream…....54

IV.

Beyond Interdependence Day: Pyrotechnic Storytelling and the Unbelievable-But-True in
David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest…………………………………………………………....93

V.

Style as Weather: Narrative Form and Global Warming in Karen Tei Yamashita’s Tropic
of Orange…………………………………………………………………………………………131
Works Cited…………………………………………………………………………….170
Curriculum Vitae……………………………………………………………………….182

iii

Introduction

Cultural critics need more insight into the ramifications of current and oncoming
environmental crises. American novelists since the mid-1990s have approached the subject of
environmental crisis in various ways, both thematically and formally. Their approaches
responded to the rise of the environmental justice movement and the widespread acceptance of
the reality of climate change since the first assessment reports of the World Meteorological
Organization’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 1 How do contemporary authors use
narrative strategies to address ecological disasters? While the novel has traditionally been
associated with dramatizing human concerns using realist aesthetics, contemporary American
novelists have frequently abandoned realism to address new environmental problems. 2 My
dissertation examines how four American novelists have sought to make the novel formally
adequate to the difficult task of narrating environmental crisis. The novelists I examine—
Jonathan Franzen, Lydia Millet, David Foster Wallace, and Karen Tei Yamashita—show how
environmental crisis requires experimental narrative strategies that attend closely to nonhuman
concerns.

1

See, for example, Evan Dara. The Lost Scrapbook: A Novel. FC2, 1995. Percival Everett. Watershed: A Novel.
Graywolf, 1996., Linda Hogan. Power: A Novel. W.W. Norton & Co., 1998., Peter Matthiessen. Shadow Country.
Modern Library, 2008., Jesmyn Ward. Salvage the Bones A Novel. Bloomsbury, 2011., Barbara Kingsolver. Flight
Behavior: A Novel. Harper, 2012., Ruth Ozeki. A Tale for the Time Being: A Novel. Viking, 2013., Richard Powers.
The Overstory. W.W. Norton & Co., 2018.
2
While the vast majority of novels published in the last three centuries use realist aesthetics to portray humans and
their concerns, a few examples include the following: Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, Samuel Richardson’s
Pamela; or, Virtue Rewarded, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther, Jane Austen’s
Emma, Charles Dickens’s Great Expectations, Mark Twain’s Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, Richard Wright’s
Native Son, Amy Tan’s The Joy Luck Club, and Donna Tartt’s The Goldfinch. On the development of the novel as a
form used to portray human concerns, see Ian Watt. The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and
Fielding. Chatto & Windus, 1957.
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In my dissertation, I argue that the formal, structural choices contemporary American
novelists make depend on the environmental problems they portray. These authors rely on rules
for reading, codes they inherited from typical reading conventions—and then break or deviate
from these codes in trying to look at environmental problems from a new perspective. 3 I use
econarratlogy (the combined foci of ecocriticism’s emphasis on the influence of environment and
narratology’s attention to structure) to explore how these four contemporary American fiction
writers use experimental narrative practices to respond to environmental concerns. 4 Erin James
notes that, though narrative theory was once considered “primarily a descriptive, noninterpretive
mode of reading inspired by a structural focus on the text alone,” it is increasingly useful for
understanding “the world beyond the text” (14). The novel form developed historically to
chronicle humans and their concerns, yet novels are useful for understanding the role of the
nonhuman in our time of environmental crisis. 5 While the authors I look at in my project are
concerned with very different ecological disasters, and their narrative choices vary greatly as
well, what they share is deliberate narrative code-breaking and a concern for environmental
problems.
This dissertation is composed of four chapters, in addition to this introduction, with each
body chapter focused on a close reading of a single novel (albeit with reference as appropriate to

3

For more on structuralist codes, see Roland Barthes, S/Z: An Essay. Trans. Richard Miller. Hill and Wang, 1974.
Pp. 10-11 and Seymour Chatman, Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film, Cornell UP, 1978.
Pp. 24.
4
Erin James describes “econarratology” as follows in The Storyworld Accord: Econarratology and Postcolonial
Narratives: “I see econarratology as pairing ecocriticism’s interest in the relationship between literature and the
physical environment with narratology’s focus on the literary structures and devices by which writers compose
narratives. Econarratology studies the storyworlds that readers simulate and transport themselves to when reading
narratives, the correlations between such textual, imaginative worlds and the physical, extratextual world, and the
potential of the reading process to foster awareness and understanding for different environmental imaginations and
experiences.” Pp. xv.
5
On the anthropocentric development of the novel and narrativized discourse more generally, see Amitav Ghosh,
The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable. U. of Chicago P., 2016 and David Herman.
Narratology Beyond the Human: Storytelling and Animal Life. Oxford UP, 2018.
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other novels that address issues similar to those brought up by the novel under discussion). In
choosing primary texts, I selected literary novels that explore different aspects of environmental
crisis and employ a variety of narrative strategies to do so.6 While several critics have chosen a
particular environmental problem to write about, such projects necessarily limit their scope and
the connections they can make between seemingly disparate environmental problems. 7 The first
two novels I address, Freedom (2010) by Jonathan Franzen and How the Dead Dream (2008) by
Lydia Millet are realist novels, but they incorporate strategies not generally regarded as realist at
critical junctures when realism is not adequate to make the points about environmentalism that
the authors want to make In Freedom, Jonathan Franzen addresses the destruction of the coal
industry and the decreasing migratory songbird population with a realist aesthetic inflected with
frequent metafictional reflections on the inability of the novel to productively address
environmental problems. In How the Dead Dream, Lydia Millet addresses the radical distinction
between humans and animals (and the subsequent disparity in the values of their lives) with the
story of a man who acts in an increasingly unrealistic fashion as the narrator eventually ceases to
make a distinction between the human and the nonhuman. The final two novels I address,
Infinite Jest (1996) by David Foster Wallace and Tropic of Orange (1997) by Karen Tei
Yamashita are less invested in realist aesthetics and more overtly experimental in their narrative
strategies. In Infinite Jest, Wallace addresses the environmental injustice of dumping toxic waste
near disenfranchised communities by contrasting first-hand accounts with a description of an art

6

Amitav Ghosh notes that few writers of literary fiction have chosen to address climate change directly. I will
discuss his argument in more detail in my chapter on David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest. While my study is not
restricted to novels that explore climate change, Ghosh’s argument could be extended to almost any environmental
crisis.
7
See, for instance, Paula Anca Farca on the water crisis, John Blair Gomber on waste, and Adam Trexler on climate
change, Paula Anca Farca. Making Waves: Water in Contemporary Literature and Film. U. of Nevada P., 2019.,
Gamber, John Blair. Positive Pollutions and Cultural Toxins: Waste and Contamination in Contemporary U.S.
Ethnic Literatures. U of Nebraska P, 2012., Trexler, Adam. Anthropocene Fictions: The Novel in a Time of Climate
Change. U. of Virginia P., 2015.
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object that problematically represents this history of environmental injustice. Wallace’s novel
attends closely to the unbelievable-yet-true quality of environmental disaster. In Tropic of
Orange, Yamashita comments on climate change with elements of magic realism, dispersing the
novel’s center of attention with several characters whose stories are all narrated in distinct styles.
Her novel presents a formal corollary for the ways human experiences of space and time are
altered by climate change. Each of these novels asks readers to engage in a particular way at the
outset but then asks readers to engage with them in an entirely different way when narrating
environmental crisis. The environmental content in each novel occasions a particular
experimental approach or departure from realism.
Responding to environmental crisis is also a problem for critics in the humanities. This
project is inspired by the rise of the environmental humanities, which has made the study of
cultural and literary texts central to the study of ecology.8 In the last few decades, work in the
environmental humanities has sought to transcend the outmoded gap between the sciences and
the humanities. Ecocritics like Lawrence Buell, for instance, show how literature played a
central role in shaping human attitudes about nonhuman nature. 9 Buell notes that ecocriticism
has developed through several waves, including “first-wave” ecocriticism, which was
particularly concerned with nature writing and conservation and “second-wave” ecocriticism,
which was more concerned with the environmental justice movement. 10 James suggests that
ecocriticism is now in its third wave, which is particularly concerned with transnationalism and
anthropocene discourse (8). The Anthropocene has become an indispensable category for critics

8

For more on the development of the environmental humanities, see Deborah Bird Rose, Thom van Dooren,
Matthew Chrulew, Stuart Cooke, Matthew Kearnes, Emily O'Gorman; “Thinking Through the Environment,
Unsettling the Humanities.” Environmental Humanities 1 May 2012; 1 (1): 1–5.
9
Lawrence Buell, The Environmental Imagination: Thoreau, Nature Writing, and the Formation of American
Culture. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1995.
10
Lawrence Buell. The Future of Environmental Criticism: Environmental Crisis and Literary Imagination. WileyBlackwell, 2005.

4

seeking to periodize literature in an age of climate change.11 Nonhuman theory, influenced by
Bruno Latour, has helped ecocritics to question the conventional distinctions between mind and
body, subject and object, nature and culture. 12
While novels that explore themes of environmental disaster are not necessarily specific to
the last thirty years, the contemporary American econovel is notable for its experimentation with
narration. Attempts to develop narrative strategies appropriate to climate change, environmental
injustice, and decreased biodiversity overlap with the waning of the postmodern as an aesthetic
category and a hermeneutic, as well as the coincident rise of the environmental humanities. 13
Experimental narration helps us to re-think nonhuman nature outside the framework of an older
humanism while better understanding the historical specificity of humanist values. The virtue of
experimental narration is that it defamiliarizes attitudes and processes readers might otherwise
take for granted, encouraging them to reexamine humanist assumptions about the nonhuman
world (Herman 2).
Ongoing and urgent conversations in ecocriticism and narrative theory have developed
new, productive ways of looking at narratives, and my dissertation seeks to demonstrate how
contemporary novels complicate older structuralist models of narratology. Gérard Genette and
other structuralist narratologists have sought to codify the moves that happen in narratives and to
classify the ways in which narratives treat space, time, and perspective. 14 Much narration in
contemporary American fiction, however, defies structural and conventional models and—in so
doing—defies how readers are conditioned to think about space, time, the body, and nonhuman

11

See, for instance, Adam Trexler. Anthropocene Fictions: The Novel in a Time of Climate Change. U. of Virginia
P., 2015 and Richard Grusin, editor. Anthropocene Feminism. University of Minnesota Press, 2017
12
See Bruno Latour. We Have Never Been Modern, Harvard UP, 1993 and Richard Grusin, editor. The Nonhuman
Turn. University of Minnesota Press, 2015.
13
On the waning of postmodernism, see Jeremy Green. Late Postmodernism: American Fiction at the Millennium.
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
14
Gerard Genette. Narrative Discourse: An Essay on Method. Trans. Jane A Lewin. Cornell UP, 1980.
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nature.15 Recent narratologists have adapted their models to account for these newer
experimental strategies. Brian Richardson, for example, has codified several experimental
narrative strategies in Unnatural Voices, while Paul Dawson has explored the richness of
traditional and unconventional uses of omniscience in contemporary fiction in his book The
Return of the Omniscient Narrator.16 Dawson’s examination of the omniscient narrator is useful
for understanding Wallace’s idiosyncratic use of omniscient narration in Infinite Jest and the two
together ask us to consider several questions about narrative. Is narration ever really
omniscient? If so, can it be omniscient even if it does not sound omniscient—that is, if the style
of presentation aligns more closely with a character’s voice than a traditional, “well-spoken”
narrator?17 Can ekphrastic description function as narration? What is the relationship between
such seemingly discrete concepts as narrator, narrative, and ecology?
Because the novels I examine in my dissertation explore very different environmental
problems and do so with very different narrative strategies, they are not meant as representative
cases, but—rather—as four different ways that American authors choose to address
environmental crisis in the contemporary novel. Taken as a group, their virtue is in their
difference, not in their representativeness. However, each of these novelists is engaging with the
resurgence of realism in American literary fiction around the year 2000. As I see it, what is

15

For more on experimental narration in postmodern fiction, see Linda Hutcheon. A Poetics of Postmodernism:
History, Theory, Fiction. Routledge, 1988.
16
Brian Richardson. Unnatural Voices: Extreme Narration in Modern and Contemporary Fiction. Columbus: Ohio
State UP, 2006 and Paul Dawson. The Return of the Omniscient Narrator: Authorship and Authority in Twenty-First
Century Fiction. Columbus: The Ohio State UP, 2013.
17
A well-spoken narrator is “a narrator whose mode of expression is a standard (or even elegant) one and functions
as a norm in terms of which the characters’ modes of expression are situated” (105). Gerald Prince. A Dictionary of
Narratology. Revised Ed. Lincoln: U. of Nebraska P., 2003. Narratologists often use the term “well-spoken” to
refer to narrators who write in Standard English, as opposed to those who write in dialect or World Englishes. The
term deserves more critique than it has gotten. For studies that distinguish a well-spoken narrator from a narrator
who is notable for use of dialect, see James E. Caron. Mark Twain, Unsanctified Newspaper Reporter. Columbia: U.
of Missouri P., 2008. Pg. 207 and Stephen M. Ross. Fiction’s Inexhaustible Voice: Speech and Writing in Faulkner.
Athens: U. of Georgia P., 1991.
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unique about each novel I examine in this dissertation is the way that each novelist takes some
problematic aspect of literary realism and works through it in a decidedly non-realist way. In
Freedom, Franzen writes a mostly realist novel that is nonetheless replete with metafictive
moments. Metafiction characterizes much postwar American fiction in the
modernist/postmodernist tradition, and it is often regarded by critics as not realist because it
draws special attention to its own artifice. The most navel-gazing of postmodern fiction does not
really represent reality at all outside of representing the process of representation. Franzen
writes a novel that is realist in many ways but metafictive when it comes to addressing
environmental politics. The metafictive moments in the novel allow Franzen to reflect on the
aesthetic and rhetorical problems associated with writing committed environmentalist fiction
without having to actually negotiate those challenges. While moments involving
environmentalism in his novel have a “meta” quality, Franzen’s dominant aesthetic is still realist.
Millet examines the rational humanist subject of realist fiction. The protagonist of How
the Dead Dream is shown to be less and less rational as the novel progresses. Affect takes over
where reason formerly reigned, and the representation of rational human thought becomes
problematic in the novel. What starts as psychologically realist, coherent thought is warped by
grief and personal growth. Eventually, the narrative cues that distinguish actants within the
narrative fail to make clear distinctions between human actants and other kinds of beings. The
gradual critique of the rational humanist subject serves to momentarily decenter the human as the
focus of the novel. Doing so allows Millet to show readers the ways in which humans have
constructed myths of human exceptionalism to rationalize violence against nonhumans.
Wallace addresses the realist quality of believability. His comic epic Infinite Jest seems
to make few claims to realistic representation, but—within the diegesis—Wallace explores a

7

historical narrative that is both outrageous and true. His strange-but-true historical chronicle
demonstrates how historical truth is embedded in aesthetic representation. More to my point
about fiction and environmental catastrophe, Wallace’s treatment of history’s aesthetic
embeddedness speaks to the unbelievable-yet-true quality of environmental disaster.
Finally, Karen Tei Yamashita takes on the realist quality of representing space and time
in a way that readers experience as lifelike. Her novel gives readers a code with which to
understand the storyworld in terms of time and space. This code is disrupted by the effects of
climate change. Unseasonable weather magically afflicts various locations in the novel, and
distances between locations become elastic as climate change brings them closer together.

Chapter One: Jonathan Franzen’s Freedom, Metafiction, and the Realist Eco-Novel
My first chapter will examine Jonathan Franzen’s 2010 novel Freedom. Jonathan Franzen’s
Freedom examines the neoliberal logics of free market competition and individual freedom in
order to critique the efficacy of large-scale environmental projects—and also to make visible the
inherent conflicts between the entitlements of individual freedom and the sacrifices necessary for
the collective good. Throughout Freedom, Walter Berglund struggles to articulate a practical
environmental policy that does not autocratically infringe on his interlocutors’ individual rights
(as they see them). He also struggles to enact a way of living that coincides with his
environmentalist and humanitarian values that does not conflict too much with his own
engrained sense of entitlement. Franzen renders the import of these struggles coherent through
his narrative strategies, such as extended use of summary to represent a social totality and putting
characters with differing political attitudes in dialogue. Freedom also self-consciously
comments on the problems involved in writing a committed environmentalist novel. Layers of

8

mediation distance readers from objective social problems like climate change and the
consumption of nonrenewable resources. Freedom refers to realistic, complex material
problems, but it does so through metafictively commenting on the inability of the novel to
productively address those same problems. It is an econovel about both the inefficacy of
ecopolitics and the inefficacy of the novel to depict problems in a way that can lead to social
change.

Chapter Two: What’s a Death Worth?: Neoliberalism and Necropolitics in How the Dead Dream
In the second chapter, I take up Lydia Millet’s How the Dead Dream, in which Millet begins
writing a realist novel (though smaller in scope than Franzen’s) with environmentalist themes but
then eventually dispenses with realism as the narrative progresses. This chapter will chart how
Millet’s shift from humanist realism to posthumanist experiment reflects both a change in
narrative strategies and a change in attitudes about the nonhuman. Specifically, the narrator of
How the Dead Dream is initially focused on the doings of a central human character. As the
novel proceeds, however, the narrator and the protagonist gradually take an interest in nonhuman
animals. As the protagonist spends more time with animals and considers the relative values of
their lives and deaths, the radical distinction between the human and the nonhuman erodes. The
narrator takes less care to distinguish between the protagonist and the animals around him. At
the end of the novel, as the protagonist encounters some kind of animal, the novel’s narrator
employs an experimental mode of storytelling that refuses to distinguish between the human
protagonist and the nonhuman actants around him.

Chapter Three: Beyond Interdependence Day: Pyrotechnic Storytelling and the Unbelievable-

9

But-True in David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest
The third chapter will look at David Foster Wallace’s novel Infinite Jest and the ways in which
Wallace addresses the difficulty of narrating the events that produce ecological disaster. In
Infinite Jest, Wallace employs pyrotechnic narration and ekphrasis to mediate between an
implausible (though factual) historical narrative and the version the characters in the novel are
given. The ecological crisis that the characters in Infinite Jest face is narrated alongside a film
version of that narrative. Mario Incandenza makes a puppet-show movie about the political rise
of American President Johnny Gentle and his policy of dumping toxins in Canada. Wallace’s
narrator periodically jumps in to comment on the historical accuracy of Mario’s film. This
commentary frequently takes the form of assurances that Mario’s representation of the ecological
narrative—though appearing to be outlandish and ridiculous—is actually close to historical fact.
In doing so, Wallace maintains the prestige and realism of literary fiction while representing a
dystopian ecological catastrophe. Wallace’s comedy works to legitimize the strange-but-true
narratives of environmental novelty.

Chapter Four: Style as Weather: Narrative Form and Global Warming in Karen Tei Yamashita’s
Tropic of Orange
In my final chapter, I will look at Karen Tei Yamashita’s novel Tropic of Orange and how
Yamashita’s narration disperses the reader’s attention across several environments and agents.
Yamashita addresses the planetary problem of global warming through several characters who
experience its various effects at the local level. In the novel, the Tropic of Cancer becomes
attached to an orange that travels northward to the United States, dragging the climate, people,
and culture of central Mexico with it, literalizing the trope of “climate change” as it travels.

10

Central to my account of Yamashita’s global warming novel is the notion that place and weather
have a profound connection. Yamashita employs magical realist aesthetics to narrate fantastic
events relating to weather. What is interesting about the novel’s treatment of global warming is
how Yamashita’s complex narration enacts a literary mimicry of some of global warming’s
features through form. Global warming disrupts weather patterns common to specific places,
shifting weather historically common to a given place to other places where it may be
uncommon. Global warming also gives rise to weather effects that are unheard of in certain
places or produces degrees and features of weather that have never been common to any place at
all. Yamashita mimics the effects of climate change at the level of form, using the
“HyperContxts” early in the novel to set up readerly expectations about what narrative styles
should be associated with certain characters only to blend discrete styles within the space of the
chapter. Readers use the HyperContexts to inhabit the lives of Yamashita’s characters and get a
sense of what is common to their experience. However, the forms that readers are led to believe
are common to each character’s experience—and the novel’s governing structure more
generally—mimic weather in an era of climate change by shifting, mixing, and producing effects
that are not characteristic of any individual space or character.

In this dissertation, I analyze contemporary American narratives via ecocritical and
narratological reading strategies to highlight how novelists approach environmental crises
through various narrative strategies. The four chapters summarized above allow me to provide
several instances where contemporary American novelists explore environmental crisis with
narrative. I undertake an analysis of these narrative strategies because I think novels are cool,
and they provide a wide tapestry for exploring society’s most pressing concerns. The novels in
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this dissertation allow readers access to the underlying ideologies that produce (and continue to
produce) environmental disaster. These novels show us how we got to where we are
environmentally, but they also suggest through innovative narrative strategies how we might
become more aware of our own conventions. I use narratology as a method of inquiry because
the conventions of thinking are embedded in the conventions of storytelling and attending
closely to the conventions of storytelling can thus open up new ways of thinking about our roles
in environmental crisis. I draw on several traditions of scholars trying to rethink cultural
products’ relationship to the environment and those who explore the conventions of narrative.
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Franzen’s Freedom, Metafiction, and the Realist Eco-Novel
Jonathan Franzen’s Freedom examines the neoliberal logics of free market competition
and individual freedom in order to critique the efficacy of large-scale environmental projects—
and also to make visible the inherent conflicts between the entitlements of individual freedom
and the sacrifices necessary for the collective good. Throughout Freedom, Walter Berglund
struggles to articulate a practical environmental policy that does not autocratically infringe on his
interlocutors’ individual rights (as they see them). He also struggles to enact a way of living that
coincides with his environmentalist and humanitarian values that does not conflict too much with
his own engrained sense of entitlement. Franzen renders the import of these struggles coherent
through his narrative strategies, such as extended use of summary to represent a social totality
and putting characters with differing political attitudes in dialogue. Freedom also selfconsciously comments on the problems involved in writing a committed environmentalist novel.
Layers of mediation distance readers and characters from objective social problems like climate
change and the consumption of nonrenewable resources. Freedom refers to realistic, complex
material problems, but it does so through metafictively commenting on the inability of the novel
to productively address those same problems. It is an econovel about both the inefficacy of
ecopolitics and the inefficacy of the novel to depict problems in a way that can lead to social
change.
In Freedom, Walter Berglund wants to do the right thing. Unlike other over-consuming
Americans, Walter wants to do right by the natural environment, but neoliberalism gets in the
way. David Harvey’s much-cited definition of neoliberalism provides the foundation for how I
will be using the term: “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human wellbeing can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an
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institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free
trade” (2).18 The individual-centric philosophy thrives on the valorization of competition as an
essential value.19 According to Harvey, neoliberalism ascended in the 1980s in the United States
and has been the dominant political-economic ideology since the adoption of the Washington
Consensus policies in the 1990s (13). The rise of neoliberalism overlaps with the narrative
Franzen writes of the Berglund family in Freedom. I use Harvey’s account of neoliberalism
because it emphasizes the pervasive ideology of individual freedom that characters in Freedom
cannot escape, even when they are aware that their decisions are detrimental to the public good.
Before exploring the intersections of neoliberalism and environmentalist politics in Freedom,
however, Franzen registered his skepticism towards large-scale environmentalism in realist terms
in his second novel Strong Motion.

CORPORATE-SPONSORED ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS IN STRONG MOTION
In Freedom, as in all novels that try to address the problem of ecological catastrophe, Franzen is
faced with the problem of how to represent the complex causes of ecological catastrophe and the
varied consequences of myriad agents and actants. Franzen faced the same problem in his 1992
novel Strong Motion where he addressed the problem of complexity by using a reader stand-in to
receive the explanation of an expert. Franzen introduces the narrative problems of
understandability and believability as they relate to making sense of environmental catastrophe
stories. Outsider/romantic hero Louis Holland moves to Boston just as a series of minor

In In the Ruins of Neoliberalism, Wendy Brown notes that neoliberalism “is most commonly associated with a
bundle of policies privatizing public ownership and services, radically reducing the social state, leashing labor,
deregulating capital, and producing a tax-and-tariff-friendly climate to direct foreign investors.”
19
According to Michel Foucault, under neoliberalism, market principles become governing principles (32). One
consequence of governing with market principles is that the governed subject becomes less a classical liberal subject
concerned with “exchange and the satisfaction of needs” and more a subject characterized by competition (Brown).
18
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earthquakes begin to rattle the city. The causes of the earthquakes mystify experts and are thus
chalked up as rare anomalies. Louis becomes the conduit through which readers take in the
expert seismographic information Franzen wants to communicate. Renee Seitcheck explains to
Louis her theory of how a chemical and textile corporation, Sweeting-Aldren, has instigated the
earthquakes by dumping toxic waste down a well and inducing seismicity.
Strong Motion also employs the information available via mass media to convey the
necessary plot points readers can use to make sense of the expert testimony. Louis, in place of
the reader, pours over The Boston Globe to get a basic understanding of what the earthquakes
actually consist of and the expert consensus as reported to mass media outlets. In an incredibly
convenient turn of the plot, Louis begins dating Renee Seitcheck, a seismology graduate student
working at Harvard, who further explains to Louis (and the reader) the unlikeliness of the recent
earthquakes in Massachusetts. In an equally incredible turn of the plot, one of the recent
earthquakes kills an enigmatic relation of Louis’s, Rita Kernaghan, who was Louis’s
grandfather’s secretary and then wife. We learn later that Rita possessed stock in SweetingAldren that transfers to Louis’s mother upon Rita’s death, thus implicating Louis’s mother in the
increasingly serious earthquakes. Sweeting-Aldren’s environmental record is impeccable, we
learn from Louis’s reading of the Globe, and presents a set of problems for Louis and Renee.
How can a small group of people, with few resources, “prove” the guilt of a major corporation of
environmental injustice? If proved, how can academic research convince the general populace to
take steps to prepare themselves for earthquakes when the consensus in mass media outlets is
that the earthquakes are merely anomalies? In the same vein, how can this research effectuate
the stoppage of Sweeting-Aldren’s crimes, either through the legal system or by other tactics?
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Finally, should Louis even blow the whistle when his mother’s $22 million in stock will certainly
depreciate if he does?
The nature of responsibility is complicated in Strong Motion as it addresses what Rob
Nixon calls the “slow violence” of certain environmental catastrophes: “a violence that occurs
gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and
space, a violence of attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all” (2). Slow
violence serves as a counterpoint to how violence is usually understood—“an event or action that
is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and . . . erupting into instant sensational
visibility” (2). In Strong Motion, the small-scale earthquakes in the Boston area do not cause
enough damage to be major media events. Furthermore, Sweeting-Aldren’s claim that it is
burning its waste instead of dumping it and inducing seismicity does not turn heads, despite the
statistically low probability of several earthquakes happening in the Boston area in a short time
frame, because the damage caused by the earthquakes does not reach of the threshold of media
saturation that makes it necessary to investigate the possibility that Sweeting-Aldren is lying.
Furthermore, the “crime” of dumping waste had been committed steadily for a long time without
major catastrophe. It is only recently that the consequences of actions perpetrated silently and
out-of-sight decades before come to be lethal actions. The company is to blame, but what does
that mean exactly? Who should pay and for what exactly?
At the end of Strong Motion, Renee’s research has been corroborated by other experts
and is getting into major media outlets, but the Boston area is in ruins and Sweeting-Aldren’s
CEOs have passed the blame, taken the money, and fled the country. The slow violence of
environmental crime “settles into a conventional potboiler convention, complete with climactic
violence” (Rubins). Franzen dispenses with a narrative of slow violence and indulges in the
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depiction of a spectacular, disastrous earthquake, connecting decades-old crimes discovered by
his characters to easily-observable, material consequences. While Strong Motion does not depict
a large-scale environmental project like Freedom does, it registers Franzen’s skepticism that we
can prepare ourselves for the disasters of human-created environmental catastrophe.
Indeed, the similarities in approach tie Strong Motion and Freedom closely together.
Like Freedom, Strong Motion is told in a way that takes as its starting point the third-person
omniscient narrator traditionally associated with realist novels (Dawson 4). Indeed, Strong
Motion is so traditionally realist that, despite its incorporation of expert discourses typical of the
postmodern encyclopedic novel, it rarely reflects back on its own narrative performance. In this
way, Strong Motion is both identifiably realist and clearly in a tradition of postmodern systems
novels (Burn 75). Strong Motion might then accurately be called an eco-novel, but Freedom
aspires to comment on the very practice of telling environmental narratives; it might be termed a
meta-eco-novel. Freedom is also, however, uniquely aware of its historical moment, after the
rise and takeover of neoliberalism in the United States, in a way that Strong Motion, for all its
commentary on corporate wrongdoing, is not.
Ultimately, Freedom takes a pessimistic stance, suggesting that the capitalist forces
operating in the twenty-first century make meaningful environmentalism on a large scale alwaysalready compromised or downright impossible. “Carbon Capture,” Franzen’s essay from the
New Yorker, begins by suggesting that combatting global warming has been futile thus far and is
likely to be futile in the future. Comparing the earth to a terminal patient, Franzen wants us to
make our final years as rich as possible by making a concerted effort to maintain what
biodiversity we still have and continuing to combat large, global issues like carbon emissions in
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small, local, personally-meaningful ways. Franzen’s brand of conservation, one tinged with faith
in earth’s near-doom, permeates Freedom.

FREEDOM AND CAPITALIST REALISM
While Franzen’s early work is often characterized as influenced by postmodern writers of
systems novels, his later work—post-Strong Motion—is often characterized as almost
prototypically realist. Both categorizations are problematic because they miss how realist his
“postmodern” novels are and how postmodern his “realist” novels are. Rather than read
Freedom as an eco-novel, as I do, Kathy Knapp reads Franzen’s book in the tradition of post9/11 suburban novels and white male midlife crisis fiction responding to the rise of
neoliberalism. She sees Walter as the protagonist of Freedom in a tradition of white, uppermiddle class male characters facing a post-war crisis in masculine authority. She reads Walter’s
environmentalism as a middle-class privilege and notes Walter’s hypocrisy with regard to such
issues as population growth and carbon emissions.
In its unremittingly grim account of the terrible personal, geopolitical, and environmental
costs of an ethos predicated on the quintessentially ‘suburban’ values of autonomy and
upward mobility, Freedom testifies to the damning failure of success. But it also
radically locates in ruin, loss, and despondency the basis for an aesthetic whose ‘social
usefulness’ resides in its unwillingness to contribute to the happily-ever-after fairy tale of
the elusive American Dream. (57).
Implicit in Knapp’s analysis is the necessary intersection of Franzen’s way-of-telling in Freedom
and the values expressed by his characters. The “social usefulness” of realism is contingent on
its willingness to testify to “the damning failure of success” and the “unremittingly grim”
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consequences of suburban American values. Knapp does not delve into what exactly Franzen’s
aesthetic consists of, so she misses the idiosyncrasies of Franzen’s narration—and what it has to
do with “run, loss, and despondency”.
What Knapp characterizes vaguely as “an aesthetic” Franzen employs, we might more
accurately follow Alison Shonkwiler and Leigh Claire La Berge in terming “capitalist realism.” 20
For Shonkwiler and La Berge, capitalist realism is an aesthetic historically situated at the waning
of postmodernism’s cultural dominance and deriving from the rise of neoliberal austerity
measures (1-3). In their introduction to Reading Capitalist Realism, Shonkwiler and La Berge
note that the concept of literary realism needs an update to account for several factors that make
contemporary realist novels unlike nineteenth century realist novels:
there is no doubt that the realisms of today do not operate in the same world of conditions
and demands as a nineteenth-century novel and cannot make the same kinds of claims to
truth. Even viewed from entirely within a literary-historical context, modes of realism
today are not clearly or straightforwardly alignable with the realisms of previous
literatures. (8)
The authors follow Joshua Clover in questioning the capacity of the central tenets of realism (as
Clover sees them) to “explain the world around us” (8): “an investment in scenes of the
everyday, an accumulation of detail, and/or the moral encounter of the individual with social
forces” (9), as well as the realist concepts of “class consciousness, social totality, and historical
transition” (10). Shonkwiler and La Berge seek to move beyond the realist-modernist dialectic
as it relates to narrative modes, arguing “capitalist realism is unstable with regard to its own
mode” (11). Realist novels are not necessarily characterized by free indirect discourse and
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See also Mark Fisher Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?, Zero Books, 2009.
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omniscient third-person narration in opposition to modernist first-person narrators (Shonkwiler
and La Berge 13, 10). However, realist novels like Freedom engage in a post-postmodern
commentary on the nature of traditional realist omniscience in fiction, Paul Dawson argues, in
response to “the decline in the cultural authority of the novel” (5). In short, “capitalist realism
calls into question what realism is” (Shonkwiler and La Berge 16). Shonkwiler and La Berge’s
introduction makes several references to Jonathan Franzen without ever actually analyzing any
of his works within a capitalist realist framework, but his novel Freedom is at once realist and at
the same time a challenge to realism as it is traditionally defined. The challenges that narration
in Freedom poses to traditional realism are visible with regard to Freedom’s treatment of issues
of environmentalism.
Because Franzen’s way of telling is so crucial to what he has to say about
environmentalism, it is necessary to describe his aesthetic more thoroughly and specifically than
broad labels like “realism” can. Caren Irr calls him “pre-eminent” among “contemporary realist
novelists in the U.S. who have heeded [the call to use narrative to help readers come to terms
with the Anthropocene],” but she does an admirable job of actually describing how Franzen’s
aesthetic works (n. pag.). Irr classifies Franzen’s realism in the genre “novels of habit,” that is,
fiction that “establishes character through accounts of routinized behavior” (n. pag.), which Irr
maps in rich detail:
Many of [Franzen’s] descriptions begin as conventional realist passages; they anchor a
character in concretely observable actions and derive much of their pathos from structural
ironies surrounding motives. However hysterically overloaded with information about
externalities Franzen’s narration might be, the psychology only remains comic to the
degree that it suggests an inner life available to reason, rather than one in which all
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human activity is reduced to tragic determinations. Although risking farce, Franzen’s
realism morphs into satire, since sane and reasoned cognition remains a condition for
self-improvement in his writing. This commitment to reason as a fundamental
responsibility ultimately defines Franzen’s characters. His satires result from the reader’s
vicarious experience of absurdly habitual actions that can be changed for the better.
Franzen’s comedies of habit rest on an ethical foundation that takes the cultivation of
habit of virtue as a primary goal. (n. pag.)
In other words, while Franzen has his aesthetic peculiarities, some of the features of his writing
are markedly realist. His narration offers realist thick description (“hysterically overloaded with
information”), the depiction of relatable human psychology and decision-making, and relies on
identification for pathos (n. pag.). This decision-making is repeatedly complicated by what Irr
calls “[e]ntrapment in habitual double binds” that plague Franzen’s “ethically weakest
characters” (n. pag.). Indeed, Adam Kelly notes that The Corrections (2001) and Freedom
(2010) are “generally regarded as standard bearers for the contemporary realist novel” and writes
as though the last word has been said on the matter (n. pag.).21 According to Kelly, “it is
difficult to argue against a reading of Freedom that sees it as sustaining the notion of the liberal
subject that also underlies classic nineteenth-century realist fiction” (n. pag.). While Kelly is
content to read Franzen as a realist and Irr notes that Franzen is fundamentally a realist with
several notable forays into satire, neither links Franzen’s narration to his environmental
concerns.
Even so, many critics (Irr excepted) seem reluctant to pin down what exactly is so realist
about Franzen’s realism. What is at stake in this distinction is the valorization of textual

Kelly writes that Franzen is “no doubt the preeminent example” of “novelists often presumed by critics to uphold
the canons of realism” (n. pag.).
21
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practices that often fall under broad labels like “realist” or “experimental” when these practices
actually operate within these categories quite awkwardly. Kelly discusses a review of Jeffrey
Eugenides’s The Marriage Plot in which the reviewer notes “coy metafictional gestures” that
“never break the realist frame” –experimental strategies that do not generically exclude the text
from a place in the realist canon (n. pag.), yet these terms “metafictional” and “realist” are often
regarded as mutually exclusive, opposing aesthetics.22 Kelly and Irr can identify Franzen’s
dominant storytelling mode, but they also note that this mode is not all-encompassing.
To understand what is unique about Franzen’s way of telling, it is useful to refer to the
work of Mark McGurl. McGurl provides a helpful corrective to this common separation by
applying a theory of reflexive modernity. According to theories of reflexive modernity, “the
postindustrial economies of the developed world” have tended towards a “multivalent social
dynamic of self-observation . . . over the course of the twentieth century, and in the postwar
period in particular” (McGurl 12). While the “self-observation” of postmodern literary
production was once viewed as the idiosyncratic hallmark of a niche within postwar literature
more broadly, McGurl argues that we can see “self-observation” functioning throughout literary
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In his review of Freedom, Sam Tanenhaus, former editor of The New York Times Book Review and perhaps
Franzen’s biggest fan, hints at without explicitly identifying Freedom as a realist novel. He calls Freedom, like The
Corrections before it, “a capacious but intricately ordered narrative that in its majestic sweep seems to gather up
every fresh datum of our shared millennial life” without ever using the terms realist or realism (Tanenhaus). But
Freedom is more than merely a great database—any blustering postmodernist can make one of those—because it is
like The Corrections, in which “the data flowed through the arteries of narrative, just as it had done in the novels of
Dickens and Tolstoy, Bellow and Mann. Like those giants, Franzen attended to the quiet drama of the interior life
and also recorded its fraught transactions with the public world” (Tanenhaus). In other words, Franzen’s novel
flouts fashionable postmodernism to embrace a glorious realist tradition concerned with social problems and the
interiority of fully developed characters. As Tanehaus puts it, “the Berglunds, introduced as caricatures, gradually
assume the gravity of fully formed people.” The real people, the “journalistic touches” of detail, the depiction of
“the world we thought we knew”—these qualities are what make Freedom a realist novel. What Tanenhaus does
not seem to notice in Freedom (or at least emphasize in his review) is that these qualities could easily apply to the
postmodern databases he so detests. Indeed, Franzen’s narration demonstrates that, for as much as his reviewers
compare him to Tolstoy, Freedom cannot escape some of the metafictional awareness of Barth and Coover.
Franzen’s depiction of neoliberalism and environmental decay in Freedom should thus be considered with both
traditions in mind.
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texts of seemingly disparate literary genres (12). McGurl moves beyond the realist-experimental
dialectic by identifying three categories of postwar American literary fiction: technomodernism,
high cultural pluralism, and lower-middle-class-modernism (32). Fiction in each of these
categories exercise the self-observation characteristic of reflexive modernity, but each has its
own themes and concerns. Technomodernism aligns most closely with postmodern fiction as it
is usually thought of, that is, as literature that addresses through form and content society’s
relation to information technology. High cultural pluralism retains modernism’s “high” ideals by
focusing on “the experience of cultural difference and the authenticity of the ethnic voice” (32).
Lower-middle-class modernism tends to reflect on “economic and other forms of insecurity and
cultural anomie” (32). I see Franzen’s work (after his first novel) as operating simultaneously
within the traditions of technomodernism and lower-middle-class modernism. Like McGurl, I
see the realist-experimental dialectic as helpful to identify certain literary practices but also
inadequate to account for postwar novels that are by turns realist in form and self-conscious,
even metafictive. McGurl’s formulation helps to show how Franzen’s novel can be at once a
realist novel and a metafictive one as well, as it operates in two of the major American postwar
novelistic traditions McGurl identifies.
Margaret Hunt Gram only considers one tradition, however, when she notes that
reviewers of Freedom found the novel’s ecopolitics awkwardly integrated into the text through
lengthy speeches by Walter Berglund (1). She observes, “Freedom’s overpopulation-content and
its other political content live in two different diegetic registers”; while other political content
resides in the story, the overpopulation-content resides only in Walter’s discourse (2). “Freedom
treats unsustainable growth discursively rather than through story,” she argues, “because it is
preoccupied with the possibility that an antigrowth politics might be incompatible with the
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affective engines that drive narrative fiction in general and with the formal mechanisms available
to literary realism in particular” (2). Franzen struggles to avoid didacticism while still revealing
“totalizing systems and problems through individual characters who experience those systems
and problems in the historical present” (2). Gram suggests that the neoliberal “reproductive
futurist logic” of Freedom is incompatible with its antigrowth politics (8). She classifies
Franzen’s novel as committed to Lukácsian realism and, with this in mind, finds two problems—
one of temporality and one of scale—in which Lukácsian realism is an unworkable aesthetic
given Franzen’s political concerns: “the temporal difficulty is that unsustainable growth is a
problem that, by its own logic, will be fully actualized only in the future rather than in the
historical present” (9). Furthermore, “the scale difficulty” Gram notes is due to the fact that the
problem of overpopulation is not a problem that can be represented synecdochically. She writes,
“No one person’s experience can stand in for the social forces at issue, and so to represent the
problem at the individual level is not to represent it at all” (9). Gram suggests that the
proliferation of post-apocalyptic contemporary novels may be in response to the same problems
of temporality and scale that Franzen is struggling with in Freedom. The problem of
representing the danger of population growth in a realist novel, she argues, may be a conduit to
critiquing economic growth or “growth as a general matter,” given the apparent ridiculousness of
Walter’s population growth crankery. Economic growth is part of the plot of Freedom, but
unsustainable or runaway growth is not (14). Ultimately, Freedom fails to produce a critique of
growth outside of discourse, but Gram suggests that it hints at a hopeful survival of the
neoliberal era of growth with its description of migrating songbirds (18).
Gram’s argument, persuasive as it is, hinges on the understanding that Freedom should
be (or rather, is best) measured against an ideal of Lukácsian realism, rather than a newer
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capitalist realism. Although Freedom is, indeed, a realist novel, Gram seems more concerned
with what Franzen’s novel does than how the novel does it. For instance, Gram does not
mention the way Freedom is told except to observe the superabundance of ideological content in
Walter’s discourse. Neither does Gram address the fact that Freedom is told in several distinct
ways in five distinct sections. These various ways of telling do not conflict with realism as such
but are nonetheless significant in how they allow readers multiple ways of seeing the problems
that Franzen addresses and Gram critiques. To treat Freedom as uniformly coherent with a
monolithic realism is then to miss how postmodern the novel actually is.

NARRATION IN FREEDOM
Examining Freedom with special attention to narrative structure will make clearer how Franzen’s
grim suspicion of the efficacy of large-scale environmental projects intersect with his realist
mode of representation, even as he self-consciously comments on his narrative practice to
perform an ongoing meta-critique of environmentalist narratives. Readers are introduced to
Walter’s environmental politics at the very beginning of Freedom. The chapter is oddly
focalized, without the assurance of an all-seeing omniscient narrator or the idiosyncratic “take”
of an individual’s perspective. 23 But to describe the narration as merely “limited” in the
traditional sense is not quite accurate either. Rather, the first chapter of Freedom (“Good
Neighbors”) is narrated in the third-person mode, but the focalization is communal, as if from the
perspective of “the urban gentry of Ramsey Hill” in St. Paul, Minnesota (3). Readers get hints of
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In Narrative Discourse, Genette brings up the problem of focalization to complicate what he sees as simplistic
accounts of point of view (186). He notes that some narrators are obviously omniscient, but they choose to relay
only information available to a certain character or characters, artificially limiting their access for aesthetic purposes.
It is necessary then to distinguish between an omniscient narrator who narrates an entire novel and a focalizing
character, who may govern the information readers receive for a portion of a story but not actually tell that story
(188). In this way omniscient narrators adopt the perspective of a particular character for a section of a narrative
through focalization.
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Walter’s past as people who knew Walter before he moved to Washington, D.C. try to reconcile
memories of the man they knew with an unflattering report published in The New York Times.
They remember Walter as “greener than Greenpeace,” but the Times report accuses him of such
un-green crimes as “conniving with the coal industry” (3). In this way, Franzen introduces the
novel’s central irony, the contradiction that the narrative will not resolve but will clarify: how
can a committed environmentalist also be a coal industry lackey? The focalization oscillates
slightly between general community knowledge on Ramsey Hill and the more privileged
knowledge of the Berglunds’ close neighbors, but it never wavers far enough to assume the
authority of omniscience or the subjectivity of an individual with situated knowledge. We learn,
for instance, that for years Walter worked as a lawyer for 3M and had several encounters with
local celebrities, after which he “surprisingly” changed jobs to become a development officer for
the Nature Conservatory (21). Franzen’s narrator reports “Nobody except the Paulsens had
suspected him of harboring such reserves of discontent, but Walter was no less enthusiastic about
nature than he was about culture, and the only outward change in his life was his new scarcity at
home on weekends” (21). There’s a hint here of disparity between the confident labeling of
Walter as “greener than Greenpeace” and being surprised when he changes jobs to pursue
environmentalist interests. Beyond these hints, we do not learn anything more about Walter’s
environmentalism. Ramsey Hill, like Sam Tanenhaus and other critics, is obviously more
interested in the juicy family drama surrounding the Berglunds than in Walter’s ecopolitics.
Already, in the first chapter, environmentalism has to compete with other narratives for the
community’s attention and is thus relegated to a quirk of a single character instead of a totalizing
social problem that has an impact on everyone. As Walter’s friend Richard Katz later reflects, he
“supposed it was inevitable that his friend became one of those people who carried around

26

laminated literature” (218). Gram’s critique of scale shows itself to be particularly apt because
Walter himself cannot embody all global environmental concerns at once but must if Franzen is
to actually address environmental disaster in all of its complexity. Characters, as well as readers,
are alienated from the reality of environmental problems.
In the first chapter of Freedom, Franzen presents focalization as a problem of knowledge.
In “Good Neighbors,” we often read sentences that start like “Barrier Street knew” or “it was
known” that later source communal knowledge with phrases like “the mothers said” or “nobody
could say” (14, 5, 10, 17). The foregrounding of problems of knowledge in this way points to
the insignificance of Walter’s personal environmentalism. As Kathy Knapp puts it,
“Unquestionably, this first chapter offers an intentionally reductive portrait of characters that the
novel will subsequently complicate” (53). Walter has not led by example because his neighbors
merely mark his ecopolitics as a harmless affectation. Franzen’s narrative strategy highlights the
communal and shared, and—in so doing—demonstrates what is not shared, what is idiosyncratic
or weird. The lack of interiority here deliberately passes by Walter’s fervent environmentalism
to show how little impact he has made in his own community. Walter is radical enough to be
known around the neighborhood as “greener than Greenpeace,” but no occasion makes this a
narratable characteristic unless his family is the object of gossip and he is himself suspected of
hypocrisy.
Where the first section of Freedom explores the limits of collective knowledge, the
second section poses the problem of representing serious political convictions like
environmentalism in the early neoliberal, high postmodern era obsessed with satire and irony.
This section, “Mistakes Were Made: Autobiography of Patty Berglund by Patty Berglund
(Composed at Her Therapist’s Suggestion),” is exactly what it purports to be, except that Patty
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writes her autobiography in an affected third-person mode. Here Patty, Walter’s wife, attempts
to compose her version of her own life’s story, including her family drama and Walter’s troubles,
while attempting to distance herself from the subjectivity of first-person narration. She tries to
look at her life objectively. Like “Good Neighbors,” Patty’s “Autobiography” stops short of
omniscience but tries to go beyond modernist/postmodernist relativity. Contrary to Knapp’s
reading and my own, James Phelan reads Patty as “the chief protagonist” of Freedom, and
indeed Walter does not show up until over thirty pages into Patty’s narrative, when she is a
student-athlete at the University of Minnesota (Phelan 238, Freedom 66). Walter is not
associated with environmentalism until almost thirty more pages have passed (93). After Patty
has an injury and gets to know Walter because he visits her at the hospital, Patty finds that
“Walter burned with all sorts of earnest and peculiar views”—many of which are
environmentalist (93). He “approved of the Islamic revolution in Iran, which he hoped would
lead to better energy conservation in the United States,” as well as population control and
“rendering the passenger car obsolete” (93). Patty herself is “not very political,” so Walter’s
investment in current affairs seems merely like a hobby than anything that actually affects her
personally (94). People like Walter are interested in “Energy conservation,” but they can hardly
expect people like Patty to care as much as they do. These nuggets of information about Walter
take the form of declarations of truth, but by the time we read them—over sixty pages into
Patty’s narrative—the affected sheen of omniscience has worn off, and they come off as
subjective, personal judgements couched in the language of objectivity.
The conceit Franzen develops in Patty’s section, third-person omniscient narration that is
really just subjective, embodied first-person narration in disguise, is not the only way Franzen
comments on environmentalism’s ability to appeal to people who are “not very political.”
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Patty’s “Autobiography” provides Franzen with a forum to begin metafictively commenting on
his own strategies as an ecologically-conscious writer. Patty relates the banter between Walter
and his sexy, punk singer roommate Richard Katz. Walter and Richard joke about the problem
of converting environmentalist and anti-population growth messages into rock music, but the
blatantly ideological, agitprop-y titles render the effect corny and obvious (102). “‘The fuelefficiency song’”, “‘The public-transportation song’” and several others bring out Richard’s
postmodern sarcasm (102). These ridiculous songs function, according to Gram, collectively as
a “figure for the novel Franzen chose not to write: a figure for art gone astray, for misguidedly
propagandistic art about a misguidedly misarticulated politics” (3). I read these songs as
evidence of Franzen’s own self-conscious commentary on narrativizing social concerns; to
become too political is to sacrifice artistry and a good story; environmentalist fervor alone cannot
power a novel. What becomes abundantly clear is that Patty respects Walter’s earnest
convictions, but she is really just interested in hooking up with Richard. What she notices and
appreciates about Walter is not his environmentalism—or any of his political views—but rather
his general likeability and abstract political conviction.24 Walter and Richard joke about
environmentalism’s disadvantage as an unsexy political stance, but their conversation, to the
listening Patty, dramatizes the stakes involved in this unsexiness. Patty is enamored with
Richard, the charismatic singer, while Walter struggles to keep her attention, especially with
Richard standing right there. The problem of environmental awareness is thus a problem of
market share; environmentalism is figured as the frumpy Walter, competing with the much sexier
Richard, who represents mass media star-power charisma—cool itself.

Later, Richard tells Patty about “Walter’s college years” in which he organized symposia on environmentalist
issues like overpopulation, and she gets a firmer sense of how serious Walter is about his political convictions (109).
24
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In Patty’s “Autobiography,” Franzen metafictively reflects on the consequences of
getting too political for an unprepared audience. In the third chapter of Patty’s “Autobiography,”
we get a glimpse of just how ridiculous Walter’s political convictions can be made to seem
without sexiness to back them up—or even the charm of abstract conviction. After marrying
Walter, Patty introduces him to her family when they all go out to dinner. Walter talks to Patty’s
professional Democrat mother about the “Club of Rome,” an organization “devoted to exploring
the limits of growth,” and the philosophy behind his anti-growth stance (121). This, too, is a
metafictive moment. Franzen betrays anxiety about inserting environmental politics into a novel
that thrives on juicy domestic drama—even as the anxiety about politics works to generate that
same drama. Patty’s family does not understand Walter’s earnestness; he gets preachier and
stauncher; Patty’s family move from confusion to subtle, snide remarks. To Patty, Walter’s
conviction becomes an embarrassment when her family prefer frivolity and light conversation
(123). Patty’s mother struggles to find an appropriate word to describe Walter later, settling for
“autocratic” to account for Walter’s radical politics (123, italics Franzen’s). In this scene,
serious environmentalism shows itself to be so far outside of the boundaries of the stances taken
by either Republicans or Democrats as to seem almost lunatic. Walter, as a spokesman for
environmentalism and anti-growth messages, sounds crazy in a room full of politicians and
regular civilians unused to radical thinking. Franzen’s metafiction demonstrates alienating an
audience that is not fully prepared to receive environmentalist messages, messages that need to
be rendered carefully by a charismatic spokesperson to hit home. If Franzen-as-novelist is akin
to Walter, as I argue he is in many ways, then this scene suggests that Franzen fears he may do
more damage than good by alienating a potentially receptive audience, like Patty and her family,
by getting too political with his forum.

30

This anxiety is borne out over the next hundred pages where Franzen seems to avoid
metafictive treatments of environmental politics, instead focusing on a more accessible and
traditional infidelity plot. After the dinner with Patty’s family, Walter’s ecopolitics disappear for
thirty pages of Patty’s narrative as Patty and Walter build a family in St. Paul, Minnesota.
Walter fades into the background as Patty becomes increasingly focused on her children,
especially her son Joey. Readers have to be reminded that Walter “quit 3M and joined the
Nature Conservancy” as a side-note to Patty’s description of her ongoing infatuation with
Richard Katz (153). She cheats on Walter with Richard, and Richard writes an album’s worth of
songs about Patty that makes him a star. In what Patty interprets as a competitive gesture,
Walter creates the “Cerulean Mountain Trust” with “megamillionaire Vin Haven” through the
Nature Conservancy, but Patty can summarize these major career moves in one page at the end
of her “Autobiography” because she mostly just notices Walter’s travelling, her son’s drama, and
her own guilt for cheating on her husband with Richard (186). Narrating her life story for over
one hundred pages makes clear just how non-totalizing environmental catastrophe feels, how
easily it fades in and out of one’s attention and becomes associated with individuals who take it
more seriously than Patty does. Her “Autobiography” also reveals Franzen metafictively
working through his predicament as a politically-committed novelist. His narrative choices
demonstrate why it is so difficult for unpopular environmentalist political projects to gain
traction. Patty stands in for sympathetic potential readers who can be put off by an over-eager
novelist pushing an unsexy political agenda.

“2004” AND ENVIRONMENTAL P.R.
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Even when the novel shifts the narrative away from Patty’s faux-objective focalization,
environmentalism still remains aligned almost exclusively with Walter. The most traditionally
realist section of Freedom is the third and longest section, “2004.” Even so, Franzen’s crafty,
idiosyncratic use of third-person omniscient narrator, free-indirect discourse, summary, and
dialogue work metafictively to comment on the difficulty of finding a novelistic mode likely to
mobilize environmental activism and retain artistic integrity. Third-person omniscient narration
alternates focalization between Walter, Richard, and Joey. These three characters are faced with
various ethical dilemmas concerning how to live a virtuous life. James Phelan accurately notes
that “it is during this section that Franzen does the most to explicitly link the lives of the
Berglunds to larger historical events and concerns, especially the Iraq War and
environmentalism” (243).
The subtitle of the first section of “2004,” “Mountaintop Removal,” foregrounds the
chapter’s emphasis on the historical problems of environmental degradation and energy
consumption, but Franzen addresses these themes through third-person omniscient narration and
direct discourse full of exposition. The section begins by situating Richard Katz in the tenuous
post-success time when he should be recording a follow-up to his recent breakthrough album
(191). After his affair with Patty and writing a critically-acclaimed album about it, Richard drifts
away from Walter. When Walter calls to reestablish contact, their conversation, like most of the
conversations between Richard and Walter for the rest of the section, serves to update readers on
Walter’s current status. Franzen crams exposition into Walter’s discourse, and readers—in the
place of Richard—re-learn about Walter’s environmentalist plans (206-7). Richard agrees to
meet with Walter and his assistant Lalitha about a proposal for “Saving the planet,” in which
they plan to involve Richard (207). The momentarily limited third-person perspective positions
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the reader with Richard as experts explain complicated scientific and political ideas to him, much
like Franzen’s narrative strategy in Strong Motion. Walter now works for Vin Haven, “a big oiland-gas guy” (209). The free-indirect discourse (even though it is focalized through Richard)
mimics Walter’s speaking without having to put several pages on end in quotes as Walter
explains his situation to Richard (and us). As a result, the seemingly objective summaries
provided for us by an omniscient narrator are actually heavily influenced by Walter’s
perspective; indeed, Walter’s language creeps into these descriptions to remind us that we are
privy to a particular perspective, not objective truth. Or is this Richard’s language? After all,
this section of the chapter started with Richard’s focalization. Ultimately, then, what we read is
an omniscient performance of Richard’s focalization summarizing Walter’s speeches. While the
commentary is subtle, Franzen undercuts the authority of omniscient narration by sneaking in
hints that the discourse is subjective and situated. This undercutting is important because it
shows Franzen being aware of the novelist’s temptation to proselytize. He is willing to put
environmental rhetoric in Walter’s mouth, but he insists on placing a character next to him who
can listen to that rhetoric and call it crazy. The environmental rhetoric is Walter’s in the direct
discourse, but the critique is also in Walter’s voice.
When Walter and Richard meet, Franzen relies heavily on two strategies to further the
novel’s environmental plot: summary filtered through free-indirect discourse and exposition
crammed into direct discourse. We learn that the multimillionaire Vin Haven decides “to blow
more than half his total wad on the preservation of a single bird species, the cerulean warbler”
which is “the fastest-declining songbird in North America” (210). The seemingly convenient
alliance between Haven and environmentalists is complicated by money. Haven plans to create a
colossal nature reserve in West Virginia for the warbler that he will be allowed to mine coal via
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mountaintop removal.25 The venture is obviously risky for environmentalists because they might
be lending their name to a disaster. Other environmentalists have refused to participate in the
scheme, but Walter is willing to make concessions to the coal interests if it means that he can do
some environmental good saving birds.
The summaries that Franzen uses to bring readers up to speed have several distinct
qualities. Richard’s free-indirect discourse makes sure to attribute the summary to Walter. 26
Furthermore, the use of contractions and emphasis on Walter’s unique place within the project
highlight the narrative mediation filtering information for Richard and the reader. Walter is the
subject of several sentences in this seemingly objective summary. Between long summaries and
direct discourse relating to the project from Walter or Lalitha, the free-indirect discourse chimes
in, commenting on Richard’s thoughts on the sexual tension in the room, reminding readers
that—indeed—all the information we’re receiving is “filtered” through Richard. The novel is
constantly conjuring and dispelling objectivity in a narrative method that is recognizably realist
but that also consistently embeds perspective in free-indirect discourse. I point out this finicky,

“The cerulean warbler, Walter said, bred exclusively in mature temperate hardwood forests, with a stronghold in
the central Appalachians. There was a particularly healthy population in southern West Virginia, and Vin Haven,
with his ties to the nonrenewable energy industry, had seen an opportunity to partner with coal companies to create a
very large, permanent private reserve for the warbler and other threatened hardwood species. The coal companies
had reason to fear that the warbler would soon be listed under the Endangered Species Act, with potentially
deleterious effects on their freedom to cut down forests and blow up mountains. Vin believed that they could be
persuaded to help the warbler, to keep the bird off the Threatened list and garner some much-needed good press, as
long as they were allowed to continue extracting coal. And this was how Walter had landed the job as executive
director of the Trust. In Minnesota, working for the Nature Conservancy, he’d forged good relationships with
mining interests, and he was unusually open to constructive engagement with the coal people.” (210)
26
To help save the cerulean warbler, Walter said, the Trust was aiming to create a hundred-square-mile roadless
tract—Haven’s Hundred was its working nickname—in Wyoming County, West Virginia, surrounded by a larger
“buffer zone” open to hunting and motorized recreation. To be able to afford both the surface and mineral rights to
such a large single parcel, the Trust would first have to permit coal extraction on nearly a third of it, via mountaintop
removal. This was the prospect that had scared off the other applicants. Mountaintop removal as currently practiced
was ecologically deplorable—ridgetop rock blasted away to expose the underlying seams of coal, surrounding
valleys filled with rubble, biologically rich streams obliterated. Walter, however, believed that properly managed
reclamation efforts could mitigate far more of the damage than people realized; and the great advantage of fully
mined-out land was that nobody would rip it open again. (211)
25
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technical move by Franzen because it shows Franzen trying to find a way to incorporate earnest
environmentalist rhetoric into the novel while also insisting on a a simultaneous critique of that
same rhetoric. It also shows Franzen trying to distance his narrator’s voice from the voice
speaking earnest environmentalist rhetoric.
Franzen’s chief problem with how to write an environmentalist novel mirrors Walter’s
public relations problem. Walter notes that there are “several” problems with his project, which
is why he is talking to Richard about it (213). The project’s central woes are limited funds and
public relations. Because Walter and Lalitha expanded their project to purchase South American
tracts of land, they now need government funding to purchase the tract in West Virginia (213).
Grassroots protesters are waging war on the project because of anti-MTR (mountaintop removal)
sentiment, which Walter thinks stems from editorials in The New York Times (213). The public
relations problem is particularly interesting in that Walter becomes like Franzen, rhetorically
trying to tell an environmentalist story, struggling to find a technique that will help him to
develop interest and outrage in his interlocutor. As a stand-in, Walter has the luxury of calling in
charismatic help, but Franzen is on his own. Walter’s environmentalist project is a metaphor for
the novelist’s environmentalist project, but Walter’s collaborative effort is also the novelist’s
fantasy of an earth-saving, communal artwork.
One of the troubles Walter and Franzen face is the problem of boredom. The
conversation between Richard, Walter, and Lalitha is almost self-consciously dull. Walter
constantly asks Richard if he’s “bored yet” or if he is “at all interested in the details” (214). The
summary-discourse mix amounts to an exposition of a plot apparently too complex to integrate
into the actions and lives of characters. The conversation also suggests that there is no realistic
alternative to human-generated environmental catastrophe and, if there were, there would be no
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way to articulate it in a manner that would convince masses of people. Even as Richard
sympathetically listens to Walter and Lalitha’s plans, he refers to Walter and Lalitha (in the freeindirect discourse) as an “angry crank” and a “crackpot” (respectively?) (218, 219).
Besides boredom, another problem Walter faces is the problem of sounding crazy or
overenthusiastic. The more Walter talks, the crazier he sounds to Richard. We learn that Vin
Haven has bought up mineral rights in West Virginia on good information that incipient
“regulatory and tax code changes” would “render natural-gas extraction economically feasible in
the Appalachians” (215). Walter and Lalitha know that their project is being used “for cover” in
this mineral rights coup (216). Walter has been tricked into helping to greenwash a resource
extraction project by emphasizing the project’s conservationist angle. 27 Because Walter feels
slightly betrayed by Vin Haven, he says that he and Lalitha have “decided to take some liberties
with interpreting the mission of the Trust”—meaning they intend to use Trust moneys to address
what they feel is the root cause of the cerulean warbler’s woes: human overpopulation, Walter’s
hobby-horse from college. They want Richard to use his celebrity to “make having babies more
of an embarrassment. Like smoking’s an embarrassment,” as Walter puts it (221). Lalitha and
Walter want Richard to “help us get people thinking about . . . overpopulation” (222) by
organizing and promoting some vague event about overpopulation, perhaps “some sort of
summer music-and-politics festival” (223). Richard agrees to help, but with silent reservations.
His free-indirect discourse confides to the reader that listening to Walter and Lalitha’s
enthusiastic plans leaves him “feeling sad and remote. Walter and the girl seemed to have

Later, a brief analepse relates Walter’s interview with Vin Haven. Haven tells a story to Walter of “Martin Jay”
of the Audubon Society, who wants Haven to set up a meeting so Jay can pitch conservation to Karl Rove. Haven
tells Jay that he can easily set up the meeting, but that Jay has to do a reputable survey of swing voters to
demonstrate how much of a priority conservation is to them. Haven ends the story, saying, “I never heard from him
again” (300). Haven and Jay agree that—in the current political climate—conservation is a political loser.
27
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snapped under the pressure of thinking in too much detail about the fuckedness of the world”
(224). This language, clearly reflecting Richard’s perspective, stands in marked contrast to the
summary of Walter’s position. While the summaries betray both Richard’s and Walter’s
perspective through language choices, they lack the outright judgement of Richard’s
reservations. Their plans to change people’s minds about overpopulation are unrealistic and
ridiculous.
After the meeting, the third-person narration emphasizes Walter’s contempt for the poor
people affected by the Trust’s plan. The section begins from a third-person omniscient
perspective and the focalization gradually narrows in on Walter’s consciousness. This narrowing
begins from a place of objective, neutral narrative summary but ends with focalization so narrow
that readers are left with Walter’s anger and prejudice. First, Walter and Lalitha have to displace
“two hundred or so families” who live on the land set aside for Warbler Park (294). Walter buys
out over half of them, but several continue to resist selling their land. The focalization narrows
when Walter and Lalitha are faced with meeting the surly Coyle Mathis, a notoriously
standoffish landowner who has been historically unreceptive to offers to buy his land. Walter
does not help matters with Coyle Mathis. When Mathis rejects the Trust’s offer of money, land,
state-of-the-art reburial of ancestors from the local cemetery, and other perks, Walter replies,
“that is just stupid” (295). Walter apologizes, and Lalitha does damage control, but Walter’s
condescension is unmistakable. After the scene involving Coyle Mathis, the narration narrows in
on Walter’s perspective, relaying how impressed he is with Lalitha and what he thinks of the
poor landowners: “as far as Walter could tell, the people of Forster Hollow had negligible skills
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beyond hunting, engine repair, vegetable growing, herb-gathering, and welfare-check cashing”
(298).28
Because “2004” is Freedom’s most Lukácsian section, Gram’s critiques most apply here.
Even at his most Lukácsian, however, Franzen still incorporates layers of mediation into his
narration. Lukács’s aesthetic praises novelists who represent a social totality through the
experiences of a single character. He writes, praising Balzac, “In his writings the unfolding of
material problems is always indissolubly bound up with the consequences arising from the
personal passions of his characters” (51). Although this method “seems to take the individual
alone for its starting-point,” it actually “contains a deeper understanding of social
interconnections and implications, a more correct evaluation of the trends of social development”
(Lukács 51). Walter’s individual struggles are not necessarily indicative of “social
interconnections and implications.”29 Gram argues that Franzen “struggles with that cardinal
Lukácsian rule No didacticism and with the complementary imperative that the realist writer
reveal totalizing systems and problems through individual characters who experience those
systems and problems in the historical present” (2). But Walter is the only one who seems to
care about environmentalism, and he does not really experience the effects of environmental
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Coyle Mathis and the rest of the holdouts are ultimately lured by the promise of jobs working for a defense
contractor who provides armor for U.S. soldiers in Iraq (301-2).
29 Walter’s anxieties about wanting to cheat on his wife parallel his anxieties about “cheating” on his
environmentalist convictions with the coal industry, and the third person narration gives readers entry into his
psychological dilemma (323). Walter sees Lalitha as something of a reward for his scrupulousness, yet the narrator
constantly intones, “How to live?” (319). The narrative strategies allow readers access to Walter’s thinking to
demonstrate the coexistence of his worldly, politically-correct skepticism toward capitalist interests and his own
self-indulgence and rationalizations. He wrestles with his desire to sleep with Lalitha—even have kids with her—
and his political conviction not to have (more) children (319). When Walter calls his wife, in a furor both over his
alluring proximity to Lalitha in an adjacent hotel room and a New York Times article disparaging the Trust’s project,
the conversation between Walter and Patty briefly confuses the oncoming professional disaster with the threat of
personal disaster (323). Walter warns Patty that, “We’re heading for a catastrophe, Patty,” but Patty does not
understand that his talking about his career and replies, “that’s starting to sound like kind of a relief to me” (323).
Franzen aligns the individual failure of fidelity onto the species failure to respond constructively to climate change,
and he does so through direct discourse between two characters.
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crisis at all, except through various media platforms. The events in Freedom, unsurprisingly—
they chronicle the existence of middle-class American white people—are actually so far removed
from the objective social condition of environmental catastrophe that Franzen does not represent
environmental crisis at all. There is no climactic event in Freedom that depicts the genocide of
huge quantities of American songbirds. The crisis is present only in the bits of data that Walter
reports about decreasing songbird numbers.30 Indeed, even though Walter and Lalitha go birdwatching around the United States, there’s very little description of birds or even of people
observing birds. Furthermore, Franzen does not provide descriptions of actual mountaintop
removal or mining. The mountaintop removal discussed in the book is either abstracted into an
event that has or will happen discussed by characters or made hypothetical through a general
description of what happens environmentally when such an event occurs. But the events
themselves do not occur in the novel. The events are not actually narrated. They are, instead,
inferred by hints such as Walter’s seeing mining machinery on the mountain. His conversations
also tell us about what happens “off screen.” What we read, though, is not a description of
environmental crisis, but—rather—a conversation between characters.
The Walter’s and Patty’s marriage “toxicity” reaches its apex when Patty gets a job and
saves up for breast-augmentation surgery (333). Franzen hammers home the metaphorical
carryover of environmental toxicity and relationship toxicity: “Walter was frightened by the
long-term toxicity they were creating with their fights. He could feel it pooling in their marriage
like the coal-sludge ponds in Appalachian valleys” (333). Walter’s fear about the toxicity of his
marriage leads to him reflecting on the fact that “when you dug up coal you also unearthed nasty

While waiting for Lalitha to mollify and angry protester, Walter mentally tallies “what had gone wrong in the
world in the hours since he’d awakened,” for instance, “Net population gain: 80,000. New acres of American
sprawl: 1,000. Birds killed by domestic and feral cats in the United States: 500,000” etc. (341-2). These grim tallies
bring Walter “a strange spiteful satisfaction” (342).
30
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chemicals like arsenic and cadmium” that inevitably caused environmental havoc (333). This
reflection leads back to Franzen, again, reinforcing his metaphor: “It really was a lot like the
deep shit that got stirred up when a married couple fought: once certain things had been said,
how could they be forgotten again?” (333). The answer, according to Franzen, is one lies to
oneself: “Lalitha was able to do enough research to reassure Walter that, if the sludge was
carefully sequestered and properly contained, it eventually dried out enough that you could cover
it with crushed rock and topsoil and pretend it wasn’t there” (333). Walter believes this “because
he had to believe in it” (333). Walter’s fears and beliefs thus come from his anxieties about the
viability of his project and the stability of his marriage.
Lawrence Buell famously characterizes the discourse around environmental anxieties as
“toxic discourse” (30). Toxic discourse, according to Buell, is “expressed anxiety arising from
perceived threat of environmental hazard due to chemical modification by human agency” (31).
Buell notes that environmental anxiety has always been a concern for people, but the neoliberal
era is unique in the proliferation of toxic discourse: “never before the late twentieth century has it
been so vocal, so intense, so pandemic, and so evidentially grounded” (31). Freedom and Strong
Motion certainly function as expressions of Franzen’s anxieties about environmental hazard, but
Walter’s (and Franzen’s narrator’s) discourse is odd in its treatment of toxicity. First, Walter
does not express his insight about the toxicity of his own marriage as such, and therefore his
ideas about toxicity do not actually enter direct discourse. He reflects on the commonalities
between environmental hazard in Warbler Park and his marriage, but he keeps his insights to
himself. These thoughts are related through free indirect discourse, and where exactly the
anxiety lies is ambiguous. The narration notes that coal mining pollution “had a way of seeping
into the water table and ending up in drinking water,” but what exactly concerns Walter about
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this is unclear (333). He may be concerned for the birds’ sake—or the viability of his project
generally if it leads to too much pollution—but the narration only mentions the “drinking water”
problem (and pollution more generally) as an abstract problem. It is never spelled out how
exactly this pollution relates to birds, Walter’s PR concerns, or the surrounding human life. Of
course, water pollution will affect each of them, but—because the discourse is never pinned to
Walter’s specific concerns for any of the above—the toxic discourse never settles into a material
problem, only an abstract one. When Lalitha kisses Walter the morning after Walter’s argument
with Patty, he pulls away after a while, guilty, saying, “I’m still trying to figure out how to live”
(336). His semi-apology is an encouragement to Lalitha, but the metaphor marriage-toxicity-asenvironmental-toxicity fades. The romance between Lalitha and Walter reads less like a sordid
contribution to marriage toxicity and more like a hopeful relationship that buds just as an
unfortunate marriage shows itself to be not working out.
Walter, Richard, and Lalitha try to hash out a way to appeal to young people, and their
efforts mimic the efforts of the novelist Franzen as he tries to find a form that will bring
environmentalism to masses of readers. Richard meets with Walter, Lalitha, and Jessica to
discuss overpopulation; this passage resembles the one almost 150 pages earlier when Walter
and Lalitha convince Richard to help with “some sort of summer music-and-politics festival” to
make raise awareness about overpopulation (223). There are several reasons why
overpopulation is a difficult topic to gain traction with, as Walter points out: “Because the
subject is a downer. Because it seems like old news. Because, like with global warming, we
haven’t quite reached the point where the consequences become undeniable. And because we
sound like elitists if we try to tell poor people and uneducated people not to have so many
babies” (360). This section reads as if Franzen is rehearsing the difficulties of writing a novel
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about overpopulation. Walter lays out the statistical connections between growth rate and
economic status, as well as growth rate and the age at first pregnancy (360). In his description,
Walter suggests that poor people are like “rats . . . because they reach sexual maturity so much
sooner” than “leopards,” an analogy that Richard points out is “already a problem” (360).
Walter realizes the public relations problem he faces: “If we try to pick on religion, which is our
real villain, we’re picking on the economically oppressed” (360). Neither a good
environmentalist nor a good novelist picks on the economically oppressed. 31 The litany of
obstacles facing activists concerned with human overpopulation’s negative environmental
impacts serve to frustrate a clear way forward for, not just committed environmentalists, but for
environmentally-conscious artists as well. Here Walter speaks frankly about the complicated
concerns of environmentalist rhetoric. The section also emphasizes the ways in which Walter
and Franzen are different. Franzen (one assumes) would not be tactless enough to refer to poor
people as like rats. Walter is used to express what Franzen suspects to be the unvoiced attitudes
of some environmentalists: brutal, privileged, and prone to elitism. 32 The group struggles to
come up with a name for their initiative, most of which “hurt Katz’s ears” (364). These names—
from Youth Against Insanity to What’s the Rush?—pose an aesthetic problem Franzen struggles
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Walter explains to the group that overpopulation boils down to “the same problem of personal liberties” (361). In
sum, the American way of thinking is: “You may be poor, but the one thing nobody can take away from you is the
freedom to fuck up your life whatever way you want to” (361). Richard points out that free market ideology rules
many Americans’ thinking. Growth is viewed as inherently good and necessary (361). Communicating an
antigrowth message makes no sense: “If you want to be heard in the capitalist media, and communicate in a
capitalist culture, overpopulation cannot make any sense. It’s literally nonsense. And that’s your real problem”
(361). Katz suggests a wholesale overthrow of the capitalist system in the United States; “sign me up for that,” he
says (362).
32
Walter’s son Joey presents a stark contrast to the idealism Walter has for young people. Joey likes his
Republican neighbors and feels that Republicans differed positively from Democrats because “they didn’t disdain
people the way liberal Democrats did” (393). The off-putting snobbery that Joey associates with his parents drives
him to revile the “unexamined condescension” that “liberal Democrats” have for “white people from less privileged
backgrounds” (393-4).
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with metafictively throughout the novel (364-5). Propaganda makes for awkward art. 33 They
settle for “Free Space,” with its connotations of free parking—and suggesting that the problem of
overpopulation solved means more resources for everyone else (365-6). A music and politics
festival is broadened into twenty different battles-of-the-bands, culminating in a mega-battle-ofthe-bands held on the Cerulean Mountain Trust lands to promote awareness of overpopulation
(366).
The way the discussion is presented in the novel also demonstrates the difficulty of
performing environmental activism when the consequences of inertia are not immediate. The
longer the discussion goes on, the more overwhelming it seems to appeal to young people, and
the free indirect discourse shows a stark contrast between what is said in direct discourse and
what is thought in indirect discourse. 34 As Walter “held forth on the subject of college kids,”
Richard becomes distracted by the sounds Patty makes in the next room. Positive social change
momentarily takes a back seat to personal desire. Richard’s distraction is narrated in free
indirect discourse. What appeared a fraught, if well-meaning, conversation between serious
adults is reduced to an “old friend’s intellectual fantasies” as Richard ponders why he tolerates
Walter at all (363). The problem itself and potential solutions are treated seriously by Richard
on one page in direct discourse and as “fantasy” on another in indirect discourse. As Richard
ironically fantasizes about being with Patty, he struggles to pay attention to the meeting about
“too much procreation” (364). The clear implication is that Richard is not fully committed to the
serious task at hand. He agrees to several favors asked of him because he resolves to take Patty

See Walter Benjamin. “The Author as Producer.” Trans. John Heckman. New Left Review (1970): 1/62. Walter
Benjamin Archive. Web. 24 February 2021.
34
As Walter sees it, European nations’ success is due to their socialism, where citizens are “not so hung up on
personal liberties” (362). Positive change happens through capturing the indignation of college students, according
to Walter (362).
33

43

away from Walter and never follow through on his obligations to the Cerulean Mountain Trust
(366-7).35
When Freedom addresses environmentalist themes outside of direct discourse, the
omniscient narration emphasizes Walter’s mediated experience with the nature he tries so hard to
protect. After the meeting discussed above, a passage narrated from an omniscient perspective
relates the roots of Walter’s attitudes towards nature and selfish Americans. In this section, large
portions of summary tell Walter’s woeful tale while connecting his childhood frustration with his
later decisions. We learn that Walter’s mother inherited a house by Nameless Lake, Minnesota
when Walter was in high school (451). Walter spends the summer after his junior year in high
school fixing the property up for ten hours per day and making “an experimental nature film”
about bitterns (454-5).36 He spends time outside “seeking beauty in nature” (455). Walter
relishes the solitude, but the solitude is short-lived since Walter’s lazy brother Mitch invades the
premises with his friends to take the property away from “nature boy” (456). Walter is furious.
Laying awake while his brother parties into the night, Walter has an epiphany:
He’d come open-hearted to nature, and nature, in its weakness, which was like his
mother’s weakness, had let him down. Had allowed itself so easily to be overrun by
noisy idiots. He loved nature, but only abstractly, and no more than he loved good novels
or foreign movies, and less than he came to love Patty and his kids, and so, for the next
twenty years, he made himself a city person. Even when he left 3M to do conservation
work, his primary interest in working for the Conservancy, and later for the Trust, was to
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That night, Richard talks to Patty, who leaves her Mistakes Were Made document for him to read (377). He stays
up all night reading it and then leaves it for Walter to read (378). Patty shows up at Richard’s place in Jersey City
later saying she had been “evicted” (381).
36
Walter’s father wants to sell the house, but Walter puts off the sale by promising to fix up the house, hoping to
rent it (452-3).
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safeguard pockets of nature from loutish country people like his brother. The love he felt
for the creatures whose habitat he was protecting was founded on projection: on
identification with their own wish to be left alone by noisy human beings. (457)
Walter sees himself as the biblical steward. Nature, like Walter’s mother, is at once a lovable
ideal and a defenseless sap who cannot defend against obnoxious human agency. Nature is most
loveable when it fits its ideal. The flashback to his childhood also demonstrates how Walter’s
investment in nature is an aesthetic one. The mosquitos of northern Minnesota—and the
unwillingness of bitterns to photograph willingly—makes for a nature that is more fun in theory
than in practice. For Walter, whose experience with nature has been mediated by novels and
movies, some of nature’s pleasures are unexpectedly difficult to access for an uninitiated novice.
With only modest enjoyment to be had, Walter would rather keep habitats for the animals than
allow other humans to enjoy them. The analepses is important because Walter’s foiled attempt
to harness nature for his experimental film returns as his inability to manage the media portrayals
of his conservation efforts. First, he tries to do damage control when a front-page New York
Times story portrays Walter and the Cerulean Mountain Trust in an unfavorable light (472).
Then, instead of playing nice, Walter finally has enough of his own (and others’) hypocrisy and
goes on an epic, viral rant at the body armor plant opening.37
Related in direct discourse, including generous usage of ALL CAPS, Walter’s rant is the
climax of the novel. While Walter’s relationship in much of the novel is heavily mediated, his
rant, while not exactly unmediated, draws its power from the impression of immediacy and how
“unfiltered” it comes across. Walter registers his contempt for the sell-out Coyle Mathis, but his

In a fit of self-pity, Walter takes Patty’s past-due-date trazadone pills and is in no condition to attend the body
armor plant opening lunch (480-1). He is supposed to speak at the opening because, as “executive director of the
Trust,” he is “responsible for bringing all those wonderful, sustainable jobs to Whitmanville and the local economy”
(483).
37
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disingenuous “welcome” expresses anger, frustration, contempt, and disappointment, but these
emotions seem to be addressed in the mode of apostrophe to an American middle class that
Mathis now represents for Walter. Walter’s rage, then, is directed as much at Mathis and those
like him as at people like Walter himself. The following passages seethe with resentment at
lower-class mobility and Walter’s hatred of his own middle-class existence. For instance, Walter
rages against consumption of televised media while ironically using the language of TV to make
his critique.38 Walter is disillusioned with the prospect of saving environments, and his speech
registers his despair. The energy the plasma-screen TVs waste is “Okay,” he says, “because
that’s why we threw you out of your homes in the first place, so we could strip-mine your
ancestral hills and feed the coal-fired generators that are the number-one cause of global
warming and other excellent things like acid rain” (483). Walter notes that this constitutes a
“perfect world . . . a perfect system” because it means “as long as you’ve got your six-foot-wide
plasma TV, and the electricity to run it, you don’t have to think about any of the ugly
consequences. You can watch Survivor: Indonesia till there’s no more Indonesia!” (483).
This section also shows how dependent Walter is on mediation, even as his expression is
as unfiltered as it can be. Even as he complains about TV, he uses the style and references of TV
to make his point. Walter notes the televisual spectacle of environmental disaster while blaming
apathy and media addiction as root causes for such environmental problems as rising sea levels.
The comments highlight the uneven vulnerability to environmental disaster. Middle-class
Americans are both distracted from environmental disaster as well as insulated from (some of) it
by their status. Because its consequences are not immediately felt, environmental disaster is

He jeers, in the fashion of a gameshow host, “You, too, can help denude every last scrap of native habitat in Asia,
Africa, and South America! You, too, can buy six-foot-wide plasma TV screens that consume unbelievable amounts
of energy, even when they’re not turned on!” (483).
38
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reduced to television spectacle. Indonesia and the people living there are reduced from a real
place with real people to an exotic setting for a primetime TV show. He yells, “I want to
welcome you all to working for one of the most corrupt and savage corporations in the world!”
(484). This, too, is an invitation to middle-class privilege. Walter jeers, “you can finally make
enough money to keep your kids from joining the Army and dying in LBI’s broken-down trucks
and shoddy body armor!” (484). When Walter’s mic goes dead, he continues (in all caps):
WE ARE ADDING THIRTEEN MILLION HUMAN BEINGS TO THE POPULATION
EVERY MONTH THIRTEEN MILLION MORE PEOPLE TO KILL EACH OTHER IN
COMPETITION OVER FINITE RESOURCES AND WIPE OUT EVERY OTHER
LIVING THING ALONG THE WAY! IT IS A PERFECT FUCKING WORLD AS
LONG AS YOU DON’T COUNT EVERY OTHER SPECIES IN IT! WE ARE A
CANCER ON THE PLANET! A CANCER ON THE PLANET! (484)
As the sarcasm and rage amplify, Walter’s speech aligns the body armor plant workers with ever
broadening groups. First, he welcomes them to the American middle class, then aligns them
with an obscure “us” that takes over sovereign nations and steals their resources, and finally he
rails against the body armor workers as humans generally past and present. Walter is punched
and kicked by a mob of people, after which he tells Lalitha he is “definitely feeling better” (485).
The rant is cathartic, but Walter’s outburst smacks of indulgence.39 When confronted with the
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Walter ironically harnesses media for his political ends after his rant. Walter is fired from the Cerulean Mountain
Trust for his outburst, and Free Space dissolves, but—as soon as it does—it comes to life again. Local TV footage
of Walter’s rant goes viral and inspires radical environmentalists from across the United States to take an interest in
the now-defunded project (487). Walter, who had been invested in the portrayals of his conservation efforts in TV
and print media for the duration of the novel, only has to move online to find his audience. He has struggled his
whole life to make environmentalist messages appealing, and his biggest success in this regard happens during an
uncalculated moment of rage.
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inability to do something constructive to address the environmental disasters he is so conscious
of, Walter settles for doing something for himself—yelling it out.40
Reading Walter’s digressive rant previews some of the controversies that would follow in
the wake of the popularization of the term “Anthropocene.” In June 2017, the United Nations
reported that the world population would reach 9.8 billion people by 2050 and 11.2 billion by
2100. These population increases present several environmental problems, certainly. Climate
change, however—and the Anthropocene generally—is not produced by all humans equally. Jill
S. Schneidermann summarizes the problem succinctly:
The proposal to name an Anthropocene epoch originates in the awareness that human
beings, acting in ways that are of out sync with the pace of geological time, are the chief
cause of most contemporary global change. Nonetheless, one can argue that the choice of
that particular name does not do justice to the true causes of the epochal change. The
Anthropocene does not acknowledge that some groups of human beings have had greater
effects on the planet than others . . . [T]he Anthropocene narrative represents humanity as
an undifferentiated species assuming power over the rest of the earth system. But in the
crucial field of climate change . . . a large segment of humanity has not participated in the
fossil fuel economy that has led to global warming. (184)

40

Though his audience still does not experience environmental disaster in a way that resonates with them, they
experience his anger—and that resonates with them. Joey uses his ill-gotten parts money to write a check to Free
Space for $100,000 (487). Two verbal exchanges with Joey are enough to put the ethical implications of taking this
money to rest (487-8). The narrative is more interested, at this point, in highlighting Walter’s successes. He makes
up with his daughter, Jessica (488). He moves out of the Cerulean Mountain Trust mansion and skips town with
Lalitha on a camping and bird-watching road trip (489). For once, everything is going great. As Walter steps away
from the sources of his anger, he notices the nuance-less anger of the radical environmentalists he writes to in his
blog and meets touring the U.S. for Free Space events (491-4). Increasingly, Walter connects his diminished rage to
being away from people, isolated in the forests looking at songbirds (495). This retreat from the difficulties of
interacting with people and tolerating their choices is exacerbated when Lalitha is killed in a car accident (500).
Walter goes to Nameless Lake to grieve (501).
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Walter does not make such fine distinctions. The slippage in his rant between high-consuming
middle-class Americans and a general “us” betrays the confusion Walter has about humanity
generally. His rage fails to distinguish between humans who have not participated substantively
in the fossil fuel economy and those who have been a major part of it.
The most curious passage in the novel follows Walter’s cathartic outburst. A single
paragraph narrates what happens when “a few hundred bird species grew restless” (485).
Whereas the previous sections in this chapter used the experience of an individual character to
limit the scope of the narrative, often delving directly into psychonarration or free indirect
discourse, this single paragraph broadens the scope of Franzen’s narration substantially. The
narrative shift is so dramatic because readers have just encountered an extensive sample of
Walter’s direct discourse—the language of a single person. The scope narrows as the paragraph
progresses, however—first, to just “hundreds,” and then to “four” tanager species that take off
from South America northward (485). The wide scope is staggering after the minute interiority
of the novel’s other passages. Instead of the workings of a single human, what is narrated is how
“cell phone towers and road traffic mowed down millions of migrants, but millions more made it
through, many of them returning to the very same tree they’d nested in the year before” (485).
The scope narrows from hundreds of species, to four species, to millions of individual birds, to
“many of them” and the evocation of single trees with single birds in them. Each year,
individual birds come back to find “more of their former homes paved over for parking lots or
highways, or logged over for pallet wood, or developed into subdivisions, or stripped bare for oil
drilling or coal mining, or fragmented for shopping centers, or plowed under for ethanol
production, or miscellaneously denatured for ski runs and bike trails and golf courses” (485).
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The litany of “or”s signifies a legion of excuses for destroying migrant bird habitats. Most of the
reasons are energy-based, but not all. All of the reasons are about human demand.
Franzen does much to characterize the experience of migrating songbirds as full of the
pathos of human experience. He describes the birds as “migrants,” for instance, but he also
describes their habitats as “homes,” and their long journeys as just as trying as long human
journeys. Their journeys are narrated as follows: “Migrants exhausted by their five-thousandmile journey competed with earlier arrivals for the remaining scraps of territory; they searched in
vain for a mate, they gave up on nesting and subsisted without breeding, they were killed for
sport by free-roaming cats” (485). The sadness in the birds’ doomed lot is palpable. The term
“migrant” evokes images of exhausted human migrants struggling for a place to exist and failing.
The experience of the troubled species is carefully humanized. The verbs Franzen uses are
actions that humans can identify with; birds are not the only ones who search, give up, or are
killed sometimes. This passage above stands in stark contrast to the rest of the novel because it
takes as its object the nonhuman. Even while parts of the rest of the novel address
environmentalist themes, it does so by focusing on the lives of individual humans. In this case,
Franzen narrates the actions of a collective subject “they.” The short passage gains its power
from being so different from the rest of the novel. It’s shortness also suggests that Franzen is
unwilling to dwell too long on the birds’ plight, as if—without access to the drama of human
interaction—nonhumans struggle to hold readers’ attention. The end of the paragraph transitions
into a brief discussion of “pockets full of bird life” still in the United States there to be viewed by
humans, and then the brief sojourn into the experience of the birds gives way to Walter and
Lalitha birdwatching (486). 41

41

Indulging in a cathartic rant leads Walter to feel acutely the sense of entitlement he decries in others. First, he
rationalizes the gas-guzzling bird-watching trip because he “felt he was owed one petroleum splurge after a lifetime
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The novel’s final section presents a semi-retired Walter working to subvert the
environmentally destructive, neoliberal obsession with individual freedom in a nearby
subdivision. The section adopts the narrative strategy Franzen uses in the first section.
Communal knowledge characterizes the focalization in this section. While the focalization is
unlimited, what is actually reported is limited to the general knowledge of the community. For
instance, the first paragraph describes the disappearance of a community family’s cat: “it was
widely assumed on Canterbridge Court that Bobby had been killed by Walter Berglund” (541).
The community sprang up near the Berglund property and the new community members’ cats
hunted outdoors in the woods by the Berglund place, “where the birds were” (542). Walter goes
door to door asking community members to keep their cats indoors (542). He is still an outsider
because the “political trembling in his voice . . . rubbed the families on Canterbridge Court the
wrong way” (542). A single conversation with Linda, “Evangelical and the most political person
on the street,” serves to illustrate the uselessness of Walter’s attempts to regulate personal
freedom (542). Walter presents several arguments for keeping the cat indoors year-round, but
Linda is not receptive to his suggestion. The cat likes being outside, and the cat is a member of
the family, so Linda’s sense of personal freedom extends into a cat’s freedom to roam and kill
birds (543). The collective good is framed as full of radical restrictions on personal freedoms.
Linda’s Fox News-ish paranoia about big government and the Obama administration make her
downright antagonistic towards Walter’s attempts to help the songbirds. Other, less political

of virtue, one nature-filled summer in payment for the summer he’d been deprived of as a teenager” (486). The
section following the description of the songbirds’ journey dig into Walter’s consciousness through third person
omniscient narration with its scope often limited to Walter’s thoughts and experience. Instead of the anger
characterizing his consciousness earlier in the novel, Walter feels he has earned the good things in life. The postcathartic-rant euphoria comes across as everything suddenly starts going right for Walter.
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neighbors simply cannot be bothered to care about what their cats do—what with the recession
and credit card debt and other worries (544-6).
Halfway through this final section, the focalization changes from third-person omniscient
narration focalized through the community, and readers get a sense of Walter’s thinking about
cats through free indirect discourse. The description of the cat’s predatory habits makes clear
that Walter has become obsessed, that the inability to fix all of the world’s problems has
manifested itself in a mania for cats. As the narrator puts it, the knowledge that cats were killing
songbirds “deranged him” (549). Therefore, “after a second summer of diplomacy and
educational efforts had failed,” Walter traps the cat and drives it three hours to an urban animal
shelter (549). When he gets back, the narrator emphasizes Walter’s grief and the tone shifts from
a semi-comedic episode about an environmentalist dealing with cats to an extended reflection on
Walter’s personal grief and attempts to numb all feeling (550-1). When Walter gets back from
abandoning Bobby, Jessica calls him to talk about why he will not divorce Patty. He answers, “I
don’t want to think about it. I just want to go out every morning and see birds who have nothing
to do with any of it. Birds who have their own lives and their own struggles. And to try to do
something for them. They’re the only thing that’s still lovely to me” (553). Walter’s grief has
produced a stubbornness that idolizes nature and has become totally unforgiving of human error.
What’s so realistic about Franzen’s novel is that, in a world characterized by neoliberal
competition, so much should oppose Walter in his quest for a pure and good life of ecological
beneficence. In the section “2004,” Walter eventually sees just how much he has been used and
how much damage he has helped to cause in the name of environmentalism. He screams at a
Trust-sponsored event, “WE ARE A CANCER ON THE PLANET” (284). But Walter cannot
help but be the cancer he denounces. Freedom aspires toward a Lukácsian “social totality” that
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allows us to see the myriad forces that complicate Walter’s attempt to do good. The largeness of
Walter’s project makes it vulnerable to the multiple capitalist forces that make it ultimately
complicit in capitalist destruction. The reason Freedom sees the failure of environmentalism is
because, by taking pains to represent the multiple forces operating against a pure ecological act,
it represents the multiple equivalences that can replace or compromise ecological acts that
require sacrifice. In representing the personal gains that replace collective gains in a dialectic of
ecological-capitalist acts, Freedom’s realism engages a logic of comparison, forcing ecological
acts via the law of general equivalency to compare with acts of personal freedom, to which they
compare unfavorably on a large scale, destined to lose. How can this be avoided? To
realistically represent anything anymore, authors have to represent neoliberalism. To represent
neoliberalism is to represent a multitude of conflicting forces competing for our energy and
attention. To realistically represent environmentalism, then, is to represent the forces that keep
us from acting according to the principles we know are necessary. Freedom not only represents
the competitors with acts for the public good, it also reflects on the dissemination of
environmentalist ideology and texts that try to subvert the neoliberal imperative of personal
freedom.
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What’s a Death Worth?: Neoliberalism and Necropolitics in How the Dead Dream

Like Jonathan Franzen’s Freedom, Lydia Millet’s 2009 novel How the Dead Dream
narrates the neoliberal tendency to submit nonhuman nature to the capitalist law of general
equivalence.42 Unlike Freedom, however, Millet’s bildungsroman does so by measuring the
affective capital expended on various human and nonhuman deaths, engaging the necropolitics
of neoliberal valuation.43 In How the Dead Dream, Millet tells the story of the deterioration of
assertions of radical differences between the nonhuman and the human through the development
of the novel’s protagonist, T. By moving beyond the assertion of radical difference between
human and nonhuman, the novel also opens a space for a revaluation of both human and
nonhuman life in terms of cohabitation rather than competition. My purpose in analyzing How
the Dead Dream in terms of its depiction of human reactions to human and nonhuman deaths is
to identify some of the strategies used to assert and reassert human superiority over nonhumans,
to note and flesh out the unique position affect and materiality occupy in these strategies, and to
show how the novel offers alternative narrative strategies to collapse the radical hierarchized
distinction between humans and nonhumans. First, I will examine How the Dead Dream to note
how the novel positions the radical separation of human and nonhuman as a problem of maturity.
Then I will discuss the novel’s commentary on materiality and affective labor—and how these

42

According to Marx, money is the expression of the form of value of goods being traded. Money translates
proverbial apples into oranges. Under neoliberalism, market logics have infiltrated institutions that were formerly
regarded as relatively insulated such logics, such as churches, pensions, marriage, and some kinds of education.
David Harvey identifies this trend as one of the destructive consequences of neoliberalization. The logic of
neoliberalization, according to Harvey, “holds that the social good will be maximized by maximizing the reach and
frequency of market transactions, and it seeks to bring all human action into the domain of the market” (3). Marx,
Karl. Capital, Volume 1: A Critique of Political Economy. Trans. Ben Fowkes. New York: Penguin, 1992. Web.
43
Achille Mbembe describes necropolitics as “contemporary forms of subjugation to life to the power of death”
(39).
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concepts function in the separation of human and nonhuman. 44 I will show how the narration in
How the Dead Dream comments on the necropolitics of valuing human and nonhuman deaths.
Finally, I will analyze the ending of How the Dead Dream, in which Millet’s narrative strategies
soften the radical distinction between human and nonhuman. The ending of the novel, I argue,
productively decenters the human without effacing it, allowing the human and the nonhuman to
coexist in a confused state that dispenses with the impulse to compare them at all. In doing this,
How the Dead Dream participates in “the nonhuman turn,” working to undermine “human
exceptionalism” and the dualism that separates humans from animals (Grusin x).
Few critics have commented substantively on How the Dead Dream. The critics who
have noted Millet’s novel have commented on her reflection on the relationship between humans
and nonhumans, especially animals. Ella Soper roots the novel’s environmental message in the
figure of the inconsolable mourner (746). Rachel Greenwald Smith argues that “How the Dead
Dream illustrates how the awareness of the centrality of nonhuman beings to human survival
exposes the single-minded entrepreneurial pursuit of profit as disastrous for humans and
nonhumans alike” (28). Greenwald Smith continues, “Yet the novel also performs its own
futility in the face of the attempt to represent nonhuman experience, as it ultimately deteriorates
into clownish pastiche and fragmented aphorism once its central character comes to this
realization” (28). Benjamin Bateman argues that the form of How the Dead Dream critically

I will be discussing affective labor as a theoretical heir to Marx’s “immaterial labor.” Leopolda Fortunati
describes the concept of “immaterial labor” in Marx as follows: “Marx addresses [immaterial labor] . . .where he
provides a secondary, supplementary description of productive labor as labor that produces material wealth . . . the
implication being that those who produce immaterial wealth do not constitute productive workers. Marx continues
his analysis by stating that immaterial production can be of two kinds. One which results in material goods (books,
pictures, etc.), and one in which the product is not separable from the act of production itself, as is the case of artist
performers, orators, actors, teachers, doctors, priests, and so on. Marx’s observations clearly refer only to the labor
invested in the production of commodities, as he does not take into consideration, for example, how much of
domestic labor is constituted by immaterial labor.” (139).
44
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exposes “the limitations of a ‘set-aside’ approach to environmental conservation” (152). 45 An
essay by Carne Irr and two essays by Ursula K. Heise mention How the Dead Dream only briefly
as an example of larger phenomena. Heise notes that novels like How the Dead Dream and
Freedom, with biodiversity as their subject, “often focus centrally on the meaning of nonhuman
species for humans” (27). In another essay, Heise roots How the Dead Dream in the “Animal
Moment” of posthuman discourse (462). 46 Caren Irr situates How the Dead Dream in a genre
she calls “the new green novel” (84).
Greenwald Smith exaggerates when she argues that “the novel ends up positing
immediate physical contact with the nonhuman world as the only alternative to the bodily
investment of neoliberal subjects in the circulation of capital” (103). I argue that these close
encounters are the events that can lead to a keener sense of likeness, as moments of growth, not
necessarily as moments of perfect harmony. According to Greenwald Smith, however, these
encounters suggest an aesthetic giving up: “[s]tory and ecological consciousness, the novel
suggests, are, at root, incompatible, and the only ecological role remaining for the novel is to tell
is the story of this incompatibility” (104). In this, I think Greenwald Smith reads T. a bit too
straight, a bit too unironically. T.’s growth is not the reader’s growth. His grief is not our grief.
When he wanders off into the wilderness to connect to nature, we should read this moment
critically. He craves closeness to nature, but this craving is still manic, individualized, and borne
of profound privilege. T., for all of his growth, is not the uncomplicated hero at the end of the
novel that Greenwald Smith reads him as. I do not think his conclusions are the ones Millet
wants us to reach or his actions those Millet wants us to emulate.

He also argues that “through his somnolent form, the novel imagines sustainable and rehabitative alternatives to
traditional character development” (152).
46
For Heise, a literary tradition starting in the mid-1990’s responds to advances in genetics and biotechnology,
coinciding with the emergence of animals studies (455).
45
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The narration throughout most of How the Dead Dream functions to centralize both
human experience and draw attention to the ways humans make sense of the world. How the
Dead Dream begins by introducing readers to Thomas, or T. as he is called by almost everyone,
a little boy obsessed with the materiality of currency. The narrator here and throughout the novel
employs inner monologue to capture T.’s voice as well as his thinking. The narrative is, then,
clearly and obviously concerned directly with human experience. The narrative voice is
consistent throughout the novel, and it is closely aligned with T.’s voice—resembling a
conventional unobtrusive, “well-spoken” narrator (200).47 Although T. does not narrate, he is
the driving force behind the story and its focalization point. The external narrator relates T.’s
thoughts directly at times, especially after T. graduates from college, but does not pass judgment.
Any judgement or reflection on other characters’ thoughts is coded as actually from T.’s
ideological point of view. The verbalization of T.’s thoughts is what Chatman calls “a
cognition” (as opposed to “a perception”) since the portions of the text that report T.s thoughts
clearly organize them into logical and grammatical units (instead of a more experimentallyrendered lump of perceptions) (181). The distinction is important for the presentation of
thinking and reflection as distinctly human activities and ways of making sense of the world.
Benjamin Bateman describes the narration in the first thirty-four pages as “mostly deadpan,” and
notes that “the possibility of interiority is granted but never explored” (157). The style avoids
flamboyance, and the tone is, as Adelle Waldman notes writing for The New York Times,
“deadpan, albeit in a lyrical and meditative prose.” Upon publication, some reviewers took issue
with Millet’s affectless style. An anonymous Kirkus reviewer remarks, “Millet’s latest doesn’t

A well-spoken narrator is “a narrator whose mode of expression is a standard (or even elegant) one and functions
as a norm in terms of which the characters’ modes of expression are situated” (105). Gerald Prince. A Dictionary of
Narratology. Revised Ed. Lincoln: U. of Nebraska P., 2003.
47
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work as a novel—it’s exhausting and disappointing. The author seldom deviates from the
expository voice.” Patrick Ness, writing for The Guardian, found of Millet, “Her writing can be
portentous and overdone” while the book itself is “reserved and oblique.” These critiques apply
to Millet’s writing, but they also extend more generally to her narrator and her protagonist. Even
as a child, T. is not excitable or passionate, and the third-person narration throughout the novel
captures T.’s self-conscious rationality and down-to-earth-ness.
How the Dead Dream initially presents the radical distinction of the human and the
nonhuman as a distinction borne of immaturity. As a child, T. loves cash so much he “had a
habit of secreting coins on his person, a thick and powerful quarter lodged under his tongue or
discreet dimes tucked into the cheek pouches” (3). T. loves money so much that he feels a need
to incorporate it into his very self, to elide the distinction between the valuable thing and his own
body. T. works for his money, but the ethics of his “commercial dealings” cover a broad
spectrum, ranging from hard-earned return on lemonade stand investment to charity walkathon
fraud (6). While at school, T. is popular and successful, but his fetishization of cash makes him
amoral when it comes to money. He goes so far as to accept from “not a first-order friend”
twenty dollars per week—or “services rendered” as he sees it—for social “favors” like keeping
this “friend” from getting bullied at school (9). The third-person narrator of How the Dead
Dream frames T.’s obsession with the materiality of coinage as a kind of youthful “stage” that he
grows out of. He retains his obsession with money, but this obsession does not take the form of
becoming one with the money. This growth, following the format of the bildungsroman, is an
aesthetic education:
As he grew up, his love became sophisticated. He no longer needed to touch coins or
bills; he found his satisfaction in surges of energy, in the stream of contact between
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machines that processed binary. He learned to like abstract money better than its
physical body. The solid house that money built sheltered him and he felt keenly that
money was both everything and nothing, at once infinite, open potential and an end in
itself. (13)
A “sophisticated” understanding of money that leads T. into fiscal maturity hinges on the mere
displacement or diffusion of money’s materiality. His “satisfaction” is not in the “touch” of
“coins,” but in ambiguous “surges of energy” that have all the appearance of bodily reactions but
are actually a kind of synonym for the function “contact between machines.” The energy is
qualified as machine energy but is nonetheless related to T.’s own satisfaction. Instead of seeing
and touching money, T. can encounter the material effects of money by feeling the climatecontrolled environment of his house and appreciate the reasoning that translates hard currency to
the sensations of physical shelter. T.’s sophisticated understanding of money is in appreciating
how coins turn into “the solid house that money built,” which in turn allowed him the bodily
“feeling” of money’s true importance. In one paragraph, Millet pushes a readerly understanding
of materiality from a naïve fixation on physical objects to a sophisticated understanding of the
flow between currency, bought commodities and services with their use values, bodies, and the
affective states produced by the interplays between each of them. The mature T. better
understands the relationship between the material and the immaterial, which later leads to
collapsing the radical distinction between the nonhuman and the human.
By signaling this aesthetic and intellectual growth so early in the novel, however, Millet
suggests the preternatural maturity of T., implying that, having achieved his growth early, his
education is already over before the novel really begins. Millet undercuts this narrative a page
later when her narrator notes that T. was “guilty” of “seeming like a prodigy,” as if T.’s fiscal
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sophistication were a kind of put-on, an ethos adopted until he could actually be a prodigy (14).
T. grows further while attending college, from the satisfaction in “surges of energy” that are also
“the stream of contact between machines” to the “quiet satisfaction” of day trading “wins” (15).
The satisfaction here is coded as even less material than a few pages before. T. has more
growing up to do because he has lost the pleasure of materiality. The machines are left out of the
narrator’s description and thus unconnected to any bodily sensation of T.’s, as if monetaryaesthetic sophistication means eschewing materiality and only focusing on money’s abstract
qualities. T.’s monetary-aesthetic sophistication now resides less in the having of money, tactile
or abstract, but in the theoretical gamification of finance—the winning. What Christopher Breu
calls “the neoliberal logic of winners and losers” is made even more sophisticated by T.’s
exercises in hiding his winning and losing, in the practice of financial secrecy (148). T. seeks to
create the maximum distance between his financial dealings and his own material existence
while maintaining the stability of both. What this leads to is the gradual abstraction of T.’s
financial practices and his having to fake affective investment to maintain social options,
captured exquisitely by Millet when T. “consult[s] his watch” while lending a sympathetic ear to
a suicidal frat-mate (17). The distance T. starts to create between his financial practices and his
material existence is decidedly temporal. At college, he focused on post-college life: “he looked
to the life beyond . . . He was beyond what there was, and in the not-yet-existent imagined a
great acceleration” (18). Focusing on the materiality of the present becomes another symptom of
childishness: “As a child he had lived in the present; now he lived in the future” (21). While the
grammar of this last sentence counters its subject’s fantasy of futurity, T. nonetheless tries to
assert a claim on “the not-yet-existent” in the present.
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IMMATERIAL LABOR AND NECROPOLITICS
How the Dead Dream explores how affect and necropolitics contribute to the radical separation
between human and nonhuman after T. graduates from college. When he graduates, T. invests in
his own affective labor to develop business partnerships. Shortly after college, T. “made his first
six-figure profit” by “brokering the sale of a derelict apartment building” and gives up day
trading for real estate (29). Without connections, T. fakes friendships, preying on the selfinterest of the rich and clueless, in the service of his developing real estate company. The work
T. has to do in this section of the novel—the self-conscious forging of friendships to further his
career—is the affective labor that underlies the materiality of his real estate production. Michael
Hardt and Antonio Negro call this labor “immaterial labor”—that is, “labor that produces
immaterial products, such as information, knowledges, ideas, images, relationships, and affects”
rather than physical goods (65).48 Immaterial labor is often paid service work approached as an
essential component of certain jobs, functioning as a kind of work-before-the-work—planning,
for instance. It is also an add-on the managerial class expects in addition to regular service or
material labor—not merely waged production and service, but service with a smile, a policing
and monitoring of affect. This sort of labor, however, looks much like what Silvia Federici calls
“reproductive work,” the naturalized, often unpaid labor (usually performed by women) that
underlies capitalist production (93). 49 While T.’s affective labor is “reproductive” in the sense
that it is consciously directed towards the continuation of the conditions of capitalist production,
it is “immaterial” in that this labor, by itself, does not produce a commodity. How the Dead
Alternatively, Maurizio Lazzarato, who popularized the term “immaterial labor,” defines it as “the labor that
produces the informational and cultural content of the commodity.”
49
In Sociology of Work: An Encyclopedia, Mignon Duffy notes that “reproductive labor” has been defined and used
in many different ways. Chiefly, it has been used “to describe unpaid activities in the home as work, thereby
conferring value and visibility on the largely invisible labor performed overwhelmingly by women.” According to
Federici, women’s work is also literally reproductive in that birthing children produces new workers for exploitation
and new consumers to participate in a capitalist economy (93).
48
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Dream does not explicitly tie affective labor to capital accumulation, but I read T.’s calculated
and reserved deployment of affect—especially early in the novel—as very much like his
considered and frugal approach to money.
The concept of affective labor has recently become a heuristic with which theorists have
described the demands of capital on labor in a neoliberal service economy. 50 If capital is stored
up labor, then the concept of affective labor implies that a capitalist, by deploying capital, can
buy affective labor and in turn sell it at a profit. 51 It also connotes a worker with a limited but
renewable supply of affective potential that they can sell for a wage, a small but renewable store
of capital.52 Just as some productive labor is expended for a wage as paid work, some is saved
for the (re)productive labor of leisure and, in turn, affective labor is expended both for a wage
and for leisure. Yet the capital spent on leisure—affective or otherwise—is necessarily limited
and is therefore subject to valuation. For example, do I have enough affective capital left, after
smiling all day in a service occupation, to care about both the hurricane wreckage in Mexico and
my grandma’s radiation treatment?
In How the Dead Dream, T. is willing to invest whatever affect is necessary to forge
business connections. That is, he is willing to invest immaterial labor (mere time and a

Juan Martin Prada puts it this way: “Throughout the recent history of industrial and commercial practices,
affectivity has generally acted as a language or a means that incites a certain positive predisposition in the
interlocutor, like when a salesperson smiles and affectionately greets a new customer (in fact, many affective
expressions are socially and not emotionally motivated). However, the gradual acknowledgement of the relationship
between affectivity and business effectiveness has meant that little by little, values such as personalised attention,
closeness and proximity to the customer have become some of the essential principles of corporate action.”
51
According to Marx, “Capital is the governing power over labor and its products;” therefore, “Capital is stored up
labor” (36, italics in original). Karl Marx. “Profit of Capital.” Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.
Trans. Martin Milligan. Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1988. Print. However, affective labor has certain limits that
“productive labor” does not. While an individual can accumulate and horde unlimited amounts of capital (and
therefore productive labor), they cannot stockpile massive amounts of affective capital. While capitalists can (and
do) pay for care, they have a necessarily limited ability to care themselves.
52
Running out of such capital is known as “burn-out,” which the World Health Organization defines as “a syndrome
conceptualized as resulting from chronic workplace stress that has not been successfully managed. It is
characterized by three dimensions: feelings of depletion of enthusiasm, increased mental distance from one’s job, or
feelings of negativism or cynicism related to one’s job, and reduced professional efficacy.”
50
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minimum of attention, for instance) and a kind of forged affect or pretense to produce an
economic relationship that will be beneficial to him in the future. Even this forged affect, the
product of waged service work everywhere, requires some affect to produce, requires energy and
patience. Indeed, his investment in suffering the inanities of his frat brothers comes back to him
in the form of the real estate opportunity noted above, which he gets through his friend Brad’s
family (26). In the first chapter of novel (where all the previous information has been
communicated), T. trains himself to be affectless even while appearing to exude the proper
affects for the benefit of his marks. Beyond these potential business partners, T. is reluctant to
invest affective capital elsewhere. Caring about too many things can be a liability for a properly
ruthless venture capitalist. But the concept of affective capital suggests to me that we do not
always have a choice where we “invest” it. Indeed, as the novel plays out, many affective
investments are obligatory, and one’s stock of affective capital often vulnerable to emergencies.
At this point in the novel, however, T.’s deployment of affect is mostly calculated as a means of
promoting business options (as opposed to required as a condition of for his continued
employment).
T.’s calculated and voluntary deployment of his affective labor is upset when he suddenly
encounters death. Death, whether it makes sense as a commodity or not, is the event for which
we are socialized to muster a sum of affective capital to deploy to the satisfaction of a
community that expects this deployment from us, or—more often perhaps—the event of death
can rip affective capital from us regardless of our rational attitude towards its deployment
(though we may find it cathartic to get rid of this affective capital, even if we then lack capital
for other kinds of affective expenditures). 53 But death happens everywhere almost all the time,
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According to Eric Cazdyn, death, both individual and socioeconomic, makes sense as a commodity in several
ways. The example he uses in The Already Dead is the life insurance resale market wherein “life settlement”
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and we certainly do not expend the same capital on every death. Deaths, by this logic, compete
for our attention and then for affective capital. The market for affective capital to “spend” on
any death, individual or collective, constitutes a necro-economics. The ideological forces that
encourage the valuation of certain deaths over others struggle in what might be described,
following Mbembe, as necropolitics.
Mbembe introduces necropolitics in his analysis of the location of sovereignty. To this
end, Mbembe finds that the “ultimate expression of sovereignty” is not in “the boundaries of the
nation-state, within institutions empowered by the nation-state, or within supranational
institutions and networks,” but rather, “in the power and the capacity to dictate who may live and
who must die” (11). Mbembe initially interrogates what constitute sovereign rights to imagine
“politics as a form or war” to ask broader questions like “What place is given to life, death, and
the human body (in particular the wounded or slain body)? How are they inscribed in the order
of power?” (12). Mbembe notes that the onset of slavery is “one of the first instances of
biopolitical experimentation” and that, violence under the biopolitical institution of slavery
“becomes an element in manners . . . an act of caprice and pure destruction aimed at instilling
terror” (21). Mbembe’s use of “manners” to denote “the links between social grace and social
control” with reference to biopower hints at how necropolitics underlie contemporary American
attitudes toward all life forms. Although How the Dead Dream does not explicitly pressure the
contours of state sovereignty, it does demand reflection with respect to humans’ power of life
and death over some nonhumans and how that power turns nonhumans into subjects of a
generalized human sovereignty. The legal right to kill most animals without infringing on the
privilege of the state might suggest that the deaths of animals are not political—at least not in the

companies buy life insurance policies from policyholders for more than they would have made giving the policy up
and then cash in when the original policyholder dies (160).
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biopolitical sense that Mbembe is discussing death in “Necropolitics”—but the grieved reactions
of humans to animal death put these deaths in a broader matrix of biopower. 54 If one measure of
the value of a life is the degree to which one can grieve for it, then the value of animals’ lives is
necessarily comparable to the value of human lives.
In How the Dead Dream, T. expends affective capital on several deaths, but he does not
spend equally, thus demonstrating the necropolitical market at work and encouraging readers to
follow the storyworld’s valuation of various deaths. Specifically, in this necropolitcal market,
several nonhuman deaths compete with various kinds of human death for human affective
capital. At the beginning of the novel’s second chapter, T.’s single-minded affective investment
in the goings-on of his potential business partners is upset by an unexpected death. Sounding a
chord that will not reverberate until the end of the novel, Millet’s narrator coyly suggests a
human murder at the beginning of How the Dead Dream’s second chapter. “He killed her
driving to Las Vegas,” the chapter starts, and the rest of the paragraph piles up prepositions
signaling what happened before the killing, never indicating exactly whom or what “He” killed
(35). The “He” is itself ambiguous. We assume “He” refers to T., but the narrator does not
make this explicit. We know that “he emerged from the diner,” but specifically-human actions
are muffled until the second paragraph:
Driving up the freeway on-ramp he turned the radio on and knew the smoothness of his
buttery seat leather against the backs of his thighs. He was satisfied; he was easing in.
Then a shape, blurred and fast from the right, and he hit it. The car bumped over it and
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In What Animals Teach Us About Politics, Brian Massumi writes about how zoos help to express how animals are
excluded from human politics: “In the zoo, the foregrounded animals are set off from the background in such a way
as to put them on display as essentially visual figures” (66). This caging/framing, Massumi argues, following
Giorgio Agamben, repeats the “founding gesture of human politics” (66). The animal is “excluded from the polis”
by being reduced to “mere biological life” (66). Massumi notes that “[t]he zoo is an exercise of human sovereignty
vis-à-vis the animal” because it “shunts the animal to the side of unqualified life, in other words ‘killable’ by nature”
(68, 68-9).
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veered off the road onto the shoulder. He jammed the brake pedal to the floor and sat
shaking.
Dust rose behind and beside him, and his two right wheels were off the shoulder
pavement. He looked out the window behind him to see if there were other cars coming.
What was that on the road? What was hit? (35)
At the end of the above passage, third-person narration shifts to interior monologue or “direct
free thought” (Chatman 183). Millet makes use of this narrative tool frequently throughout the
novel. Often, events are actually narrated matter-of-factly, dispassionately—in this case, even
ominously procedurally—to be followed by T.’s interior monologue responding to the narrative
situation. Close by, “a mound” turns out to be “a coyote,” an observation later amended via
psychonarration: “the poor thing was a bitch” (36-7), but the above passage makes clear the
human-oriented phenomenology of the accident. The subjects of these independent clauses—the
actors in the narrated events—are mostly “he” (with a few references to his car and its wheels).55
Thus, the temporality of the scene is rigidly oriented around a human’s consciousness. The
coyote, because “he” does not yet know she’s a coyote, is referred to vaguely by depersonalized,
gender-neutral pronouns and as “a shape”; before the narrative moves on, the narrator taps T.’s
inquiring consciousness, which has indeed reduced the coyote to a “what”—a thing in its vaguest
sense. The information in this scene is only reported once it becomes available to T., the subject
of the interior monologue.
The structure set up in this scene—narrated encounters with humans and nonhumans
followed by T.’s reflections related through interior monologue—is a structure that repeats
throughout the novel. I will be focusing particularly on T.’s reflective interior monologues

The combination of “he” and automobile functions as a Latourian “hybrid actor” (33). The human “agent” and
the nonhuman “actant” are both named by the narrator (Latour 33).
55
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because they often eschew narration and always allow the reader access to T.’s understanding of
his own relationship to humans and nonhumans at any given point in his development. These
reflective interior monologues function as what David Herman calls “self-narratives” (13).
Herman describes self-narratives as “the stories people tell in order to make sense of and justify
their own actions—with this storytelling process at once reflecting and helping establish
relational ties with others” (13). According to Herman, “such stories of the self are imbricated
with assumptions concerning the scope and limits of selfhood as such” (25). I bring up Herman
specifically because his account of self-narratives emphasizes “how self-narratives relate to—
emerge from but also potentially impinge upon—assumptions about possibilities for selfhood
beyond the human” (Herman 25).
The shift from a more distanced approach to T.’s thoughts to interior monologue
occasions this focus on self-narrative. At this point in the novel, what worries T. is that the thing
is not just a thing, that it has a human connection and thus his hitting it entails his responsibility
to another human. T.’s processing of the shift from thing to coyote happens as follows: “A
coyote. People said they were pests. They took pets out of yards in the suburbs, ran off with
children’s kittens. He was briefly relieved: no one to be angry at him, no owner” (36). The
recognition of the thing’s species is immediately followed by “People”—the only reference point
T. has that matters. T. rehearses the very human-made meanings associated with “coyote,”
shifting immediately from identification and denotation to the negative connotations humans
have for coyotes. He assesses the thing’s value and is relieved to find that it has “no owner,” so
the thing does not put an obligation on him to a specific human in terms of a property relation.
What makes him actually check on the coyote is the thought that on-coming cars might stop and
put him in the awkward position of trying to leave the animal with potential witnesses to his
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responsibility, so “[h]e leaned down and put his arms around the front, picked up the body with
its head lolling against his chest” (36). The sensation of having the physical “thing” in his arms
brings about a confusing change in T. “It,” he notes, “was curiously light for its size and left a
sweep of blood on the blacktop when he dragged it” (36). The idea of the coyote becomes more
real and requires more of his attention when its materiality asserts itself. The weight of the thing,
the trail of blood it leaves, the growl it utters combined with its unmoving legs—these sensory
details, experienced first-hand, alert T. to the possibility that “it probably did not want him near”
(36-7). “It”—or at least the combination of “Its” qualities—makes T. recognize in the animal a
will. T. wishes to respect what he thinks “It” wants, but “somehow he could not leave”—instead
anxiously going to his car and then coming back out again “to see if she was dead yet” (37). The
pronouns shift here from “it” to “she,” as if the time T. spends with the coyote eventually
necessitates the transformation of the coyote from a mere thing to a gendered being, also
requiring more intimate terminology. This materiality is oppressive. T. “willed himself not to
look at her legs” but the loud surge of cars with their bright lights and the smells of asphalt and
blood do not go away no matter where he looks (37).
The materiality of the dying coyote prompts T.’s reflection on the relationship he has to
the nonhuman dead. This relationship takes the form of comparison and a weighing of relative
value. The comparison reasserts his value as a human and mitigates the value of a coyote’s death
based on the responses to each: “Animals died by the road and you saw that all the time,
everyone did. You saw them lying there, so obvious in their deadness . . . You saw the insides
all exposed. You thought: that is the difference between them and me. My insides are firmly
contained” (37-8). Note the rhetorical “you” here, as if the psychonarration insists on appealing
to the human-ness of the reader to legitimate human superiority and the insignificance of an
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animal’s death. The first type of comparison here simply notes difference; it concerns the
material fact of internal organ placement, the material fact of being alive versus being dead.
There is another comparison, however: “And were I to lie on the side of the road dying, it would
be nothing like that. No one would drive around me: the cars would stop, tens upon hundreds of
them; there would be lines of stopped traffic for miles as they removed my body . . .” (37-8).
What separates the human from the nonhuman in this situation is that the human is alive to see
and note the deadness of the nonhuman.
This kind of distinction is what Herman is referring to when he writes about how selfnarratives condition “assumptions concerning the scope and limits of selfhood as such” (25). He
writes, “these understandings are interwoven not only with assumptions about what a human self
is and how it emerges over time, but also with broader cultural ontologies, which determine the
kinds of selves that are assumed to populate the world, and hence the range of others in relation
to whom a given self-narrative takes shape” (Herman 25). These “cultural ontologies” indicate
“what sort of entities should be profiled as a ‘who’ and not just a ‘what’” (Herman 25). T.’s
internal monologue shifts to measuring significance in terms of human response. Humans give
meaning to any death by their reactions. Stopped cars and lines of automobiles are signs of the
importance of humans. A lack of these signs signifies unimportance, that “it was just a coyote”
(38). The narrator informs us that, in spite of T.’s reasoning, “he felt confused” (38), suggesting
that his rationalization is less than persuasive even to himself. T.’s rationalization demonstrates
his eagerness to absolve himself of wrongdoing towards a coyote, but his confusion shows that
he does not achieve this self-absolution.
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What sort of death is this? Mbembe discusses several types of death that might
characterize an animal death at human hands, “survivor” and “sacrifice,” for instance. 56 But
Mbembe does not discuss accidental death in his article and the deaths he is interested in are
human deaths at the hands of other humans.57 The types of death Mbembe discusses all indicate
a conscious, reasoned killing functioning symbolically as a display of power. Is T.’s accidental
killing of a coyote, then, outside of necropolitics? It is certainly enmeshed in potential legal
obligations to other humans if the carcass causes any damage to human life or property on the
road. The killing is not in itself a demonstration of sovereign power calculated to further subdue
more nonhumans and coerce specific behaviors. Yet his response is political. It requires, at least
from him, a response, an obligation of some kind. It has to be justified and evaluated. As we see
in the pages that follow the death of the coyote, killing the animal also changes T.’s habits in
terms of deploying affect.

AFFECTIVE OBLIGATIONS AND MATERIALITY
Narration in How the Dead Dream explores how affect and materiality contribute to the
deterioration of radical distinctions between the human and the nonhuman. In the passages
following the death of the coyote, T.’s habit of rational expenditure of affect is challenged in
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Jacques Derrida famously follows Heidegger and Levinas in his distinction between human and animal in his
interview with Jean-Luc Nancy: “The animal will never be either a subject nor a Dasein. It doesn’t have an
unconscious either (Freud), nor a rapport to the other as other, no more than there is an animal face (Levinas).”
According to Donna Haraway, Derrida is commenting on the “logic of sacrifice” here, “in which there is no
responsibility toward the living world other than the human” (78). In other words, “Within the logic of sacrifice,
only human beings can be murdered” (Haraway 78).
57
In Animal Liberation, Peter Singer avoids commenting on humans killing nonhumans because of how
complicated the issue is, choosing to focus on animal pain to make his argument. Nonetheless, he writes, “Just as
most human beings are speciesists in their readiness to cause pain in animals when they would not cause a similar
pain to humans for the same reason, so most human beings are speciesists in their readiness to kill other animals
when they would not kill human beings.” He continues, “to avoid speciesism, we must allow that beings who are
similar in all relevant respects have a similar right to life—and mere membership in our own biological species
cannot be a morally relevant criterion for this right.” Before moving, however, Singer makes clear that “a rejection
of speciesism does not imply that all lives are of equal worth.”
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several ways. Indeed, the narrative emphasis on T.’s interiority asks readers to question both
how rational humans really are and how rational they should be. The psychonarration in the
passages after the coyote incident provide a phenomenological description of T.’s experience of
change. He rationalizes, acts on a whim, cares for his distraught mother, falls in love with an
investor’s assistant, and grieves when the woman he loves suddenly dies. These scenes—and
T.’s internal reactions to them—pressure the radical distinction between human and nonhuman
by demonstrating the human tendency towards irrational behavior while maintaining the ability
to rationalize.
T. struggles emotionally and psychically because his experience tells him to rationalize a
radical distinction between the human and the nonhuman, but he feels guilt as if the death of the
coyote were fundamentally like a human death. T.’s response is typically human in this sense; he
relies on the uniquely human faculty of rationalization to cope with the fear that certain valued
qualities are not unique to humans. After the coyote dies and T. goes back to Los Angeles, his
rationalizing continues as a symptom of his obvious affective investment in his material role in
the coyote’s death. He abjectly gets rid of the car he hit her with—“irrational, but he had to get
rid of it” (38). T. tries to convince himself that it was “maybe half-blind” or “feeble and
exhausted” (38). Perhaps it suffered and consciously chose to be hit by his car. This line of
thinking is a dead end, however: “But no. A coyote might want relief from suffering, but to plan
for her own end seemed human” (38). Of course, the coyote cannot have human qualities! His
response is irrepressible, “a rising pity he could not repress” (38). This pity causes him to reflect
(another uniquely human activity) on how he has interacted with animals throughout his life. As
a child he always wanted a pet, but his mother refused. His mother liked animals “as long as
they stayed where they belonged—that is, in paintings, stories, even stained-glass windows”
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(39). She refuses several ideas for pets with a variety of reasons related to hygiene and
cleanliness, chiefly that they all “smelled” (39). It’s clear from T.’s reflection that he has
internalized from his mother’s conditioning uncomfortable feelings about animal materiality.
Representations of animals—the idea of animals—were interesting and desirable, but the fact of
them being near repulsed her. When T. thinks of coyotes later he feels “a pulse of identification
and regret, curious and painful” (62).
The narrative description of irrationality and rationalizing is accompanied by a narrative
emphasis on phenomenology and materiality. On a whim, T. adopts a dog, and the process is
narrated with strange attention to detail (40). 58 The narrator continues to present T.’s internal
reactions to these goings-on, narrating such oddly obvious non-events as “An animal was with
him” (40). The effect of such statements is bizarre; T. is obviously adapting to the novelty of
being in proximity to an animal he chose, but the only novelty in this situation is the material fact
itself. There is nothing else to narrate except the blatantly obvious, banal fact of T.’s coexistence
with the dog, yet—to accurately follow T.’s thinking—this non-event must be narrated because
it’s novel to him. The narration also focuses on phenomenology in this portion of the novel, as
opposed to reporting rational human thought or action. In such moments, Millet begins to use
narrative to break down the radical distinction between human and nonhuman. While T.’s
rational thought is uniquely human, the feeling of closeness is not.
How the Dead Dream examines the nature of affective obligation by putting T. in
situations where the rational construction of affective expenditures is disrupted by other kinds of
affective work. The adoption of the dog is followed by another unwelcome affective obligation.
T.’s mother Angela shows up at his workplace crying because, as she tells T., “Your father’s
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Dogs and coyotes are both in the genus Canis and are thus closely related species (Bekoff 2).

72

gone” (41). When T. asks where his father has gone, she responds “I don’t know” (41). The
internal monologue following this exchange demonstrates T.’s gauging the affective obligation
required of him: “I don’t know, he thought. So not dead” (41). T.’s affective investment in his
family necessitates several kinds of responses to the vague status of “gone.” Gone-as-in-dead
requires on type of affective display, and gone-as-in-merely-disappeared requires quite another
type. The affective display T. chooses turns out to be something of an over-commitment when
his mother stays in his guest room where she is still living weeks later. The psychonarration
notes that “in terms of progress her presence threatened to reduce him” and therefore “[s]he was
a liability” (44). Like the scene in which T. kills the coyote, Angela’s material presence in his
home comes as an awkward and inconvenient infringement on his autonomy because it elicits
affects he tries to hold in check as much as possible. Also like the coyote, Angela’s physical
presence is experienced by T. in terms of weight, as a kind of oppressive thing-ness: “now
suddenly he carried personal freight, which threatened to hold him back” (45). The use of the
word “progress” earlier and the phrase “hold him back” here suggest a physical burden, wherein
the metaphor of personal freedom and success as a kind of unencumbered movement positions
T.’s mother’s presence itself as a carryable, burdensome thing. Here, again, rational human
thought is mixed with phenomenal emphasis on materiality in Millet’s narration. The narrative
focus on materiality is not linked to nonhumans specifically, however. Indeed, it functions more
like a metaphor for T.’s experience of stress. T. fears that his investors will correlate
childishness with his mother’s presence. Angela’s presence is thus both like a physical weight in
the metaphor of financial freedom as freedom of movement and evidence of the lack of
sophistication T. hopes to have grown out of earlier in the novel. But T. lets her continue to stay,
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in spite of her inconvenience, because “he could not bring himself to hurt her further” and “he
wanted to comfort her” (45, 49).
In these passages, the novel seems to focus on how T. deals with unplanned affective
expenditures—most of which are inconvenient and unwelcome. T.’s conversations with his
mother demonstrate his insistence on dispassionate calculation and his mother’s panicked
inability to function on her own. T. accepts the affective obligation of her presence because of
her own affective dependence. Part of what frustrates T., however, about his mother’s affective
dependence on him is his notion that this dependence should be located elsewhere. 59 He
struggles to cope with his father’s “callousness” in leaving without a word (52). When she gets a
letter from T.’s father indicating that the divorce has been finalized, T. comes home to find her
and her friend Terry outside, and Terry informs him that “She broke things” (63). 60 That night T.
finds her in the bathtub unconscious from a stroke and calls paramedics in time to save her life
(66). While Angela is at the hospital, T. concludes that “His father’s absence . . . meant more to
her than his presence ever had” (66). When Angela leaves the hospital, T. installs her in her own
apartment (69). Like his mother, T. needs an outlet for the aggression catalyzed by his father’s
apathy. Unlike his mother, however, T. runs to relieve this energy. For him, the physical
exertion is not how he gets rid of this energy, but through the pounding his feet take on the sand
(83). The sensation of slamming his feet into the sand works like his mother’s breaking of
household objects. The narration emphasizes T.’s attempts to reconcile his sense of obligation to

When his father calls, T. insists that his father call his mother and account for his actions. What’s owed here is
recognition of another’s affective investment.
60
As it turns out, T.’s father has dispensed with all of his marital affective obligations and has chosen to embrace a
new lifestyle as a gay man in the Florida Keys (76). T. resents his father’s transformation yet recognizes when he
meets him that “he was not the same man” (78). His father’s transformation is almost complete; he is physically
more fit and tan, blonder as well, and he dresses more casually. He goes by “Davy” now instead of “Dave” or
“David” as T. remembers him (80). He’s “starting fresh” and T. remarks that he “doesn’t seem to be interested” in
Angela’s stroke (81).
59
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his mother with his impatience. These passages also make clear how much T. depends on others
to do affective work that he would rather not do. Not all unplanned affective expenditures are
unwelcome, however. T.’s next unexpected affective investment happens when he falls in love
with an investor’s assistant named Beth. This sensation is “giddy, liberated and captive both” as
he “lost his autonomy” (58). For thirty pages she is his perfect companion. When she is
suddenly killed due to a rare cardiac event, T.’s grieved response connects this human death to
the death of the coyote earlier in the novel (90-1): “His ears were ringing. He was choking and
his knees buckled. His head was squeezed, itched, and stung” (90).
The description of T.’s response to his girlfriend’s death demonstrates several things
about affect. T.’s response shows the ways in which affect is not always expended rationally.
Initially, his grief is so visceral that he has to be helped to a cot and then to a toilet because he
has trouble controlling his bowels (91). When he gets out of the bathroom, his body seems not
his own: “The teeth chattered out of control; his jaw was not his own. He thought his eyeballs
might be jarred loose” (91). The doctor tries to manage his grief by assuring T. that her death
was instantaneous, that she would not have known what was going on, that she would not have
felt pain (92). His mother takes care of him while he is all but incapacitated by grief. 61 When T.
gains more control of his body, he mourns for several pages while periodically trying
antidepressants and religion to alleviate his ennui, until he can visit her grave. Then he visits
Beth’s grave obsessively, even though she’s buried in another state, and starts a fire near it for no
apparent reason (109). His grieving becomes insistent and spectacular. The narrator informs us
that “soon grief ceased to order his time and his demeanor returned intact” (111). Yet an
“alteration” in his routines insists that the grief has not actually passed, only become repressed or
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Indeed, he is so incapacitated that he finds out later that he missed Beth’s burial (96).
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properly sublimated (111). As he walks away from the fire in front of Beth’s grave, he can hear
sirens in the distance (presumably to respond to the blaze at the cemetery), but he feels better.
The psychonarration tells us simply, “Authority was not all,” and, though the narrator does not
dwell on this statement, it proves an epiphanic moment as T. comes to the realization that the
only way for him to come to terms with his grief is through processes that are not officially
sanctioned or socially acceptable responses to death (109).

THE GRIEF MARKET
How the Dead Dream uses T.’s experience to draw comparisons between various kinds of death.
T. gets back into real estate. He has the chance—a “golden egg”—to develop “a swath of empty
desert” into a retirement community (55). Bateman describes this project as a “set-aside”
development (160).62 Although, this development project will result in the displacement of an
obscure rat species, T. goes ahead with the project anyway (123). A biologist explains to him
that the kangaroo rats might go extinct because of this project (125). While the biologist tells
him this in “a matter-of-fact” way, T. “found his own throat closing” (125). He wonders what
could cause this emotion: “Was it something else from his life? It must be, something else
glancing across from the side as he stood there. Still always Beth, possibly; he could not be
choked up over the kangaroo rat,” though he obviously is (125). He mistakes the guilt of being
responsible for the deaths of the last members of a species for a belated moment of grief over
Beth’s death. Shortly thereafter he finds out that the rats had been “extinguished” (128). When

According to Bateman, “In conservation biology, ‘the set-aside’ (Sotherton 259) designates a compromise
between environmental preservation and economic development. In exchange for setting aside a piece of land for
protection of a vulnerable or endangered species, the developer or farmer is allowed to proceed with a project, be it
the extraction of resources from proximate land or the construction of residential or commercial property upon it”
(152).
62
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he finds out that the kangaroo rat is extinct he examines the desert oasis he constructed and notes
the boundary between the property and the unbuilt environment where coyotes live: “Coyotes
could live anywhere. They were not like the rats, who lived only on one small patch of land.
They could live anywhere and die anywhere too. Like him. They were opportunists” (128-9).
To diminish his grief and guilt, T. compares rats to coyotes and coyotes to himself, finding the
rats inferior for their inability to adapt, for their lack of durability. His psychic well-being is
predicated on a comparison that is always-already self-serving. Bateman argues that the concept
of a “set-aside” proves untenable, both in terms of conservation and as a metaphor for T.’s sense
of independence from his environment: “The very place he had intended to sequester in order to
distinguish himself as both a valuable developer and a conscientious conservationist becomes
instead the site of his undoing and absorption into an ecology whose multiple nonhuman
agencies refuse to separate or be set aside” (161).
T.’s self-understanding as obviously, radically different from the nonhuman world begins
to break down after the kangaroo rat extinction, about halfway through the novel. Greenwald
Smith sees the novel’s major tension in T.’s return to real estate as he comes to consciousness
about his role in violence towards nonhumans (107). In these passages, reading is awkward
because it’s difficult to identify with T. (Smith 107). Greenwald Smith writes, “The result is a
prevailing sense of unease, alienation, and distress, as the need for communion with the
nonhuman is urgently declared and the opportunity for interspecies relation through emotional
codification is denied” (107). He frequently returns to the desert outside of the built community
where he feels “permeable” and “oddly inseparable from the dirt and the dry golden grass” (129).
He sits staring into the desert for hours and feels elemental sensations: “Sediment accumulated
on him, buried him gradually, and more and more he was silted in” (130). Being “silted in” here
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amounts to effacement of personal identity as a tactic for allaying grief and other troubles of
being in the world. As Greenwald Smith notes, however, “Despite T.’s existential revelations,
the novel stubbornly continues to put him at the center of the action, seemingly more in accord
with the novel’s form than in any way consistent with the belief and motivations of T. as a
coherent character” (109). While the protagonist has a mental shift with regard to his attitudes
towards nonhumans, the novel does not enact a corresponding formal shift by decentering the
human.
Ella Soper reads How the Dead Dream as participating in the interdisciplinary animal
studies project that seeks to transform human relationships with nonhuman animals in the
interest of justice (746). According to Soper, literature is uniquely capable of contributing to this
transformation because it can encourage humans to empathize with nonhumans (746). To this
end, Soper “suggest[s] that the novel provokes our moral imaginations by foregrounding the
figure of the resistant mourner” (747). By “resistant mourner” Soper means that “both the
attitude of the melancholic mourner, who resists consolation, and the ways in which mourning
beyond prescribed social bounds might culminate in acts of overt dissent” (747). The structural
elements illuminating T. as a resisting mourner that culminate in T.’s act of overt dissent are “his
surprising and erratic encounters with wounded and imperiled animals” (749). Soper then
focuses on the instances in which T. is called upon to respond to various deaths, both human and
nonhuman. Like Freedom, How the Dead Dream self-consciously reflects on the ethics and
feasibility of producing eco-narratives at all. Soper notes that Millet uses the character of T. to
comment on the ethics of profiting through ecological grief-mongering. Soper notes that T.
profits from the destruction of animals, but he does not seem to understand his role in their
deaths or allow knowledge of his role to change his actions. T., not unlike the novelist or

78

ecocritics, “profit[s], to one degree or another, from the grief work they feel compelled to
perform” (755n2). This leads Soper to call for a practice of grief in response to species loss that
resists consolation, thus drawing attention to the ongoingness of the dead grieved for by refusing
appeasement.
The affective price of various deaths must be considered, at least partially, with an eye
towards character development. For example, T. at the beginning of the novel spends little time
thinking about the death of the coyote—and from this readers get a sense of both T.’s early
callousness as well as a general understanding that the coyote’s life is not worth what a human
life is worth—but he might, after some affective training or character growth, expend more
sympathy if he were to encounter such a death near the end of the novel. What, then, is Millet
really measuring here? On the one hand, the death compares with other deaths in the novel, so
readers can judge an appropriate response to the deaths and thus the appropriate value of the
imagined life. On the other hand, however, readers can also judge T.’s response to the death by
degrees of appropriateness—perhaps on a scale from callous indifference to sentimental
overflow of feelings—thus measuring T.’s character itself based on his over/under-valuations of
deaths and lives. The temporality of the novel then can function to either line up instances of
comparable data (deaths) for us to compare and generate market information from or it can
function as a conditioner of moral fiber—the longer the hero lives, the closer he gets to the
appropriate response to any given death. 63 As Soper puts it, T.’s learning to sleep in the presence
of animals becomes “a measure of his affective growth” (752).

The novel’s message about grief is constructed through this death data. Harvey notes that neoliberalism’s
“commodification of everything” runs against the grain of some cultural values, such as the inappropriateness of
commodifying religious events (166). While the value of an individual death may be uncomfortable to calculate or
discern by comparison, Millet’s novel demonstrates just how susceptible death is to neoliberalization.
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REFLECTING ON DIFFERENCE
T.’s excessive grief expresses itself in his insistence on cohabitating, even briefly, with the last of
various species. Rachel Greenwald Smith argues that this concerted effort at “envisioning the
world from the perspectives of endangered species” signals the dissolution of “[t]he foundations
of the bildungsroman form” (103). 64 In these cohabitations, the cognizing of grief becomes
inadequate to do justice to these dying creatures. T. finds their dying demands his physical
presence, his material self, to cohabit with them, to share the space of their enclosures for at least
one night. Brian Massumi argues that “in the case of the zoo, as well as in other contexts where
humans work to hold themselves at a distance in the role of uncomplicated observer, whether in
the field, in the laboratory, or in front of a screen, it is visibly an issue of a rigidly exclusionary
operation” (65). T.’s cohabitation suggests that the “exclusionary operation” of animal
observation must, for no stated reason, become less rigid. When he starts cohabitating with
animals at night, he has no special expertise. He knew the zoo animals lived in cages but nothing
more about them except that they were alone, most of them, not only alone in the cages, often,
but alone on the earth, vanishing” (134). T.’s loneliness after Beth’s death makes him empathize
with animals stuck alone in enclosures and map his loneliness onto them. According to
Massumi, even though zoos enact an exclusionary gesture on caged animals, zoos encourage
spectator identification with the animals: “an identificatory confusion is overlaid upon the
category separation inherent to the institution of the zoo” (72). His considerations of mortality
align the individual human life with threatened species life—precarious, protected but

For Greenwald Smith, this dissolution has broader implications: “The end of the novel sees narrative form
floundering in the face of a Copernican revolution in species supremacy. The implication is that the form of the
novel itself, and indeed perhaps the form of stories in general, is so firmly esconced in the legacy of capitalism and,
more radically, in human exceptionalism that it cannot articulate challenges to these foundational beliefs without
ceasing, in some fundamental sense, to tell a story” (104).
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nonetheless vulnerable, ultimately doomed. The animals, whom T. reads as lonely, offer him an
image of his own loneliness, as if only they can truly appreciate his own condition. Like him,
“rare” animals were “at the forefront of loneliness” (135). T. admits to himself, however, that
“he had no good reason for doing this” when he climbs, for the first time, into the enclosure of an
aging Mexican grey wolf (135).
T.’s “identificatory confusion” in zoo enclosures can be productively understood in terms
of what David Herman calls “discourse domains.” (20). According to Herman, discourse
domains are “the arenas of conduct in which strategies for orienting to self-other relationships—
including human-animal relationships—take shape. Discourse domains are frameworks for
activity that, operative in a full range of cultural, subcultural, and interpersonal settings,
determine what kinds of subjective experiences it is appropriate and warranted to attribute to
others, nonhumans as well as human” (202). 65 According to Herman, “it is an established
position within narratology to associate far-reaching mental-state attributions with fictional
narratives” (223). Nonetheless, How the Dead Dream speculates very little on the mental-state
attributes of nonhuman animals. It does, however, track the mental-state attributes of a human in
several different discourse domains as he changes his thinking about how animals think. The
passages in which T. is breaking into zoos emphasize the human quality of reflection, but the
need to enter enclosures are never presented as the result of reasoning.
The narrator presents T.’s growth in his thinking about the relationship between humans
and animals, but we are never given access to persuasive, logical accounts of why T. has to break
into zoos to sooth his grief (or for any other reason). After spending a night in the zoo with the

Herman uses the examples of “paleontological research, debating the status of animal minds, or going on a walk
with a dog”—“Clearly, different sorts of ascriptive practices will be deemed appropriate and warranted across these
different domains” (222).
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Mexican grey wolf, T. reorients his perspective on animals. He reflects, “Animals were selfcontained and people seemed to hold this against them—possibly because most of them had
come to believe that animals should be like servants or children. Either they should work for
men, suffer under a burden, or they should entertain them” (137). The distance separating T.
from animals has shifted. When he kills the coyote earlier in the novel, he thinks in dualistic
terms: me vs. not-me, like-me vs. not-like-me, human vs. non-human. He has not likened the
animals to himself, but he chooses corollaries that are human. 66 These corollaries, however, are
classed—kinds of humans that he is not himself, humans with less agency or even subjectivity.
Nonetheless, T. realizes that he is only in the process of overcoming long held beliefs and
prejudices about wild animals. Even as he recognizes that it is wrong to expect animals to either
work for humans or entertain them, he harbors these desires himself: “Privately, he thought, at
the heart of it, you wanted animals to turn to you in welcome” (138). The narrator insists on
marking the unutterability of this sentiment. T. thinks this, but also maps the thought onto
someone else, anyone else—“you.” T. knows how ridiculous it is to expect wild animals to
actually turn tame and friendly when humans desire it, but the narrator suggests how difficult it
is to come to terms with this desire and respond to it ethically. 67
T.’s attempts to recognize his grief and loneliness reflected back at him in “lonely” zoo
animals leads him to see that his economic choices make him complicit in the loneliness of
endangered animals. The more he researches, the more he sees that mass extinction is linked to
the expansion of capital. He considers his own situation as a real estate developer and knows

The narrator channels his thoughts as follows: “Beth was finished being dead, with her departure accomplished
and her absence complete . . . The animals on the other hand were in the middle of dying, not only one at a time, but
in sweeps and categories. This he found increasingly distressing” (139).
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It’s only later, after T. becomes a seasoned breaker-and-enterer-of-zoos—and after a run-in with a baby
crocodile—that the narrator can state firmly “[t]hey were not pets” (164).
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that he has a job to do but laments that “[t]here should have been a fair fight . . . there had to be
reason, balance. There had to be, at the very least, recognition” (141). 68 But T. is interested in
more than recognition. He wants to make animals his “study” because the animals in them were
“close at hand,” so he researches them extensively (141).69 He does not break in to “stalk”
them.70 Rather, he “enter[s] their enclosures [to] sit in one place to observe them” (164). He
learns lock-picking to aid his study and visits zoos “at nighttime, which left his days free for
commerce” (141). Susan McHugh notes the hypocrisy in T.’s attempts at “recognition’: “At
night he breaks into zoos and captive breeding facilities in order to make himself vulnerable to
these rare animals, explicitly not to look at them but to enable them to notice him feeling the loss
of their kind” (249). This is not quite accurate, as the quotes above should make clear. T.
certainly does break into the zoos to see them in a particular way—as well as to be seen by them.
Nonetheless, McHugh criticizes T.’s actions thus: “It reads like a version of white-savior
complex because it remains unclear what that does for the animals” (249). This point is an
important one because the novel is clearly more concerned at this point in what T.’s actions do
for T. than what they do for the animals.
T. attempts to put himself in the place of the vanishing animals in an effort to understand
what their existence is like. David Watson notes that “the affective and ethical transformation”
of T. is occasioned his brush with extinction and his realization that “the human species shares in
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T. begins subscribing to magazines that gave him information about vanishing animals (139).
He also “only broke into accredited zoos” because he is wants to see something besides misery—which is what he
thinks he would see if he broke into unaccredited zoos with a low standard of treatment for the animals (151).
70
According to Bateman, T.’s entrance into enclosures to sleep is a form of surrender. He argues, “His surrender to
sleep in these scenes is simultaneously a surrender to the animals. If sleep is something we surrender to from the
earliest age, then perhaps it is the condition of our ability to surrender to other forces and agencies as well” (164).
Batmean reads T.’s act of sleeping as a gesture that resists “the modern idea that each sleeper should have his own
private quarters” that “has led to the construction of larger houses and the destruction and displacement of still more
wildlife” (164).
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this drift toward extinction” (61). 71 He visits some pupfish—which evolved in isolation and are
therefore very rare—and has a similar sensation. He reflects, “It was easy to think of the fish
existing in pure monotony” (161). He cannot understand what it is like to be these fish. At this
sanctuary for the fish, he engages in metacongnitive work, realizing that his ideas about the
personalitylessness of fish are linked to how they figure as “lesser” beings than humans. When
he breaks into enclosures, he begins to realize that he cannot actually understand their loneliness
or their boredom, so he cedes power to the animals by falling asleep in their enclosures, often
waking up with the animals nearer him than he expected (164-7).72 As he does this, his mother’s
condition deteriorates. T.’s mother stops exhibiting some of the features that T. associates with
her as an individual human being, such as cleanliness, materialism, pickiness with regard to the
food she eats (146-8). The narrator does not use language that specifically animalizes T.’s
mother, but T. hires a nurse to make sure that she bathes, as if an effort must be made by those
involved to keep her human. He reflects later that his mother “was so often childlike” (159).
As T.’s reflection on how nonhumans should be treated develops, he begins to treat
humans with more tenderness. Around the same time that his mother’s condition starts to
deteriorate, T. meets Casey, the daughter of his assistant, Susan. Casey is an “angry and
depressed” paraplegic (152). T. is “amused by her pugnacity”; she seems like a teenager to him,
even though she’s only a few years younger than him (155). He spends time with her almost
every week. When his mother fails to recognize him, he treats her with more care and patience
than he did earlier in the novel (189-94). He also reflects on the affective conventions of family.
He realizes that he is not close to his family: “Part of the growing estrangement from family, in

With a Sumatran rhinoceros, T. tries to fathom the animal’s loneliness and cannot gauge anything about what it
thinks or feels. He obstructs his own sight to try to approximate how the rhinoceros sees (145).
72
According to Bateman, “Resting and sleeping symbolize T.’s flatness, but they also function as a melancholic
identification with the dead” (159).
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the end, was a simple product of freedom. It was the American way to pick and choose from a
range of possibilities, not to be bound and obligated”—and so too with divorce (195). T.
considers how animals are different (195-6).
T.’s reflections on the relationship between humans and nonhumans develops throughout
the novel. He reflects, “The zoos were not new. What was new about them was the way the
animals were valued as possessions more than symbols, the way the animals had become scarcer
and scarcer as millennia passed so that they now were tradable” (196). Mass extinction turns
zoos into mausoleums where animals are preserved on their way to disappearance. This
realization eventually overwhelms T. He spends several nights with elephants who remember
him from previous nights, and he begins to feel what he thinks is their loneliness, boredom, and
rage (198-200). He resolves not to return to zoos anymore for fear of being infected with their
ennui(199).
The last few chapters of the novel relate T.’s trip to Belize, where he is developing a
tourist resort.73 About halfway through the novel, he buys a jungle island in Belize to develop a
tourist destination and initiates plans to strip the shoreline of vegetation, to ship in sand from
elsewhere to make the spot look more traditionally tropical (111-3). When he takes a trip to
supervise the construction, it is on the eve of a major tropical storm (about which he is “not
worried”) (204). The storm functions as both a tragic human disaster and a spectacular
nonhuman reclamation of space. Flooding spoils the man-made landscapes around the hotel he’s
staying at, and the television feed the guests are using to monitor the storm’s progress fails (205-

While T.’s real estate business is apparently based mostly in the United States, his foreign enterprises mark him as
one of the elites of neoliberal globalization who are not tied down—financially or otherwise—the any particular
nation-state (Harvey 35-6).
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6). The power is out and the gardens are destroyed when the storm finally “blew itself out”
(207). T. reflects on the flimsiness of human works:
Mastery was only a moment in the mind—of other men, of yourself. Like the stock
market, a consensus of optimism, a pure abstraction, nothing to the tsunamis, the boiling
sun, the plate tectonics. The social compact was abstraction—roads, buildings, and a
temporary agreement about behavior. That was it. The matter beneath it all was what
lasted, ad meanwhile, always, the world of people was on the edge of dissolution. (207)
These reflections are framed as the drunken musings of a bored T. as he drinks wine in a hotel
without any electricity. Nonetheless, they present a commentary on T.’s earlier insistence on and
fetishization of control. In these musings, control is precarious, necessarily temporary, and
perhaps illusory. The control he thinks he exercises is dwarfed by natural disasters. Emblems of
human control over nature like roads are ultimately reduced to mere matter when stripped of
their human-endowed meaning.
The next day, when people can finally leave the hotel, T. wants to get a boat to his island
to assess the damage. When trying to find a pilot, however, he finds out that the nearby village
has been decimated. His workers’ lives are in disarray. His foreman’s son has not returned and
is probably drowned (211). T. tries to empathize with his foreman, and—in an odd moment—
asks for a guide down the main river into the jungle “to the preserve where the jaguars live”
(211). When he finds out his development property is “totaled,” he lends his hotel room to a
family whose house had been destroyed (212). He calls his mother to tell her he will be out of
touch for a few weeks, but she cannot hear him well and does not recognize him (213). He heads
inland and wonders, “Was that where everyone would go, once the coastlines were gone?
Higher ground” (213). He considers the jungle the place where men can go to be animal again,
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but also considers what it means to be human: “you did not have to know yourself to be fully
human. There were always those who did not, and no one said they were beasts” (214). This
last passage seems to connect with T.’s last conversation with his mother, who does not
recognize him—or even herself. He clings to the notion of his mother as human but—
uncharacteristic at this point in the novel—relies on a logic that appeals to what “no one” said for
affirmation. His ambitions are animal freedom, but he wants human-ness for his mother.
In the jungle, T.’s guide explains to him that the odds of seeing a jaguar, even on a jaguar
preserve, are extremely low (215). T. replies, “It’s OK . . . I just want to be where they live. I
want to be in the theater. You know? But I don’t expect them to give me a show” (215). The
metaphor is an odd one because, even framing the jaguar search in terms of theater belies T.’s
desire to see a jaguar. He may not realistically expect a show, but he cannot help but want one.
The passage echoes his frustration with the inconsiderate family in the zoo earlier in the novel.
Even as T. tries to separate himself from the selfish human spectator that appreciates nonhuman
animals only for their spectacular qualities, he indicates that is is—in fact—much like them. He
reflects that he “had mostly wanted to get away” (216). The “mostly” here is telling because it is
evidence of the desires that T. knows to be illicit or unethical but that he harbors nonetheless.
After a few days of travel, the narration begins to change subtly. T. returns to camp to
find his guide unresponsive, perhaps dead (219). 74 He is five miles from the riverbank and a few
days on the river away from anyone who can help him, but he resolves to drag the guide’s body
back to human-populated areas.75 The passages following the guide’s death relate T.’s hapless
attempts to drag the body to the river and navigate a boat downriver to settlements (219-24). In
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This discovery occurs directly after T. reflects on how dependent he is on humans and suffers hints that his
fantasy of re-animalization is superficial (218).
75
His trial is excruciating, and “once or twice, exhausted, he found himself weeping, though he did not feel grief”
(221).
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these sections, T. is never referred to by Thomas or “T.,” as he has been referred to throughout
the novel. His identity is effaced, and T. becomes simply “he.” T. loses his name and, with it,
his identity. Specifically, his actions become indistinguishable from the actions of any other
forest entity to whom masculine pronouns apply.

NARRATION
The narration in How the Dead Dream consistently reasserts the primacy of human experience in
opposition to the experiences of both other humans and nonhumans. It does so, that is, until the
end of the novel. Much of the novel reinforces a familiar realist humanism at the expense of
narrating with the nonhuman in mind. This reinforcement is expressed most when the narrative
“stops” and the narrator reports T.’s reflections. The reportage of time passing and events
happening takes a back seat to the supposedly human faculty of reflection.76 Near the end of the
novel, however, the discourse domain changes dramatically. Earlier in the novel, narrative
depended on the human faculty of reflection and a particularly human experience of the passage
of time. When T.’s ability to reflect gets muddled, and his sense of the passage of time becomes
less distinct, the narrative tools to represent experience that is uniquely human become
inadequate, and representational strategies Millet employs reflect experiences that are not
particularly human.
At the end of the novel, however, T. fades as a distinct character separate from other
characters and his surroundings. Caren Irr writes of the end of the novel: “[it] closes with a
dangerous trek through a tropical forest” and “resolves in the hero’s renunciation of his drive to
know his environment” (86). After the death of T.’s guide in the Belizean jungle, the narrator
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Herman notes that “forms of reasoning” have long been held up as “threshold criteria for species identity” (100).
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stops referring to T. as “T.” and instead T. becomes simply a masculine pronoun. It is this
masculine pronoun the narrator refers to when T.’s reflections are expressed. After growing
frustrated with the oarless boat and exhausted, T. sets up the tent on land and considers that he
has spent much of his life in buildings, in cities, and how far he is from cities now (228). He
absent-mindedly notices “an animal perched on a branch” but does not identify it (231). The
boat accidentally escapes, and T. is stranded in the jungle, where he reflects, after indulging is
some of his remaining whisky, “When a thing became very scarce, that was when it was finally
also seen to be sublime and lovely” (238). T. thinks he finally comes to a mature epiphany about
the value of animals, even though “the market had failed to see the animals for what they were . .
. worth far more than single commodities” (238). The market, T. realizes, will take too long to
realize its mistake, however (238). T. falls asleep with these reflections only to awaken because
“an animal lay on the right hand and arm through the mosquito net” (239). T. cannot see the
animal because it is dark and he refuses to move and risk disturbing it. The description here is
vague: “There was a heft to it, but it was not huge; it was neither large nor small. It was a
mammal, certainly. It was not a jaguar, nor an ocelot or a margay, nothing feline and sly—more
likely a young tapir or a paca, large, stout, snouty, and ground-dwelling” (239-40). He tries to
fall asleep again into his whisky reverie, he periodically wakes up and his reflective sensations
are reported by the narrator. This act is reported as follows: “They were sleeping simply, as the
other animals did, sleeping and dreaming of the life that once might have been . . . As the animal
slept its way through time until the end of it came, so would he” (241). This passage first uses
the plural pronoun to unite the human and the nonhuman. In the next sentence, “the animal”
could well apply to either the human or the nonhuman. The last few pages play on this
ambiguity. Stripped of his name, and his human identification, T. and “the animal” become
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closely aligned, even indistinguishable. According to Caren Irr, “both creatures are shadowed by
the threat of extinction” (86). The passage following the portion quoted above reports a narrative
of “the mother” leaving its young alone. This speculation could be T.’s. He may be considering
a plausible narrative to account for this lone animal’s snuggling up to him. The narrative also
applies to T. in his grief over his mother’s deterioration, as well as what an animal might think
coming upon a stationary, lost mammal in the jungle. The reflections are therefore not rigidly
coded as those of either the human protagonist or the nonhuman character.
The human is not subsumed by the nonhuman, however. Some combinations of pronoun
and verb suggest human action more than others. Within any given paragraph some sentences
may seem to refer to a human actant while others are more ambiguous. The narrative
focalization becomes more communal. The actions are all shared to one degree or another. No
actions are clearly separated into the categories of human or nonhuman. The ambiguity presents
some narratological confusion. This confusion is best explained by referring to Seymour
Chatman’s theory of “existents” (107). According to Chatman, existents are “the objects
contained in story-space . . . character and setting” (107). Chatman calls for what he calls an
“open” theory of character, one in which character “is reconstructed by the audience from
evidence announced or implicit in an original construction and communicated by the discourse”
(119). The problem with “reconstructing” character in the passages at the end of How the Dead
Dream is that, while the original constructions clearly delineate between T. and “a mammal”
who is not T., the “evidence announced or implicit” that the audience is supposed to use to
reconstruct character fails to clearly delineate the two.
These last passages also narrativize a shift from humanism to posthumanism outlined by
Cary Wolfe. While Wolfe carries several definitions of posthumanism through his book, one
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useful definition he uses to describe posthumanism is “a new theoretical model for biological,
mechanical, and communicational processes that removed the human and Homo sapiens from
any particularly privileged position in relation to matters of meaning, information, and
cognition” (xii). In How the Dead Dream, T. clearly occupies a privileged place in the narrative,
and the emphasis on his actions and reflections mark the text as privileging human experience—
even as nonhuman experience is pondered by T. According to Wolfe, “the human occupies a
new place in the universe, a universe now populated by what I am prepared to call nonhuman
subjects” (47). How the Dead Dream presents an interesting case in which the philosophical
question of what it means to be a subject is explored novelistically. Narrative attention is never
fully taken away from the human in favor of the nonhuman, but the attention of the human
subject of the novel is frequently drawn to the experience of nonhumans. Furthermore, the plural
pronouns at the end of the novel grammatically encode a decentering of the human, though they
do not—consequently—privilege the nonhuman as such. The narrator seems to follow T.’s
thinking about walking “to the sea” in the morning, but attribution of these thoughts is not
explicit. Indeed, what the narrator reports is reflection on likeness: “they breathed and breathed.
They both had lungs, they loved to sleep, they liked to be alongside each other in the comfort of
their rhythm” (243).
The last paragraphs emphasize the materiality and affect of closeness, “the feel of others
like itself here close” (243). These passages seem to echo the scene earlier in the novel when T.
hits the coyote and lifts her body. The way How the Dead Dream functions as an eco-novel is by
asking big picture questions about what something is worth in the twenty-first century, when
apocalyptic predictions increasingly warn us about the extinctions of humans and nonhumans.
When apocalyptic predictions become increasingly mundane and fail to be newsworthy, what

91

constitutes “newsworthy” is the effect of an affect economy. “Appropriate” grieving becomes
increasingly untenable. Millet’s treatment of T.’s affective growth dramatizes the difficulty of
reconciling capitalist success and conservation. The narration in How the Dead Dream,
ultimately, takes a more productive approach than the protagonist. While T. tries to juggle his
grief for the oncoming and already-here extinction of humans and nonhumans alike with his
business interests, the narrator of Millet’s novel abandon’s the privileged place of the human in
the moment of crisis. From this critical moment of ideological change, the novel enacts a radical
shift that T. cannot perform himself.
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Beyond Interdependence Day:
Pyrotechnic Storytelling and the Unbelievable-But-True in David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest

In this chapter, I will focus on several passages from David Foster Wallace’s novel
Infinite Jest that present the reader with information about the ecological catastrophe in the
novel’s storyworld. In Infinite Jest, pyrotechnic narration and ekphrasis serve to mediate
between an implausible (though factual) historical narrative and the stylized version of history
the characters in the novel accept as truth. To make sense of Wallace’s approach to representing
geopolitical violence in the novel, it is necessary to understand his treatment of the concept of
believability. The plausible plot of realist fiction would seem to be far removed from Wallace’s
famously satirical aesthetic agenda, but verisimilitude is central to how his narrator in Infinite
Jest treats historical truth within the novel’s storyworld. I will put Wallace’s project in dialogue
with Amitav Ghosh’s recent argument that literary fiction in the realist tradition has struggled to
address the problems of climate change. I will briefly situate Wallace relative to this realist
tradition because I think critics have largely ignored Wallace’s concern with realism, as well as
his environmentalism, in favor of connecting his work to topics Wallace himself wrote about—
such as irony and postmodernism. Ultimately, I argue that in Infinite Jest, Wallace interrogates
the idea of interdependence in its various valences—political, ecological, and medial—through
an unbelievable-yet-true environmental catastrophe narrative. While interdependence is ironized
in the novel as a geopolitical relationship, it is complicated by Wallace’s layering of media to
present his history of environmental injustice. Through the concept of “interdependence,”
Wallace shows how geopolitical and environmental histories are a highly mediated constructs,
narratives that are themselves composed of various media and competing interpretations.
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Wallace’s pyrotechnic storytelling presents the ecological consequences of
environmentally unjust geopolitics, and his humor and overdescription attend to the
unbelievable-yet-true quality of environmental disaster. The ecological crisis that the characters
in Infinite Jest (which was published in 1996 but is set in the future) face is narrated alongside a
film version of that narrative. The conceit itself requires extensive description to even
summarize. Briefly then: a character in the novel, Mario Incandenza, makes a puppet-show
movie about the political rise of an American president and his policy of dumping toxins in
Canada. Wallace’s narrator provides ekphrastic description of that film and periodically jumps
in to comment on the historical accuracy of Mario’s project. This commentary frequently takes
the form of assurances that Mario’s representation of the ecological narrative—though appearing
to be outlandish and ridiculous—is actually close to historical fact. In doing so, Wallace
maintains the prestige and realism of literary fiction while representing a dystopian ecological
catastrophe. Wallace’s comedic epic works to legitimize the strange-but-true narratives of
environmental novelty.
Wallace shows how environmental justice eludes historical documentation. In the novel,
government officials cover up toxic dumping and characters are left with limited journalistic
accounts and rumors to account for birth anomalies and other evidence of poisoning. Through
Mario’s film, Wallace points to the ways in which various media construct environmental
histories that are by turns outlandish and mundane. The causes and effects of environmental
catastrophe are both mired in a mix of journalistic fact and tall tale. What counts as a
“believable” or “plausible” history of environmental injustice is complicated when the facts
prove to be just as fantastic as tabloid headlines and conspiracy theories. The anomalies caused

94

by environmental disaster defy realist representation by being so far removed from what is taken
to be common or everyday.
Amitav Ghosh notes that literary fiction struggles to represent climate change because of
the unbelievability of climate weather events.77 Literary fiction gained its prestige and
popularity by maintaining the illusion that its narratives were true despite their fantastic qualities.
Climate change exists beyond the scope of literary fiction because its weather events do not
achieve requisite believability. In The Great Derangement, Ghosh tries to account for what he
sees as literary fiction’s lackluster response to climate crisis. According to Ghosh, literary
fiction has not responded to the climate crisis for several complex reasons. One has to do with
the way novels depict reality. 78 According to Ghosh, in the eighteenth century mainstream
literary fiction rose in prestige and popularity because of its ability to appeal to readers’ sense of
realistic narrative (16-7).79 Even while recounting improbable events, novels insisted on the
illusion of probability and gained prestige through this adherence to the illusion of realism,
especially in contrast to other forms, such as the epic, the myth, the fable, etc. Because the
fantastic weather events of our age of climate crisis are significant precisely because they go
against the statistical evidence of several centuries, Ghosh argues that literary writers risk losing
the prestige associated with literary fiction by representing events that are inherently unrealistic
(24-6). Furthermore, novels buck up against the scalar magnitude of climate change. Its causes
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Amitav Ghosh, The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable. U. of Chicago P., 2016
In The Rise of the Novel, Ian Watt argues that what was so novel about the novel form was its ability to represent
human experience realistically. Novelists follow “a set of narrative procedures” common only to the novel and
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are centuries old, exceeding the temporal scope of even epic literary novels (61-2). Its causes are
also global in scope, exceeding the spatial limitations of the intimate and distinctive worlds
constructed by literary novelists (63).
Although Wallace was skeptical towards the kind of literary fiction that Ghosh clearly
has in mind—that is, literary fiction in the realist tradition—critics have been conflicted about
the realistic aspects of his work. Wallace describes himself as “clearly not” in the realist
tradition, but even with the blatantly unrealistic satirical elements in his fiction he tried “to
countenance and render real aspects of real experiences that have been previous excluded from
art” (McCaffery 139, 140). What Wallace calls “Big R” realism of literary fiction is not what he
is going for, though there is an element of realism that he holds dear. 80 Some critics have noted
realist qualities in Wallace’s fiction. For instance, Timothy Jacobs argues that “[i]n Infinite Jest,
Wallace revives the mimetic tradition of realism . . . by defamiliarizing current literary
perceptions and expectations within his artifact” (216).81 Still, Wallace’s satirical novel, at first
glance, makes few claims to believability. It is hardly the kind of realist literary fiction that
Ghosh is writing about. Frank Louis Cioffi calls Infinite Jest “a science fiction novel of a sort
insofar as it presents a future world” (165). While its literariness has rarely been disputed, how
to categorize Infinite Jest has been the subject of much critical debate. Though it may be
obvious, Tore Rye Andersen notes that the dust jacket for Infinite Jest’s first edition makes sure
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to distinguish Infinite Jest from other genres: “Wallace and/or his publisher have clearly found it
important that their book be characterized as a novel” (257). Marshall Boswell sees Wallace,
despite his admirable work in several areas of writing—short stories and journalism most
notably—as primarily a writer of encyclopedic novels, of which Infinite Jest is the most obvious
example, and argues that Wallace saw himself as such (264). In a similar vein, Tom LeClair
regards the “prodigious fiction” of Wallace, Richard Powers, and William T. Vollmann as
“information systems, as long-running programs of data with a collaborative genesis” (14).
Wallace himself had much to say about the kind of writing a serious writer should do.
Much of the critical response to Wallace’s work—especially the critical response initially
following Infinite Jest—has been skewed by Wallace’s own forthright publications about his
aims in writing fiction. Wallace’s essays and interviews frequently comment on the
responsibility of artists and the proper goals of fiction. Wallace’s 1993 essay “E Unibus Pluram:
Television and U.S. Fiction,” is frequently read as a manifesto outlining Wallace’s aesthetic
theory. In this essay, Wallace argues that “irony and ridicule are entertaining and effective, and .
. . at the same time they are agents of a great despair and stasis in U.S. culture, and . . . for
aspiring fictionists they pose terrifically vexing problems” (171). While irony was, for
postmodern artists (especially fiction writers) a useful tool for critiquing dominant power
structures, Wallace points out what he sees as the co-opting of irony by television and mass
culture, making irony lose its bite, turning it into “weary cynicism” (184). To counter the
overabundance of irony in 1990’s U.S. culture, Wallace suggests that “the next real literary
‘rebels’ in this country might well emerge as some weird bunch of ‘anti-rebels,’ born oglers who
dare to back away from ironic watching, who have the childish gall actually to endorse single-
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entendre values” (192).82 Many viewed Wallace as therefore attempting to break from the
tradition of postmodern irony to advocate for a new sincerity in literary fiction without resorting
to an outdated form of literary realism.
What this critical concern amounts to is Wallace setting the terms under which his work,
especially Infinite Jest, would be discussed for almost two decades. Bradley J. Fest correctly
suggests that “a ‘standard’ reading of his fiction has emerged,” one that “revolve[s] around irony
and his sense of being a latecomer in relation to his postmodern forbears” (284). Mary K.
Holland argues that “Infinite Jest fails to deliver on the agenda that Wallace set for it, not only
because it fails to eschew empty irony for the earnestness that Wallace imagines but also, and
more importantly, because it fails to recognize and address the cultural drive toward narcissism
that fuels and is fueled by that irony” (218). Timothy Jacobs compares the ideologies expressed
in Wallace’s Infinite Jest and Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov to argue that in
Infinite Jest “Wallace subtly suggests that the same kind of cultural nihilism of Dostoevsky’s
time is apparent in contemporary American literature” (269). Iannis Goerlandt argues that
Infinite Jest “explicitly functionalizes the abstract ‘superstructure’ of poetic texts to counter an
ironic reading,” unlike the “Entertainment” cartridge in the novel’s plot (310). These critical
accounts of Wallace and irony function to focus on the ways in which Wallace is mired in a
tradition of postmodern metafiction that had rejected literary realism as outdated—even as
Wallace himself tried to rehabilitate the reputation of some realist literary principles.

Other literary critics have focused specifically on irony in Wallace’s work. Mark Bresnan’s essay on Infinite Jest,
for instance, focuses on play and anxiety. Bresnan writes that “In each of Infinite Jest’s three interconnected plots,
characters confront dilemmas that require them to renounce their autonomy in order to engage in playful activities,
including sports, recreation, and leisure” (52). Petrus van Ewijk sees Wallace’s treatment of Alcoholics Anonymous
in Infinite Jest as a curative rebuttal of irony-obsessed mass consumer culture or at least a temporary safe haven
from it (143). Allard Den Dulk offers a systematic comparison of the “irony critique” of David Foster Wallace (by
focusing on Infinite Jest) and Søren Kierkegaard (325). Adam Kelly argues that Infinite Jest “instantiates a new
brand of sincerity in a formal and performative manner” (n. pag.).
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Curiously, few critics have commented on Wallace’s environmentalism. The most
influential account of how Wallace’s fiction comments on environmentalism is almost certainly
Heather Houser’s description of the linkage between the affect of disgust and somatic sickness in
Infinite Jest. She argues as follows:
Wallace’s fiction of social, ecological, and somatic poisoning molds a medicalized
environmental consciousness with disgust as its emotional core. Activated by the
imbrication of body and environment, disgust is a conduit to engaging with human and
nonhuman others as it counteracts forms of detachment that block environmental and
social investment. (120)
For Houser, bodies and environments are always-already interdependent, but the way we have
access to this interdependence is through analyzing bodily responses to environments—what she
understands as affect. Houser roots the environmental and somatic sickness in Infinite Jest in a
broader cultural obsession with detachment. She shows how Wallace’s grammatical structures,
such as passive voice and strings of prepositional phrases, figuratively detach the narrator from
narrated bodies—the objects being described and the synecdoches for those things, respectively
(122-3). She reads the style of Infinite Jest as symptomatic of a detached social attitude that
produces or necessitates a toxic governmental and political policy of detachment: “Infinite Jest
expounds its claims for somatic/ecological interdependence by conceiving of urban space in
terms of the medicalized human body. Infinite Jest animates its setting through human forms
such that contemporary space and the body are ‘cobuilt’” (129). Houser tracks Wallace’s
descriptions of the landscape around Enfield, noting “the body is the vehicle for a conceit that
generates a medicalized symbolic landscape” (130). The affect of disgust is unique in its
political efficacy because it—unlike other affects, Houser argues—is unignorable. Houser’s
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interpretation is perhaps too sweeping. Not every instance of Infinite Jest that addresses
problems concerning the environment is charged with disgust. Furthermore, it is not clear
whether Infinite Jest produces the affect of disgust in the reader through something like an
objective correlative or whether Wallace’s descriptions of the characters’ affective states (or
both) are supposed to lead us to ecological consciousness.
N. Katherine Hayles has a more nuanced take. Hayles argues that in Infinite Jest,
“possessive individualism and redemptive wilderness interact destructively with one another
when the illusion of autonomy is allowed to blot out the fact of recursive interrelation” (678).
She explains: “As Infinite Jest suggests, adding virtual environments to the mix, far from
offering an escape from contemporary ecological problems, is likely to intensify the already
existing paradoxes to the point of implosion” (678). For Hayles, Infinite Jest critiques the idea
that the abject—waste and pollution, for instance—can just be dumped somewhere and safely
ignored. As she suggests, because these wastes “always return[] in recursive cycles of
interconnection that inexorably tie together the sanctified and the polluted,” the media “serve as
the social mechanism” which both expels and returns this waste (687). This point is underscored
by Wallace’s recursive narrative structure in Infinite Jest. Readers are given information
“through mediating pathways” such as Wallace’s notorious endnotes (688).
While Bradley J. Fest does not directly comment on Wallace’s environmentalism, he
brings up the theme of apocalypse so crucial to environmental thinking. He sees Wallace as
countering the apocalypticism of postmodern metafiction. For Fest, Wallace’s “Infinite Jest and
his subsequent fiction dramatize the profound necessity for literature to continue imagining a
world in which the future is not always already eschatologically foreclosed” (127). Fest is more
interested in how Wallace inverts postmodern tropes about nuclear warfare than the actual
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environmental disaster on-hand in the novel, though he does note that the crux of Wallace’s
depiction of environmental disaster is the “highly mediated textual layering” in Mario
Incandenza’s filmic representation (132).

INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE YEAR OF THE DEPEND ADULT UNDERGARMENT
Published in 1996, Infinite Jest takes place in a dystopian future world. In the world of
Infinite Jest, numbered years of the Gregorian calendar (like 1996) have been replaced with
names of years sponsored by corporations to generate tax revenue. Much of the novel’s action
takes place in the Year of the Depend Adult Undergarment (Y.D.A.U.), which critics say
corresponds variously to 2008, 2009, or 2011. The novel speculates comically on what kinds of
technologies, language, and geopolitical structures will govern daily life barely a decade after the
novel is published. While readers become accustomed to the sci-fi neologisms throughout the
first few hundred pages of the epic novel, the main “history” of post-1996 political decisions that
bring us to life in the Y.D.A.U. is narrated chiefly through an ekphrastic description of a studentmade film celebrating/parodying that history. Here’s a broad-strokes summary: when NATO
dissolves, the United States and Canada are presented with an environmental crisis concerning
how to deal with waste from nuclear warheads. Because the germophobe U.S. president does not
want the waste on U.S. land, he “strong-arm[s]” Canada and Mexico into signing on to a
“CONTINENTAL ALLIANCE” called the “Organization of North American Nations”—or
O.N.A.N. as it is abbreviated—in order to dump waste into northeastern United States and
“expropriate” that poisoned region to Canada (Miller 9, Wallace 391). The ratification of this
new geopolitical entity is known as “Interdependence,” the day of which is celebrated on
November 8 (31). One of the consequences of the formation of O.N.A.N. is the sectioning off of
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a large chunk of northeastern United States and southeastern Canada to create The Great
Concavity (or The Great Convexity from the Canadian perspective), into which the United States
jettisons toxins. While many New Englanders evacuate the area, the toxic waste that is basically
dumped into Canada has terrible effects on residents of Quebec.
Infinite Jest weaves three major threads into its plot by focusing on the actions of three
loose groups: a Québécois separatist organization called Les Assassins des Fauteuils Rollents,
several Boston-area substance-abusers associated with Ennet House Drug and Alcohol Recovery
House [sic], and the students, faculty, and staff at a Boston-area tennis academy called the
Enfield Tennis Academy (E.T.A. for short). The plot revolves around the Incandenza family.
James O. Incandena, founder of E.T.A. and filmmaker, and his wife Avril have three children:
Orin, Mario, and Hal. James O. Incandenza allegedly created a mythical film cartridge called
The Entertainment that is so entertaining that it causes catatonia in anyone who views it.
Various organizations in the novel are seeking a copy of the cartridge. The scenes in Infinite Jest
are not presented in chronological order, but Richard Stock argues that the general structure of
Hal’s narrative is chronological after the initial scene, the first in the novel, which presents Hal
after everything else in the novel has occurred (44). Though Hal is more central to the novel’s
plot, it is Mario who occasions much of the novel’s ecological focus. Mario, the middle child,
assists his father on film shoots and inherits a great deal of professional equipment when James
kills himself. Mario’s first finished film cartridge is a puppet show shot in a janitor’s closet
chronicling the history of the founding of O.N.A.N., a project that has proved so popular with the
faculty and students of Enfield Tennis Academy that the school screens it every year on
Interdependence Day for the entire Academy. An ekphrastic description of one such screening,
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on Interdependence Day Y.D.A.U., is the source of readers’ historical understanding of Infinite
Jest’s storyworld’s ecological crisis.
Much of the authority of the improbable-yet-true climate crisis narrative comes from the
intervention of Wallace’s omniscient narrator. Frank Louis Cioffi aligns the show-off-y
narrative voice with Wallace’s penchant for verbose prose (167-8). According to Paul Dawson,
the omniscient narrator is a voice associated by most critics with the canonical works of
nineteenth-century (Big R) realist novels, and it waned with early twentieth-century modernism’s
emphasis on subjectivity (2). In the twenty-first century, it is a bit of an anachronism in literary
fiction, sometimes viewed as either philosophically untenable and/or politically conservative
(Dawson 2, 9-10). Nonetheless, many contemporary fiction writers, such as Wallace, adapt the
conventions of omniscient narration for new historical contexts (Dawson 2). As Dawson sees it,
the return of omniscient narrators in literary fiction is a response to “the decline in the cultural
authority of the novel” (5). Wallace’s narrator performs many of the rhetorical features Dawson
aligns with omniscient third-person storytellers: providing intrusive commentary, ranging freely
across space and time, and providing access to the consciousness of characters (1). And, indeed,
the narration in Infinite Jest is such a performance. Cioffi goes so far as to argue that “the
novel’s performative gestures, its Brechtian alienation effects that interrupt the flow of the
narrative and call attention to the work qua performance, encourage readers to become conscious
of their own performances as readers” (168). Dawson describes several types of twenty-first
century omniscient narrators, even using Wallace’s story “Octet” as an example of what he calls
the “ironic moralist,” but his description of the “pyrotechnic storyteller” is a more apt type to
account for Infinite Jest’s narration (73, 111). The narrator of Infinite Jest maintains a distinct,
idiosyncratic style, even while presenting the consciousness of disparate characters. Dawson
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describes the pyrotechnic storyteller as: “typically humorous or satirical, employing a flourishing
and expansive narrative voice, a garrulous conversational tone, to assert control over the events
being narrated, eschewing the impersonality of analytic omniscience to the extent that the
narrative voice often overshadows the characters being described or analyzed” (111). 83
Wallace’s narrator is intrusive, but the voice “produced most strikingly by expressive features of
style” (Dawson 111). Dawson notes that authorial style is not a quality of omniscience, but it
“establishes an idiosyncratic presence tied to the narrative voice itself” (111). These
descriptions, which are meant to describe the category of pyrotechnic storytellers, apply directly
to Wallace: “For David Foster Wallace, stylistic pyrotechnics, in the form of extended sentences
replete with qualifications and parentheticals, function as a way to elaborate the convolutions of
individual character thought, while retaining a deliberately bland “style” in terms of lexical
choice and figurative range” (115). Dawson describes Wallace’s pyrotechnic narration: “These
features of style—overdescription, metaphorical excess, and narratorial elaboration of character
thought—are all ways in which the omniscient pyrotechnic storyteller rhetorically performs the
controlling presence of the authorial narrator” (116). Such features are on full display
throughout the novel, but I want to focus on the narration that most directly addresses the
ecological crisis in Infinite Jest’s storyworld.
Before the novel gets around to presenting Mario’s cartridge screening, readers get an
important hint of the geopolitics of environmental disaster in the Year of the Depend Adult
Undergarment. The day before Mario’s screening (and almost 100 pages before the description
of that screening begins), Hal is working on “the only really challenging . . . class” he has:
“Separatism and Return: Québécois History from Frontenac Through the Age of

Though Infinite Jest is outside the scope of Dawson’s study, he notes that this type of omniscient narrator can be
found in “much of the work of David Foster Wallace” (111).
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Interdependence” (309). Channeling Hal’s thoughts, the narrator remarks that although Hal
“[found] the stuff rather more high-concept and less dull than he’d expected—seeing himself as
at his innermost core apolitical—[he] nevertheless found the Québécois-Separatism mentality
almost impossibly convolved and confused and impervious to U.S. parsing” (310-1). Wallace
frequently focalizes through characters in his third-person omniscient narration, most notably
Hal, though Hal is not the novel’s narrator (as Greg Carlisle argues) (45, Carlisle 205). The textproper at this point does not go into the environmental disaster, but an endnote does. Instead,
when the narrator describes the antics of a Québécois separatist terrorist cell he notes that when
Hal considers U.S.-Québécois relations he feels “nauseous . . . as if someone had been reading
mail of Hal’s that he thought he’d thrown away” (311). Without getting into much detail,
Wallace’s narrator presents Hal’s feelings alongside the hint of environmental injustice,
positioning Hal as the beneficiary of U.S. geopolitical gerrymandering. This is the first instance
of the disgust that Houser identifies as linked to environmental toxicity. It also hints at the
complexity of the geopolitical relations the ekphrastic description of Mario’s film will takes
pains to elucidate almost 100 pages later.
An “Inter-Day Eve” conversation between Hal Incandenza and his brother Orin, lumped
in an extremely long endnote, introduces the geopolitical situation later addressed in Mario’s
film (1007n110). Orin, a professional football player, wants to impress a woman interviewing
him who has asked about Canadian politics, so he calls to ask his brother Hal what the word
“samizdat” means and why it would be connected to their family (1011n110). This question
hints at the future revelation that Orin and Hal’s father created The Entertainment being used for
terrorist purposes. Then Orin wants to know why the Québécois separatist movement shifted
“seemingly overnight” to anti-O.N.A.N. agitation about The Great Concavity (1012n110). Hal,
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like many who do not suffer obvious effects of others’ environmental decisions, identifies as a
“privileged white seventeen-year-old U.S. male” and therefore asks Orin “why not just say who
cares?” (1016n110). Hal voices his doubts about Orin’s selfish reasons for wanting to know
about Québécois politics, but he eventually tells Orin the “obvious response” to questions about
Québécois terrorism: “the Concavity—the physical fact and fallout of the Concavity—it’s
Québec’s problem. Something like 750 clicks of border along the Concavity, with attendant
seepage, for Notre Rai Pays” (1017n110). Orin replies “Yes plus the brunt of the airborne
wastes from the high-altitude ATHSCMEs, plus being the province that gets splatted when the
E.W.D. vehicles overshoot the Concavity” (1017n110). Not only is the U.S. jettisoning toxic
waste onto land occupied by Québecers, they also set up fans to make sure that the airborne
toxins from the dump do not make their way back southward. What becomes clearer from Orin
and Hal’s conversation is that the risk of consequences from environmentally risky acts is not
shared equally among Canada and the United States. Also, Hal and Orin, though apparently
political neophytes, know enough about U.S. dumping in Canada to have an informed
conversation about it. According to Hal, “it’s Québec that’s borne the brunt of what Canada had
to take” (1017n110). It is Québec that suffers
the gooey end of the Canadian dipstick. It’s mostly now western Québecer kids the size
of Volkswagens schlumpfing around with no skulls. It’s Québecers with chloracne and
tremors and olfactory hallucinations and infants born with just one eye in the middle of
their forehead. It’s eastern Québec that gets green sunsets and indigo rivers and
grotesquely asymmetrical snow-crystals and front lawns they have to beat back with a
machete to get to their driveways. They get the feral hamster incursions and the Infantdepredations and the corrosive fogs” (1017n110).
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The description here aligns closely with a later description in Mario’s cartridge. The correlation
between this laundry list of Québec’s harrowing consequences of living with nuclear waste and
the later description in Mario’s cartridge suggest that these consequences are generally known
but little cared about. The mixture of harrowing consequences with comical description also
points to an attitude shared by many characters who take the daily reality of environmental
injustice as a bit funny if it’s not happening to them. As Mathieu Duplay puts it, “Wallace’s
particular brand of terror is fully compatible with an acute sense of humour” (77). Though the
narrator’s presentation here is of Hal’s direct discourse, several of the terms—and even ways of
thinking—are common to several privileged characters in Infinite Jest.
Wallace’s narration also blends extreme, unbelievable descriptions of environmental
consequences with more plausible, realistic consequences of toxic exposure. Kids the size of
Volkswagens are paired with odd-colored sunsets. Because the description is put in the mouth of
a (sometimes sarcastic) character, it is not clear how seriously readers should take Hal’s
characterization. Hal’s hyperbole is delivered with the jaded cadence of a snarky, privileged
teenager poking fun at dire (though novel) environmental consequences. The mix of plausible
and implausible descriptions also suggests that Hal does not really know the extent of the
consequences of toxic dumping, electing to repeat hyperbolic or mythical descriptions for their
novelty in the absence of more widely known, accepted facts.
These diagnostic descriptions are frequent in Infinite Jest. Emily Russell has focused on
the embodied politics in Infinite Jest, “discover[ing] assembly in the physical, social, and textual
bodies of Wallace’s novel, arguing for the perils and possibilities of this conceptual and material
intervention” (150). Russell notes that Wallace’s extensive descriptions function like a “medical
chart” in which “a collection of increasingly specific descriptors will be able to account for a
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character completely” (153). While Russell is most interested in the medicalized descriptions of
exceptional and disabled bodies in Infinite Jest, her point about Wallace’s style applies well to
the description of Québecer children and environment more generally. These descriptions are
hardly “realist,” however. The descriptions do not “document social and material fact” as realist
descriptions traditionally do (Puskar 19). Instead, they are simultaneously descriptions and
overdescriptions, accounts of what we are supposed to take for truth provisionally in the absence
of a higher narrative authority and accounts that seem unbelievable in and of themselves.
The remainder of Orin and Hal’s conversation reveals a pronounced skepticism towards
Interdependence as satisfactory geopolitical situation. Orin questions if there is “really any sort
of realistic hope of Québec getting Gentle to get O.N.A.N. to reverse the Reconfiguration. Take
back the Concavity, shut down the fans, make us acknowledge the waste as fundamentally
American waste”, to which Hal replies, “Well probably of course not” (1017n110). Before Hal
hangs up, Orin floats the idea that Québec separatist terrorists are making their acts seem like
Canada has endorsed them as collective anti-O.N.A.N. acts, hoping to secede from Canada and
O.N.A.N. by claiming The Great Concavity as their own, even though it’s toxic (1019-20n110).
Readers leave this scene with the ominous sense that the Québecer terrorists will stop at nothing
to free Québec from “Interdependence,” even harming themselves. They are also left with a
sense that everyone knows that the United States is dumping toxins in Canada and that this
problem has faded into an injustice so commonplace that only terrorists make a big deal about it.
This is also an occasion to ponder what exactly “Interdependence” means in the context of the
novel.
What is interdependence? According to the Oxford English Dictionary,
“interdependence” is a noun meaning “the fact or condition of depending each upon the other;
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mutual dependence” (OED). The “each upon the other” here suggests that interdependence
happens between at least two coherent entities. The word “Interdependence” has a noted
corollary in the history of environmentalism with regard to toxins. In her landmark book on the
dangers of pesticides, Silent Spring, Rachel Carson describes the problem of poisoning
individual species as “a problem of ecology, of interrelationships, of interdependence” (189). As
Carson makes abundantly clear, environmental hazards never affect a single species because of
the linkages between individual species and the ecosystems they are a part of. For Carson,
“interdependence” refers to a situation of mutual implication and culpability, of mutual benefit
and mutual risk. “Interdependence” is the noun Carson uses to articulate a “problem”
concerning human-caused environmental destruction. The idea of mutual dependence, however,
is somewhat unclear in Carson. She explains that, for example, salmon are dependent on flies to
live, and she makes clear that some animals and economies are dependent on salmon fishing, but
this dependence does not appear to be mutual. Rather, Carson seems to suggest that what she
characterizes as a problem of interdependence is the ecological problem of at once depending on
and being depended upon, a problem of positioning within a food chain. The flies and salmon—
as well as several other organisms discussed by Carson—occupy this position of being food for
some creatures or performing some necessary function for the production of energy for some
organism, and—at the same time—consuming some creature, that is, depending on some other
creature for survival.
The reason I want to pressure the word Carson uses here—“interdependence”—is
because it suggests that the food chain is some kind of connecting circle or closed system, in
which humans naturally occupy some essential place as producers of energy for other organisms.
“Interdependence” suggests that the salmon is somehow dependent on us. The notion of
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interdependence is often self-serving—in this case, to the human. Certainly, we can imagine
organisms being dependent on us: our pets, for example, are dependent on us; mosquitos prey on
us; deer hunters in Wisconsin argue that if populations are not managed, then disease could
decimate the entire white tail population. Are these animals dependent on us in the same way
that salmon are dependent on flies? “Interdependence” takes on a very different valence in
Infinite Jest, referring ironically to a geopolitical dependence by which a nation coerces another
nation into subservience, all the while appealing to the illusion of mutual benefit.
Interdependence is thus not interdependence at all, but simply dependence. Wallace addresses
the ways in which interdependence becomes a rhetorical tool to legitimate parasitic relationships
in which dependence gets reframed as somehow mutually beneficial, obscuring lopsided power
dynamics simply by adding the prefix “inter.”

NARRATION AND EKPHRASIS
The idea of interdependence is not merely disingenuous rhetoric to legitimize exploitative
geopolitical relationships; it operates in other registers within Infinite Jest. Mario’s depiction of
Reconfiguration and Interdependence is heavily influenced by his late father’s (James
Incandenza’s) interpretation of these historical events, and the information we get in this scene
should be taken with a grain of salt (Wallace 385). Indeed, both Incandenzas make cartridges
about the history of Interdependence.84 What we read when we read about the formation of
O.N.A.N. is a description of Mario’s film wherein the narrator occasionally comments on the
potential discrepancies between Mario’s film and historical truth. It is mostly (but not entirely)

We learn little of James O. Incandenza’s project, but one of Wallace’s many endnotes indicates that Mario’s
ONANtiad, though an “explanation-parody,” is “funnier and more accessible than [James’s], if also a bit more
heavy-handed” (380, 1032).
84
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clear that what the narrator is describing is not the historical events themselves but—rather—the
events as they appear in Mario’s film. Mario’s film recounts events that are patently ridiculous
but are nonetheless often historically accurate; his film is a 48-minute puppet show shot in a
closet, and the DIY nature of the project combined with low production value add layers of
mediation that call attention to the text’s distance from the actual events being recounted. 85 A
great deal of work has gone into making sure that we do not read any of this as realistic. And
yet, in a world so ridiculous as the one portrayed in Infinite Jest, what counts as “unrealistic”
should be reconsidered frequently.
Wallace’s narrator’s description of Mario’s film fits into a long tradition of ekphrastic
writing, yet it is unique in that tradition. 86 Jean H. Hagstrum’s influential account of literary
pictorialism discusses ekphrasis extensively, acknowledging that it is sometimes understood as a
large category of literary description, but defining ekphrasis as “that special quality of giving
voice and language to the otherwise mute art object” (18n34). Ekphrastic writing, then, takes a
(usually) static art object, like a painting or statue, and seeks to give it voice. When ekphrastic
poets succeeded in bringing to life a static scene, they achieved the effect of enargeia (Hagstrum
29). In relying on ekphrasis as a mode of description, Wallace effectively treats narrative itself
as an object. The object Wallace describes, a narrative film, has a temporal element that makes
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Raymond Williams describes mediation in art extensively in Marxism and Literature. For Williams, one
important way of understanding mediation as a “persuasive physical metaphor”, as distinct from reflection. In one
view, artists merely “reflect” the world around them (Williams 97). An opposing theory of art suggests that artists
do no merely reflect the world around them in art. Instead, they actively intercede or interpret the world around
them (Williams 97). Mediation should be understood both in its negative sense as an ideological disguise through
which art distorts reality and in its positive sense as merely a necessary process by which any meaning is
reproduced, that is—one form, such as lived experienced, is translated into another, such as literature (98-100).
With this in mind, I understand “layers of mediation” to be both of Williams’s versions of mediation: first, as
disguises upon disguises that distance readers and viewers from social reality further and further with each “layer,”
and second, as merely different media through which messages must go through to reach their audience.
86
See, for instance, James Hefferman. Museum of Words: The Poetics of Ekphrasis from Homer to Ashbery.
Chicago: U. of Chicago P., 1995. See also W.J.T. Mitchell. Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual
Representation. Chicago: U. of Chicago P., 1994.
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Wallace’s description very much like narration, but ultimately history and time are treated like
art objects. In one sense, ekphrasis writing exercises interdependence. Ekphrastic writing is
dependent on some other text for its own generation. That other text is dependent on ekphrastic
writing for its energia. Furthermore, Wallace’s ekphrastic description complicated structuralist
models of narration, especially the concept of duration.
Wallace’s ekphrastic description puts some pressure on structuralist models of the
narratological concept of duration. Because ekphrasis usually describes static objects, it operates
unconventionally when describing a dynamic object that unfolds in time. According to Seymour
Chatman, duration “concerns the relation of the time it takes to read out the narrative to the time
the story-events themselves lasted” (67-8). Both Chatman and Genette identify several varieties
of duration, but both base their systems on the idea that the telling/reading must be understood as
taking one time while the story-events take another (Chatman 68, Genette 94-5). While this idea
makes sense, it functions under the assumption that what is being narrated actually counts as a
story-event. In the ONANtiad sections of Infinite Jest, the “events” being narrated are sometimes
themselves representations, not necessarily real-life events that actually happen in the
storyworld. Wallace’s narrative practice, therefore, blends the narratological categories of
“summary” and “pause.” Summary is when the “discourse is briefer than the events depicted”
(Chatman 68). A pause is when “story-time stops though the discourse continues, as in
descriptive passages” (Chatman 74). Genette refers to these portions as “absolute slowness . . .
where some section of narrative discourse corresponds to a nonexistent diegetic duration” (93-4).
Because the screening takes place over about sixty pages in the novel and corresponds to the 48
minutes of the cartridge, the passage functions narratologically as “scene”—the one-to-one
temporal correspondence of telling and tale told. The sixty or so pages do not all refer to the
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screening itself, however, so the telling is actually shorter than the tale. Furthermore, the telling
itself is not really narrating a story, but—rather—describing Mario’s telling of the story of
interdependence, a story that takes place over a much longer period of time.
The description of Mario’s film starts with marking the occasion for its screening, an
Interdependence Day holiday event (Wallace 380). 87 Following the scene at Enfield, the narrator
starts to describe the film cartridge’s cheapo production quality and its introductory emphasis on
President Johnny Gentle (Wallace 381). What follows this introduction is a six-page description
of Johnny Gentle and his rise to political power. 88 Gentle has his
white-gloved finger on the pulse of an increasingly asthmatic and sunscreen-slathered
and pissed-off American electorate . . . in a dark time when all landfills got full and all
grapes were raisins and sometimes in some places the falling rain clunked instead of
splatted, and also, recall, a post-Soviet and –Jihad era when . . . there was no real Foreign
Menace of any real unified potency to hate and fear, and the U.S. sort of turned on itself .
. . with a spasm of panicked rage that in retrospect seems possible only in a time of
geopolitical supremacy and consequent silence, the loss of any external Menace to hate
and fear. (Wallace 382)
The list of requirements for a third-party candidate to get elected is rather long. Johnny Gentle’s
rise in politics is contingent on appealing to disillusioned fringe voters. Furthermore, Gentle
becomes president at a moment when ecological crisis so threatening that a one-issue candidate
can be elected (a time when there is no foreign crisis distracting American voters). His career is

Mario made the film for “woefully historically uniformed children” at Enfield, but the film is screened every
Interdependence Day—November 8th—at an all-school assembly (380).
88
Gentle is a “world-class retentive” with “a paralyzing fear of free-floating contamination” (Wallace 381). He is
“the founding standard-bearer of the seminal new ‘Clean U.S Party’”—or “C.U.S.P.,” the “agnation” of jingoistic
far-right and radical environmentalist far-left American fringe politics (Wallace 382).
87
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dependent on silence and absence. It is also interesting that the narrator demands that readers
“recall” the historical moment, as if watching these events years after they occur makes them
incomprehensible or the historical reasoning inscrutable.

ONANtiad
The beginning of Mario’s cartridge mixes summary and scene to show how geopolitical
interdependence came to be—and also to help readers to understand exactly how the storyworld
works, but these summaries and scenes occasionally demand commentary by the narrator. The
interplay of various media also emphasizes the interdependence of media accounts in the
production of environmental history. The Clean U.S. Party’s platform is structured around the
policy of launching waste into space, but—instead of doing that initially—the Organization of
North American Nations is created. For Gentle, cleaning up the United States is “an essentially
aesthetic affair” (Wallace 383). 89 Instead of making the world better environmentally, the
cleaning up of the United States is a selfish effort. Cleaning one area means dirtying another. In
a speech, Gentle tries to put an end to “atomized Americans’ fractious blaming of one another
for our terrible internal troubles” (Wallace 383). 90 The tone of the self-consciously ridiculous
speech is a bit difficult to describe. Mario apparently captures an American structure of feeling
at a point of geopolitical dominance in the face of environmental disaster. He does so, however,
in such a brazen way that Gentle’s rhetoric sounds either sarcastic or necessarily dumbed down
to convey the structure of feeling to school children. 91 Mario’s depiction of Gentle’s jingoistic
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Gentle reflects the popular American attitude when it comes to environmental destruction: Not In My Back Yard.
Mario’s movie depicts Gentle as he “declares Dammit there just must be some people besides each other for us to
blame. To unite in opposition to . . . He swears he’ll find us some cohesion-renewing Other” (Wallace 384).
91
Gentle is, after all, admitting that he’s actively looking for a scapegoat to blame in order to achieve political
success.
90
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inauguration speech shifts to a representation of the president’s cabinet, which includes the
Presidente of Mexico and the Prime Minister of Canada being “honorably appointed” to cabinet
positions as “secretaries” of their own countries (Wallace 384).92
Wallace’s narrator does not merely summarize historical narrative. Intermixed with
narrative summary is commentary on Mario’s representational strategies. In representing
Gentle’s cabinet, Mario conceives of dialogue which clarifies how exactly “interdependence” is
understood geopolitically by the citizens of the United States and Canada. In this dialogue,
Gentle sweet talks the Canadian Prime Minister into helping dissolve NATO and making
sacrifices to ensure that NAFTA remains in place, including a provision which disarms Canada’s
“strategic capacity” of ICBM missiles which leads Gentle to announce “we’re interdependent”
(Wallace 385-6). They’re interdependent because Canada is dependent on the United States for
economic reasons, and—as we find out—the United States is dependent on Canada as a place to
dump waste. The narrator’s elaborate description of Mario’s cartridge and the scene around
which it screens devolves due to Mario’s repetitious filmmaking:
Mario as auteur opts for his late father’s parodic device of mixing real and fake newssummary cartridges, magazine articles, and historical headlines from the last few great
daily papers, all for a sort of time-lapse exposition of certain developments leading up to
Interdependence and Subsidized Time and cartographic Reconfiguration and the renewal
of a tight and considerably tidier Experialist U.S. of A., under Gentle. (Wallace 391) 93

The narrator reminds us that, at this point, Mexico and Canada are basically “post-millennial American
protectorates” (Wallace 384). The sovereignty of the neighbors of the United States has been so eroded that their
leaders are reduced to secretaries in the Gentle’s cabinet. This is a calculated, more-or-less bloodless takeover
where the issue of dependence and interdependence is most clear.
93
As Bradley J. Fest puts it, “Rather than absorbing and transforming the other through imperialist foreign policy
and the grand narrative of Manifest Destiny, Gentle’s program gets rid of the exorbitant, excessive other by ‘gifting’
or ‘exporting’ irradiated portions of the United States to Canada” (132). Fest also notes the importance of “U.S.
Experialism” to the plot of Infinite Jest: “U.S. foreign policy describes the horizon of Infinite Jest’s narrative
structure, as most of its many characters and virtually every plot point are continually set against the background of
92
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This bit of film criticism re-alerts readers to the fact that they have been reading an ekphrastic
description of historical events, not history itself. The story of Interdependence is constructed
with interdependent media. The narrator cannot show the cartridge itself, so they represent it,
not just as a narrative summary, but as a description of the technical strategies Mario uses and
the story he tells. This mix of narrative summary and film criticism is important because it
demonstrates how the historical narrative that characters in the storyworld take for truth is
embedded in the media they rely on to tell that historical narrative and is, for readers,
inextricably connected to those media. The mix also demonstrates how “real and fake news”
become the basis for strange-but-true narratives of environmental catastrophe. Furthermore, the
film criticism positions Wallace’s narrator slightly closer to “reality” than Mario’s aestheticized
retelling of history. By assuming the authority to comment on Mario’s representational
strategies, the narrator also assumes the role as arbiter of what counts as “realistic” within the
scope of the novel—and important role in a novel that often seems unrealistic and readers might
easily make the mistake of lumping every scene together as equally divorced from reality.
The narrator draws readers’ attention to the formal elements in Mario’s cartridge. What
follows the narrator’s editorial commentary on Mario’s representational strategies is literally
three pages of time-lapse newspaper headlines telling the story of Interdependence. After these
headlines, Wallace includes a paragraph to remind readers that we are not, indeed, reading
newspapers as such but, rather, a boy’s lo-fi video project collation of those headlines—some
from respectable New York-based papers and others from local periodicals. The headlines,
Wallace’s narrator reminds us, come “twirling journalistically out from a black acetate . . .

Experialism” (132). U.S. Experialism produces two major eschatological, nuclear-bomb-like threats: the Medusalike “Entertainment,” so engrossing its viewers stop doing anything but watching it, and The Great Concavity, the
irradiated landscape in the former New England that has been ceded to Canada (132).
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background in vintagely allusive old b&w-film style, with a sonic background of that sad sappy
Italianate stuff Scorsese had loved for his own montages” (393). These elements are presented
comically, as derisive criticism—thought the narrator does not, at this point, tell readers that any
of Mario’s depiction is untrue. While not necessarily untrue, they account is difficult to take
seriously because of how mediated it is. Even if the events presented can be read as realistic, the
form they are presented in makes them unrealistic. History is rendered, simplistically or not, by
a not-so-adept filmmaker, who himself relies on his father’s interpretation of history and
dominant accounts published in newspapers. Furthermore, his interpretation demands further
explanation and comment by a narrator reporting on the filmic text in an idiosyncratic way. The
film is dependent both on commentary to give it narrative authority and other media texts, such
as newspapers, for its very construction. The newspapers are dependent on Mario’s film to make
history accessible at all to “woefully historically uninformed children” (380).
The editorial film criticism and heavy exposition should alert the reader to several other
things as well. First, the agents who orchestrate O.N.A.N. and the Great Concavity are hidden
behind newspaper headlines. Abstract monoliths like Mexico and Canada do things, not
individual people. Because of this, interdependence exists between abstract monoliths as well,
rather than deformed rural Québécers and addicted American consumers. Second, the
complexity of historical representation proves too ambitious for a low-budget film cartridge, and
thus history itself is reduced to newspaper headlines. The paragraph at the end of the montage
betrays an anxiety that readers will take the headlines too seriously or invest them with too much
unmediated access to the storyworld’s environmental history. Mario (and perhaps Wallace)
finds geopolitics almost unrepresentable. Through these headlines we learn that “MEXICO
SIGNS ON FOR ‘ORGANIZATION OF NORTH AMERICAN NATIONS’ CONTINENTAL
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ALLIANCE,” Burger King wins the bid for naming the first year of subsidized time, that
“CANADA ‘NUCK’LES UNDER,” and that Canada’s missiles have merely been transferred to
the United States (391-2). After the creation of O.N.A.N., the Great Concavity is made. These
macro-events, national and continental in scope, mask intricate sets of conflicting and
negotiating values as well as individual agencies operating over long periods of time.
N. Katherine Hayles is alert to Wallace’s mediation in his presentation of information and
environmental waste. As Hayles puts it, “Within the world of Infinite Jest, this double move of
obscuring and clarifying is associated with media, which operate in the original sense of media
as mediation, circulating information along pathways so circuitous it is at once revealed and
covered up” (686). She continues, “Crucial information is conveyed through such devices as a
puppet show, a seventh-grade essay, a ‘soft profile’ for a popular magazine and correspondence
buried in the footnotes” (686). Waste and information function similarly in the novel. Just as
waste is cycled through the Great Concavity to create energy, “information is recycled through a
variety of media before it arrives on the page for the reader to consume” (686). While waste
ultimately becomes energy through intermediaries in the novel, the material reality of
environmental injustice filters through various media before a historical narrative becomes
coherent.
What becomes increasingly clear in Infinite Jest is that one of the elements complicating
Mario’s representation of environmental history is the complicity of the United States
government in geopolitical violence. Because the United States is complicit in criminal acts of
poisoning, media outlets become more credible than official government accounts of
environmental history. The newspaper headlines show that Gentle’s plan to launch waste into
The Great Concavity is showing signs of inefficacy. One headline assures us that “YOU’LL BE
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ABLE TO EAT RIGHT OFF TERRITORIAL U.S. BY END OF TERM’S FIRST YEAR”
according to President Gentle, but the next headline reads “ANOTHER LOVE CANAL? – 24point Superheader; TOXIC HORROR ACCIDENTALLY UNCOVERED IN UPSTATE NEW
HAMPSHIRE” (398-9). For this tidbit, Mario treats viewers to a section of the news article
itself. In it, we find that “18 federal EPA staffers” accidently “quote ‘stumbled on’” huge drums
“leaking industrial solvents, chlorides, benzenes, and oxins” near Berlin, New Hampshire (399).
While “environmental officials . . . flatly denied” the existence of the drums, the staffers claim
that were planted by hazmat-suited workers from “long shiny trailer trucks” with O.N.A.N. logos
on them (399). Residents in the surrounding area report “incidence of soft-skulled and extraeyed newborns” exceeding the national average (399). Several other sites are “STUMBLED
OVER” by EPA investigators, and Gentle declares the area north of Syracuse-TiconderogaSalem as federal disaster areas as health anomalies become pervasive in the area (399). 94
Government staffers are apparently responsible for the dumping that the Environmental
Protection Agency is investigating. Obviously, readers are not to trust government accounts of
environmental history because one government agency is struggling to hold another accountable.
Clean-up is financially impossible, so funds are sought for those who wish to relocate from New
England (400). The headlines are interrupted by a narratorial “and so on and so forth,”
suggesting that the extensive parade of headlines presented to readers is nonetheless incomplete
(400).
As Mario shows government accounts of Infinite Jest’s environmental crisis to be
suspect, he also casts doubt on the legitimacy of the news media outlets he gets his headlines
from. We learn that “it’s hard to tell which of the headlines and other stuff are for real and

For example, a headline from the Scientific North American reports that “SUB ROSA FUSION-IN-POISONOUS
ENVIRONMENT TEST SITE ALLEGED AT MONTPELIER, VT” (399).
94
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which have been dickered with, usually, if you’re too young to recall the actual chronology”
because Mario had access to James O. Incandenza’s “old optical editing lab,” which “has
imposing Compugraphic typesetting and matting facilities” (400). This is yet another reminder
that the students at ETA are not watching history, and the reader is not reading it. The kids know
that “[a]t least some of the headlines are phony,” but in the absence of any more legitimate
authority, Mario’s cartridge “gets to stand uncontested by fact” (400). What readers are left with
is a series of historical interpretations, each of which Wallace gives readers reason to doubt the
legitimacy of. None is wholly untrue; all contribute to the novel’s depiction of historical reality.
Because the facts are apparently matters of conjecture, Mario’s version of environmental
history is just as true as anyone’s—unrealistic as it may seem. His cartridge then recounts a
cabinet meeting that is, nonetheless, highly unbelievable. The cabinet members are represented
by “doo-wopping” puppets in “purple dresses and matching lipstick and nail polish” (400). 95
The interdependence of various media and historical interpretations are again on full display.
The six-page scene is presented in the fashion of a teleplay, but the narratorial voice describing
the action is clearly the same narrator describing Mario’s cartridge earlier. The dialogue, then, is
the narrator’s presentation of Mario’s take on what might have been said at the historical cabinet
meeting. The action is the narrator’s comical description of Mario’s mise-en-scène. In the
scene, an incoherent Gentle, communicating only in “Hhhaaahh Hhhuuuhh”s, has apparently
appointed “MR. RODNEY TINE, CHIEF, U.S. OFFICE OF UNSPECIFIED SERVICES” as his
proxy. While Gentle spends the meeting inhaling “pure oxygen,” Tine provides a map of the
toxic area and proposes to the cabinet that the U.S. “give it away” (400, 402). The narrator
describes the photos that Tine displays to accompany the maps:
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President Gentle, a former lounge singer, has a cabinet appropriately outfitted in the fashion of Motown
background singers.
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a New Hampshire runoff-ditch running of stuff a color nobody’s quite ever seen before; a
wide-angle horizon-stretching vista of skull-embossed drums, with short-haired guys in
white body-suits walking around adjusting knobs and reading dials on shiny hand-held
devices; a very weird chemical sunrise, close in hue to the Cabinet members’ lipstick,
over some forests in southern Maine that look way taller and generally lusher than
January forests ought properly to be; a couple indoor-lit snapshots of a multi-eyed infant
crawling backwards, its ear to the carpet, dragging its shapeless head like a sack of spuds.
The last display’s a real heartstring-plucker. (400-1)
This passage functions as an ekphrasis within an ekphrasis—the hyper-interdependence of visual
and descriptive media. Mario alludes to the environmental crisis cartoonishly through photos of
“skull-embossed drums,” and the infinitely complex ecological consequences of introducing
massive amounts of toxins is being attended to by official-looking people “adjusting knobs and
reading dials” (400, 401). Scientific response is reduced to what is minimally observable. The
garish, unnatural sunrise has a corollary in the appearance of the Cabinet members’ appearance.
The coy understatement “generally lusher than January forests ought properly to be” suggests
that the toxins are amplifying natural processes (401). The gruesome photos or infants with birth
defects, placed next to evidence of toxic waste’s effects, makes clear the connection between the
two. Readers are dependent on descriptions of photos, which are, in turn, dependent on tragic
events—to present environmental history. They are also dependent on this layering of media to
link the affective response to its material roots. The narrator’s phrase “a real heartstringplucker” works to emphasize the tragedy, but it does so in a distanced, ironic way, both
acknowledging the affecting quality of the photo and suggesting, in its insistence on comedy,
that the instance is more entertaining than awful, an object of sport even in its obvious horror.
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The narrator does not insist on the invalidity of Mario’s interpretation, suggesting that it
is, indeed, close enough to an accepted interpretation (1030n156). An endnote in the narrator’s
voice comments on the fairness of Mario’s interpretation of history here, describing it as “simply
one theory and direction for finger-pointing” (1030n156). Mario’s version emphasizes the ironic
nature of interdependence. The various U.S. secretaries show signs of being comically
disengaged from the crisis.96 The next set of newspaper headlines show Gentle trying to give
away the toxic parts of New England to Canada as a gift and the Canadian Prime Minister
politely refusing, “INTERDEPENDENCE RHETORIC, OR NO” (406). Canada is not
“dependent” on the United States for anything; indeed, Canada only acquiesces to a policy of
interdependence because of threats.97 The headlines hint at Johnny Gentle’s deteriorating mental
stability and investigations into possible incompetence (406). When Mario provides the story
accompanying one of his headlines, it’s a wacky situation indeed (406-7). Gentle has “isolated
himself in a private suite at Bethesda Naval Hospital” and sings to the person handcuffed to the
Black Box of U.S. nuclear codes (406, 407). In this state, officials decline to comment on
reports of “erratic Executive directives,” one of which is to remove missiles in the toxic zone and
replace them in their silos upside-down (407). Another report says that Gentle has
“COMPLETELY LOST [his] MIND” and threatens to detonate missiles if Canada does not
accept the toxic territory (407). Thus, the Great Concavity might be irradiated because the U.S.
has exploded nuclear missiles on its own soil.98
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They all recognize the seriousness of the crisis, but they do not act as if the problem affects them personally.
They are also unconcerned about the public relations fallout from exporting populated U.S. lands to another nation.
97
Quebecers threaten secession if Canada accepts the territory (406). According to Mario’s headlines, Gentle
threatens “LOOK, BABE, TAKE THE TERRITORY OR YOU’RE GOING TO BE REALLY REALLY SORRY”
(406).
98
Indeed, both the United States and the U.S.S.R. did fire missiles during the cold war—they just shot them at
themselves. Fest’s “Nuke in the Garden” essay picks up on this idea, seeing it as a clever inversion of the
postmodern nuclear trope (133).
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The ekphrastic description of the end of the film transitions into the narrator recounting
legend of Eric Clipperton, which the narrator insists Mario’s cartridge alludes to. The Clipperton
digression further demonstrates the ironic nature of interdependence in Infinite Jest. Clipperton,
as legend has it at E.T.A., was a junior tennis player who held a gun to his head and threatened to
shoot himself if he lost matches—and thereby found a strategy for winning all of them (407-10).
Clipperton, the story goes on later, ends up shooting himself in the head at E.T.A. (433). His
only friend was Mario Incandenza. Emily Russell asserts that the “Clipperton legend . . .
demonstrate[s] the fatal ends of an independent star”—in contrast to the celebration of
interdependence depicted in the cartridge, even when “interdependence loses some of its utopian
luster in the geopolitical context of Infinite Jest” (157). Mario’s cartridge celebrates
interdependence, though ironically. Wallace places the Clipperton legend next to the ekphrastic
description of Mario’s film because an ironic depiction of interdependence is too simplistic.
Clipperton’s success is dependent on his opponents whether he likes it or not, and the illusion of
independence is a dangerous one. In a similar way, nations are dependent on each other’s
decisions whether they like it or not.
The narratorial interruption to explain that the cartridge slyly alludes to the Clipperton
legend emphasizes how incapable Mario’s cartridge is of standing in for history to an audience
of non-initiates. After this digression, Wallace’s narrator notes that the Interdependence Day
crowd watching Mario’s cartridge is getting bored, though it’s at this time that the narrator
describes Mario’s father’s version of the ONANtiad in an endnote for the purpose of comparing
Mario’s version to it favorably (438, 1032n176). The footnote, situated next to a telegraphed
concern with narrative excitement, betrays anxiety about how “boring” narratives fail to convey
historical content if they cannot command their audience’s attention. History is dependent on
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media for its transmission, but the media texts are dependent on audiences to actually attend to
them. Wallace himself bifurcates his own narrative by putting important parts of it in the
endnotes, the realm of those interested in the details—thereby implying that some readers would,
quite reasonably, not be interested.
The medial interdependence continues when the narrator’s summary of the Clipperton
narrative ends and the ekphrastic description of Mario’s cartridge must continue, this time with
more summary headlines and a teleplay. As Mario represents another cabinet meeting, the
narrator notes that the puppets’ mustaches “could be straighter but are on the whole pretty
impressive mustaches,” lest we make the mistake of believing what we’re reading to be an
accurate historical record (439). Gentle declares “Territorial Reconfiguration” a success, despite
cost figures that cause “a couple mustaches” to “fall off altogether” in surprise (439, 440).
Gentle and his cabinet consider their revenue problem and decide they cannot raise taxes or cut
programs, so Gentle—inspired both by the Chinese Agricultural Calendar and its zodiacal
Terrestrial Branches and the practice of naming sponsored college bowl games—prepares to
suggest the era of Subsidized Time (442).99 The scene is odd for several reasons. First, it’s not
clear at the beginning of the scene where it’s going narratively or historically until the very end
when Gentle prepares to propose Subsidized Time. Second, the narrator’s point (four pages
earlier) that the upcoming scene is historically anachronistic seems to invalidate the entire scene,
even while the narrator implicitly endorses the historical interpretation on view in much of the
rest of the cartridge. Finally, an articulate Gentle would seem to stand in opposition to the
increasingly deranged figure portrayed earlier in the cartridge.

99

An earlier page tells us that Subsidized Time did not, indeed, occur after Territorial Reconfiguration in response
to a revenue problem but, rather, before it (438).
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Infinite Jest includes information about ecological crisis in a few other areas of the novel
besides the scenes involving Mario’s cartridge screening. The Territorial Reconfiguration
narrative disappears for over a hundred pages at the end of this section and, with it, direct
references to the ecological crisis underlying life in Infinite Jest.100 When interdependence
returns, it comes as an explanation of how waste and energy are interdependent in the world of
Infinite Jest. E.T.A. student Michael Pemulus lectures another student about annulation a few
days after the Interdependence Day screening. E.T.A., it turns out, has a special connection to
the environmental catastrophe in Infinite Jest.101 Pemulus is trying to tell another student, Idris
Arslanian, about the plight of Anton Doucette, an otherwise minor character in the novel, who
has an anxiety attack in the weight room of E.T.A. (569, 567). Doucette is failing a “laughable
Energy survey class” because he does not understand “annular fusion/fission cycles, DTlithiumization”—both processes made up by Wallace in relation to nuclear fusion (569).
Pemulus thinks the basics of these processes are easy to understand:
Just picture a massive psudocartographic right triangle. You’ve got your central,
impregnately-guarded O.N.A.N.-Sunstrand waste-intensive fusion facility up in what
used to be Montpelier in what used to be Vermont, in the Concavity. From Montpelier,

Rodney Tine shows up, however, investigating reports of The Entertainment in the “metro Boston” area, though
this time he’s not being represented in Mario’s cartridge (548). This scene does not comment on environmental
disaster as such, though the CDC is investigating The Entertainment’s properties and Tine suspects that there are
Canadians plotting to use the device for terroristic purposes (549). The description in this short, two-page, section
of The Entertainment is notable because it recalls Mario’s cartridge by bringing up Tine, but this time Tine is
connected to a different cartridge, one that cannot be described. Wallace’s narrator describes the U.S. Office of
Unspecified Services’ attempts to describe what exactly The Entertainment entails, what its “qualities” are (549).
All that they learn is that it “opens with an engaging and high-quality cinematic shot of a veiled woman going
through a large building’s revolving doors and catching a glimpse of someone else in the revolving doors, somebody
the sight of whom makes her veil billow” (549). And that is all the U.S. government knows about the actual
contents of the cartridge. This is a marked contrast to the extensive description Wallace’s narrator provides for
Mario’s cartridge.
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Pemulus explains that James O. Incandenza “helped design these special holographic conversions so the team
that worked on annulation could study the behavior of subatomics in highly poisonous environments. Without
getting poisoned themselves” (572).
100
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the process’s waste’s piped to two sites, one of which is that blue glow at night up by the
Methuen Fan-Complex, just south of the Concavity, right flush up against the Wall and
Checkpoint Pongo . . . where the toxo-fusion’s waste’s plutonium fluoride’s refined into
plutonium-239 and uranium-238 and fissioned in a standard if somewhat hot and risky
breeder-system, much of the output of which, is waste U-239, which gets piped or
catapulted or long-shiny-trucked way up to what used to be Loring A.F.B.—Air Force
Base near what used to be Presque Isle Maine—where it’s allowed to decay naturally into
neptunium-239 and then plutonium-239 and then added to the UF4 fractional waste also
piped up from Montpelier, then fission in a purposely ugly way in such a way as to create
like hellacious amounts of highly poisonous radioactive wastes, which are mixed with
heavy water and specially heated-zirconium-piped through special heavily guarded
heated zirconium pipes back down to Montpelier as raw material for the massive poisons
needed for toxic lithiumization and waste-intenseness and annular fusion. (Wallace 571)
Briefly summarized, Pemulus says this process is “[j]ust a moving right-triangular cycle of
interdependence and waste-creation and -utiization” or, as Pemulus states later, annular fusion is
“a type of fusion that can produce waste that’s fuel for a process whose waste is fuel for the
fusion” (571, 572). According to Pemulus, the only problem “with the whole process
environmentally” is that “the resultant fusion turns out so greedily efficient that it sucks every
last toxin and poison out of the surrounding ecosystem, all inhibitors to organic growth for
hundreds of radial clicks in every direction . . . You end up with a surrounding environment so
fertilely lush it’s practically unlivable” (573). It’s difficult to gauge the degree of truth in Idris
Arslanian’s response: “Therefore rapacial feral hamsters and insects of Volkswagen size and
infantile giganticism and the unmacheteable regions of forests of the mythic eastern Concavity”
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(573).102 Pemulus agrees with this characterization and explains that this is why O.N.A.N. needs
to keep catapulting toxins into the eastern part of The Great Concavity to “keep the uninhibited
ecosystem from spreading and overrunning more ecologically stable areas” (573). Waste is
catapulted on each month’s prime numbers, so that the eastern Great Concavity is “especially
barren” early in the month because of frequent poisoning (573).103 At the end of the month,
however, growth is accelerated, which Pemulus likens to “an incredible slowing down of time”
(573).104 This description by Pemulus makes clear that the United States really is dependent on
Canada to get rid of waste and to produce energy. How this relationship is “interdependent” for
Canada—that is, how Canada is dependent on anyone else—is unclear, underscoring the ironic
quality of Wallace’s geopolitical interdependence. The description of annular fission/fusion
suggests a less ironic interdependence between energy and waste, however.
The Pemulus scene is notable because it is clearly from an American perspective, where
the tragedy of environmental injustice is viewed as a necessary evil. Wallace balances this
Americentric perspective with a scene in which Rémy Marathe tells a woman in a bar that his
wife is dying (775). Marathe is a member of the Québécois separatist organization called Les
Assassins des Fauteuils Rollents and may or may not be double- or triple-crossing the
organization with O.N.A.N. officials. He is wheelchair-bound and claims to be Swiss to tell his
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At E.T.A., which is near The Great Concavity, the students have their own notions of what the area consists of.
While cleaning out litter from the tunnels underneath E.T.A., students are afraid of encountering “a Concavitated
feral hamster” (or maybe just a rat) (668). The exciting potential of seeing a gigantic feral hamster is occasion for
the narrator to list the kids’ other Concavity rumors: “mile-high toddlers, skull-deprived wraiths, carnivorous flora,
and marsh-gas that melts your face off and leaves you with exposed grey-and-red facial musculature for the rest of
your ghoulish-pariah life” (670). The E.T.A. students are convinced of the reality of huge feral hamsters,
however—“the sort of rapacious locust-like mass-movement creature that Canadian agronomists call ‘Piranha of the
Plains’” (670).
103
According to Fest, “Wallace, through merely suggesting that nuclear weapons have been inverted in their silos
and used against New England, creates an alternative space where the boundaries between ‘machine’ and ‘nature’
break down, not by creating a pastoral space but rather a fundamentally uninhabitable ‘outside’ which is neither
nature nor technology, a space that the United States nevertheless relies upon for its energy” (134).
104
The eastern Concavity is “a whole different kettle of colored horses” from the western Concavity, however,
which is “barren Eliotical wastes” (574).
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story to Kate Gompert, an addict recovering at Ennet House (774-6). Marathe tells Gompert
about the sense of hopelessness he feels about combatting the surrounding countries who have
invaded his beloved “Swiss” land until he saves the life of his wife (777). 105 Marathe’s wife, he
tells Gompart “has no skull” because she is “among the first Swiss children of southwestern
Switzerland to become born without a skull, from the toxicities in association of our enemy’s
invasion on paper” (778-9). She wears “a metal hat,” without which “the head hung from the
shoulders like a half-filled balloon or empty bag, the eyes and oral cavity greatly distended from
the hanging” (779).106 Marathe describes his wife further, noting that “her head it had also
neither muscles nor nerves” and
[t]here was the trouble of the digestive tracking. There were seizures also. There were
progressive decays of circulation and vessel, which calls itself restenosis. There were the
more than standard accepted amounts of eyes and cavities in many different stages of
development upon different parts of the body. There were the fugue states and rages and
frequency of coma. (779).
Marathe’s wife, Gertraude, has a hook for a hand and is currently in a permanent “comatose and
vegetative state” (780). Wallace faces a unique narrative problem with Gertraude’s ailments. To
describe actual deformities suffered by victims of environmental injustice, he risks making his
novel too realistic and losing the comical and satirical edge. Therefore, Wallace’s exaggeration
here is obviously barbed. His overdescription is comical in its outrageous calamity but part of
the humor of the exaggeration is the understanding that environment-related deformities can be

Marathe rescues his wife and takes her to “the nearest Swiss hospital specializing in deformities of grave nature,”
which is a bit of an understatement (779).
106
She leaks “cerebro-and-spinal fluids . . . at all times” (779).
105
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very grave, so we never know if Wallace is really exaggerating, even when the list of symptoms
are couched in Marathe’s cartoony Frenchified-English.
In Infinite Jest, Wallace explores the idea of interdependence in its various valences—
political, ecological, and medial. While interdepenedence is ironized in the novel as a
geopolitical relationship, it is complicated by Wallace’s layering of media to present his history
of environmental injustice. Furthermore, through the conceit of annular fusion/fission, Wallace
suggests how interdependence works ecologically for humans who overtax energy resources.
For Wallace, a history of environmental decay is almost literally unnarratable. Instead, his
narrator provides readers with an ekphrasis of Mario’s film, highlighting the layers of mediation
and the distance from those who want to know the truth from what is, ultimately, an unknowable
real.
In this chapter, I presented scenes from Infinite Jest that provide the reader with
information about the ecological catastrophe in the novel’s storyworld. I showed how Wallace’s
humor and overdescription attend to the unbelievable-yet-true quality of environmental disaster.
Wallace presents readers, not with history itself, but a description of a novice filmmaker’s take
on history. Mario’s account of interdependence is a hodge-podge of newspaper headlines—
some real, some fake—and patently ridiculous renderings of the actions of government officials.
Wallace uses these tactics to present environmental history as a highly mediated construct where
official accounts are always compromised by the crimes of officials complicit in environmental
crimes. Though obviously not a realist novel, in Infinite Jest Wallace attempts “to countenance
and render real aspects of real experiences that have been previous excluded from art” by
presenting environmental history as he does (McCaffery 140). Environmental disaster is
increasingly common due to climate change, and its effects are increasingly unrealistic when
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judged against the data of the past. The aspects Wallace addresses are the unbelievable
occurrences of environmental novelty in the age of flora and fauna mutated by toxins and
weather that defies the logic of centuries. While much of Wallace’s novel seems unrealistic, the
grounds on which readers gauge what is plausible and what is fantastic are the frequent themes
of Infinite Jest.
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Style as Weather: Narrative Form and Global Warming in Karen Tei Yamashita’s Tropic of
Orange
In Anthropocene Fictions: The Novel in a Time of Climate Change, Adam Trexler asks
several questions in an attempt to develop a method adequate to the description of climate
change in the contemporary novel. One of these, “How can novels articulate the simultaneously
local, national, and international politics of climate change,” guides my investigation of narration
and global warming in Karen Tei Yamashita’s 1997 novel Tropic of Orange (Trexler).
Yamashita addresses the planetary problem of global warming through several characters who
experience its various effects at the local level. In the novel, the Tropic of Cancer becomes
attached to an orange that travels northward to the United States, dragging the climate, people,
and culture of central Mexico with it, literalizing the trope of “climate change” as it travels.
Central to my account of Yamashita’s global warming novel is the notion that place and weather
have a profound connection. Yamashita employs magical realist aesthetics to narrate fantastic
events relating to weather. What is interesting about the novel’s treatment of global warming is
how Yamashita’s complex narration enacts a literary mimicry of some of global warming’s
features through form. Global warming disrupts weather patterns common to specific places,
shifting weather historically common to a given place to other places where it may be
uncommon. Global warming also gives rise to weather effects that are unheard of in certain
places or produces degrees and features of weather that have never been common to any place at
all. Yamashita mimics the effects of climate change at the level of form, using the
“HyperContexts” chart early in the novel to set up readerly expectations about what narrative
styles should be associated with certain characters only to blend discrete styles within the space
of the chapter. Readers use the HyperContexts to inhabit the lives of Yamashita’s characters and
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get a sense of what is common to their experience. However, the forms that readers are led to
believe are common to each character’s experience—and the novel’s governing structure more
generally—mimic weather in an era of climate change by shifting, mixing, and producing effects
that are not characteristic of any individual space or character.
Many of the characters in Tropic of Orange are displaced, and displacement functions as
one of the novel’s governing premises. The novel follows seven characters over seven days as
they reside in, travel from, or travel to Los Angeles, California “perhaps . . . [in] the recent past”
near the summer solstice (sometime between June 20 and June 22) (Tropic of Orange, hereafter
ToO n. pag.) The seven characters are Rafaela Cortes, Bobby Ngu, Emi, Buzzworm, Manzanar
Murakami, Gabriel Balboa, and Arcangel. Rafaela Cortes is a Mexican immigrant to the United
States and a labor organizer working at Gabriel Balboa’s house near Mazatlán, Mexico; she is
recently estranged from her husband, Bobby Ngu. Bobby Ngu is “Chinese from Singapore with
a Vietnam name speaking like Mexican living in Koreatown” and a workaholic small business
owner (ToO 15). Emi is a Japanese-American television news producer and is Gabriel Balboa’s
on-again-off-again girlfriend. Gabriel Balboa is a Chicano journalist who often relies on
Buzzworm for tips on untold stories about Los Angeles. Buzzworm is an African-American
“Angel of Mercy” who patrols Los Angeles giving aide to the city’s poor and homeless (ToO
26). One of the homeless Buzzworm is aware of is Manzanar Murakami, a Japanese-American
who stands on platforms as a “conductor” of traffic symphonies (ToO 34). Arcangel is a five
hundred-year-old man, a mythological trickster figure making his way north, and a symbol for
the peoples of Latin America. The plot of the novel concerns an automobile pile-up on the
Harbor Freeway and the homeless community takeover of abandoned vehicles following the
accident.
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Several critics have read Tropic of Orange as a critique of globalization, specifically the
1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Molly Wallace sees Tropic of Orange
as a “politically productive symbolization of NAFTA” and traces the metaphors critics of
globalization saw NAFTA representing (standing in for globalization or neoliberalism, for
example) while Wallace herself notes how NAFTA is troped in Yamashita’s novel (158). In
Tropic of Orange, one of Arcangel’s many guises is El Gran Mojado (The Great Wetback) who
challenges a personified NAFTA (known as SUPERNAFTA) to a wrestling match, a major
media event that occupies several chapters at the end of the novel. The chief critique of NAFTA
articulated by the novel is the tendency it perpetuates to allow for the free flow of capital across
borders while restricting the movement of bodies.
Several critics have also noted that Tropic of Orange is replete with border-crossings and
that Yamashita’s characters reflect on the easy mobility of capital and labor versus the strained
mobility of migrants. Kandice Chuh writes that “Yamashita’s work encourages an opening out
of U.S. boundaries in different registers (the political, the imaginative, and the critical) and
multiple directions (south and west, especially)” (621). John Blair Gamber argues that Tropic of
Orange “challenges absolutes of purity as they relate to space and place (especially as examined
by borders, boundaries, and cartography)” (122). He continues: “[a]ll boundaries—whether
between nations or territories; between past, present, and future; between the self and the other;
or between humans and other species—are positively polluted, recognized as porous, and
constantly permeated and penetrated” (Gamber 122). Even as the novel embraces qualities like
multiculturalism, it does not merely present multiculturalism as cure-all. Hande Tekdemir is
skeptical of claims that hybridity is the “ultimate solution to Eurocentrist, imperialist, and
colonialist discourse,” as is Yamashita’s character Emi (41). Emi scorns the “multicultural
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mosaic” as “just about money” (ToO 127, 126). She insists to Gabriel that “cultural diversity is
bullshit . . . cultural diversity is a white guy wearing a Nirvana t-shirt and dreads” (ToO 128).
Iyko Day argues that Tropic of Orange demonstrates how “neoliberal multiculturalism reinforces
the abstraction of both wealthy and poor Asian North Americans” (171). Yamashita is careful
not to romanticize multiculturalism even as she employs magical realism to blur traditional
borders and boundaries.
For a novel about globalization and border-crossings, few critics who have commented
on Tropic of Orange’s treatment of global environmental problems, instead reading the novel as
an environmental justice text. As Julie Sze puts it, Tropic of Orange “traces the geography of
neoliberalism and free trade, including the shifting barriers between nature and culture, as
inscribed on women’s bodies, because women’s bodies are the means through which new
processes of global production and consumption operate” (35). Following Sze’s example, Chiyo
Crawford argues that Tropic of Orange “link[s] the historical trauma of internment during World
War II (1939-1945) to recent environmental justice struggles for Japanese Americans, shaping a
critical discourse on human values that will be crucial for the entwined outcomes of social justice
and environmental preservation” (87). Crawford’s reading draws parallels between Manzanar
Murakami’s connection to Japanese forced removal to the Manzanar Internment Camp, where
Manzanar was born and chooses his name from after abandoning life as a surgeon, and Los
Angeles’s attempts to forcibly remove the city’s homeless population (91). Although I agree that
Tropic of Orange is concerned with environmental justice, focusing on environmental justice too
narrowly has led critics to pay close attention to only a few of the novel’s characters, thus
missing how the novel positions global problems in relation to local contexts. I argue that Tropic
of Orange is what Hande Tekdemir calls a “local adaptation” of magical realism that explores
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the conflict between global and local understandings of the problem of climate change, not just
as collection of regional social justice issues (51n5, 53n13). To understand how Tropic of
Orange comments on climate change as both a global and local problem, it is essential to
understand how the “HyperContexts” early in the novel sets up readerly expectations about the
narrative space of each chapter.
Ursula K. Heise has noted the theoretical conflict between a sense of place and a sense of
planet, especially as it relates to environmental concern. On the one hand, notions like
globalization and transnationalism seek to transcend the narrowness of national- and communitybased identities to demonstrate how some political problems—like nuclear proliferation—are
global problems that affect everyone, not just the citizens of certain nations or communities
(Heise 5-6). On the other hand, there has been a recent return to local-, regional-, and nationbased identities as “a tool of resistance to global imperialism” (Heise 7). The problem of climate
change gets at the heart of this tension. Climate change is a planetary problem that transcends
nations and individual communities, but it also does not; the manifestations of global warming’s
consequences are observable at the local level. Tropic of Orange addresses the problem of
global warming by commenting on the local effects of climate change in each chapter by treating
the space of the chapter metaphorically as a region or locality within which style functions like
local climate. The HyperContexts is a paratextual grid printed on the pages after the “Contents”
and before the novel’s dedication, somewhat like an alternative rendering of the table of contents
that lists the seven characters along one axis and the seven days in which the novel takes place
along the other axis. The grid suggests that each character has seven chapters devoted to their
story, one for each day of the week. In the initial chapters, the reader finds that the style in each
of the first seven chapters, a style associated with each individual character, is different from any
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other chapters, as if each character gets their own narrative style unique to “their” chapters.
Throughout the novel, however, these stylistic expectations are subverted. The code suggested
by the HyperContexts proves helpful but ultimately inaccurate. Styles from some chapters
invade the space of other chapters, for instance, acting like weather anomalies pointing to a
disruption in the stability of the HyperContexts’s chapter-style code and the “climate” of the
chapter-space.
In Tropic of Orange, Yamashita provides a stylistic and structural corollary to climate
change’s effects. The stylistic boundary-crossing is not the only way that Yamashita mimics the
effects of climate change at the level of form, however. The stylistic disruption of chapter-space
is like the magical disruption of Yamashita’s literary realism. Elizabeth Ermarth argues that the
lifelike aesthetic of literary realism is produced by the serial representation of scenes from a
unified perspective (511).107 While Ermarth’s point is that individual scenes in a novel do not
have the character of realism until taken collectively, her analysis is contingent on “the
conception of time as a common plane which extends to infinity and, thus, as a continuous
medium in which distinctions between past, present, and future are meaningful because they are
mutually informative” (512). Ermarth’s description of realism’s dependence on human
“experience of consciousness in time” apply to human experiences of space as well (512). As
novels construct time and space to correspond to readers’ experience of those concepts,
experimental novelists have often constructed space and time in novels in ways that do not
correspond directly to familiar human experiences. What readers recognize as a disruption of the
formal code they were led to believe governed the novel aligns with anomalous weather events
that contradict decades of experience and, in some cases, centuries of documented scientific

Different narrative perspectives present “concordable differences” which “always exist to be overcome” in
realistic fiction (Ermarth 514).
107
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climate data. Yamashita disrupts the realist sections of her novel with magical contractions and
expansions of both space and time. In disrupting familiar experiences of space and time in the
novel, Yamashita translates climate change into a disorienting human experience—not just an
effect demonstrable through data.
Ultimately, Yamashita uses style and structure to reframe how readers think about
climate. The space of the chapter (and character-based chapter-set) gives the reader the
impression of something that is both discrete and coherent though, of course, connected to the
novel as a whole. Combined with Yamashita’s incorporation of global warming discussion in
the novel’s direct discourse and the use of magical realist aesthetics that trope the effects of
climate change, Yamashita uses the readerly expectations constructed by the HyperContexts to
show how the worlds of the characters overlap and how their experiences of time are vastly
different due to climate change. What appear to be discrete worlds at the outset of Tropic of
Orange prove to be inextricably bound together. What binds these characters together is not
merely that they are figures in the same novel but that they all experience the spatial and
temporal effects of climate change in their own way. Each characters suffers the
consequences—either directly or indirectly—of climate catastrophes far away or close at hand.

GLOBAL WARMING AND SENSE OF PLACE
While the history of climate change research is clearly influenced by scholars who understand it
as a global phenomenon, by the 1990s various places began to record its effects at a local level
(Weart). A 1988 New York Times story about James E. Hansen’s testimony to Congress
illustrates how global warming was popularly understood (Shabecoff). The story starts with
assertions about global planetary conditions (“The earth has been warmer in the first five months
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of this year than in any comparable period since measurements began 130 years ago”) and
continues with the language of globality and planetary shared conditions until near the end of the
article, where the reporter—Philip Shabecoff—notes that “the rise in temperature is not expected
to be uniform around the globe” and finally mentions a few specific places that are expected to
be affected in specific ways. For some people the most obvious manifestation of the effects of
global warming is at the local level, through such consequences as weather anomaly. According
to the National Wildlife Federation, “The intensification of weather and climate extremes will be
the most visible impact of global warming in our everyday lives” (“Global Warming”). While
climate change scientists are quick to point out that extreme weather events are the product of
many factors (not just climate change)—and are therefore only partial manifestations of climate
change—there is evidence to suggest that extreme weather is, indeed, linked to global warming.
The United States Environmental Protection Agency encourages visitors to their website to think
of climate change as “increasing the odds” of extreme weather (defined as changes in frequency,
intensity, duration, and/or timing of climate events), rather than causing it (EPA). Yamashita
addresses the notion of weather anomaly at the level of manifest content in the plot of Tropic of
Orange, as well as stylistically.
The novel explicitly references global warming on several occasions in the direct
discourse, though critics have focused more on the environmental justice commentary in the
novel than the novel’s treatment of climate change. What is interesting about these references is
that they are occasioned by a sense of abnormality associated with place. In the first chapter, the
narrator, clearly channeling Rafaela’s thoughts, reflects on Gabriel’s navel orange tree—“the
only citrus tree in the garden that had a fruit on it”:
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The tree was a sorry one, and so was the orange. Rafaela knew it was an orange that
should not have been. It was much too early. Everyone said the weather was changing.
The rains came sooner this year. “What do they call it?” mused Doña Maria. “Global
warming. Yes, that’s it.” Rafaela had seen it herself. The tree had been fooled, and little
pimples of budding flowers began to burst through its branches. And then came a sudden
period of dry weather; the flowers withered away except for this one. Perhaps it had been
the industriousness of the African bees, their furry feet dusted heavily in yellow pollen,
that had quickly mated the flower to its future, producing this aberrant orange—not to be
picked, not expected, and probably not very sweet. (ToO 11)
In this passage, Rafaela’s individual reflections are backed up by what “everyone said.” The
local, place-based knowledge that “the weather was changing” accounts for the tree’s early
blooming. The early bloom is not an isolated instance of aberrant weather, but evidence of a
greater climate change. What constitutes “early” here is also place-based, what the EPA passage
above calls changes in the timing of climate events. Weather thus functions as a code by which
we understand what is normal or common for a specific place, in this case Mazatlán. According
to that code, the orange is an “aberrant orange”—a product of global warming. The aberrant
weather could be seen as just that—an aberration, not a product of global warming—but the
novel’s emphasis on foregrounding other kinds of simultaneous aberrations suggests a link to
climate change, not just a stand-alone anomalous instance. Rafaela’s observation above endows
the orange with a quality of synecdoche: as a product of global warming, it stands in for global
warming throughout the novel. The individual events that it produces are then not merely
isolated instances of odd aberrations but evidence of a larger pattern of events connected to
climate change.
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Later, in Emi’s first chapter, Emi marvels to Gabriel that a sponsor paid for a midafternoon slot on the news (ToO 20). She speculates that the sponsor “didn’t want to hear of
anything controversial” and thus ended up getting slotted before the weather report (ToO 20).
The notion that weather is not “controversial” is doubly ironic when read against Rafaela’s
statement on global warming only nine pages earlier. First, it cannot be controversial because, as
Rafaela points out, “everyone said the weather was changing”; a consensus exists about the
problem. Second, even though “everyone said the weather was changing,” there’s no mention of
anyone doing anything about it. A consensus about climate change is rendered uncontroversial
nonetheless because of political apathy. Layers of irony pile up as Emi makes fun of Gabriel’s
love of L.A.-based detective movies wherein “[i]t’s always raining” even though “[i]t never rains
here! The only reason it rains in those films is so that Bogart can wear a trenchcoat” (ToO 20).
In Emi’s mocking formulation, weather is denaturalized, made an effect of human artifice. Filmweather is likened to real weather while being contrasted with it. The notion that weather is
uncontroversial based on Emi’s sense of Los Angeles’s famous weather patterns: “Monday.
Overcast in the morning. Sunny in the afternoon. Tuesday. Overcast in the morning. Sunny in
the afternoon. Temperature holding at seventy-eight degrees” (ToO 20). Before the chapter is
over, it starts raining (ToO 25). Indeed, the rain is more than a mere shower, but a downpour, a
flash flood, that ends almost as soon as it begins.
Manzanar Murakami’s chapters also explicitly comment on climate change. He uses the
patterns associated with place to conduct symphonies. These patterns, too, are related to climate
change. According to the omniscient narrator of Manzanar’s chapters, “There was a schedule of
sorts, a program, an appropriate series of concerts and symphonies in accordance with the
seasons and the climate of the city. As noted by many others, climatic change in L.A. was
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different from other places. It had less perhaps to do with weather and more to do with disaster”
(36). Manzanar’s compositions are partially weather-related and partially based on the “climate”
of the city’s populace. By tapping into a the Heideggerian stimmung of the city, Manzanar can
express a collective affect that, without him, is doomed to dispersal. 108
The Los Angeles weather is revealed to be an amalgamation of natural pattern and human
tampering and artifice. The degree to which it can be predicted is contingent on human
understandings of such natural patterns and their own influence on global climate. Buzzworm,
for one, puts little faith on human ability to manage climate. His veneration of palm trees is
almost pantheistic. He tells various neighbors, “Palm tree’s smart, knows the time for
everything. Knows to put out flowers and fruit when the time’s right, even though out here don’t
seem like there’s any seasons to speak of. Suppose we could all learn something from a palm
tree that knows the seasons better than us” (ToO 31). Buzzworm’s veneration of palm trees, as
Amy C. Tang points out, “appears to offer a fairly straightforward parable about learning to
appreciate one’s local environment by developing an indigenous viewpoint” as well as a simple
respect for nature (97). However, the beauty Buzzworm sees in palm trees is a beauty that is best
when viewed from a distance (Tang 97). Up until this point in the novel, chapter 6, nonhumans
respond according to realist expectations of the characters. After this point, however, what the
human characters think they know about nonhuman processes—weather, for example—is
brought into question by the magical elements in the text, particularly the magical realist
moments that Tropic of Orange uses to figure global warming’s consequences as magical events.

Jonathan Flatley describes stimmung, following Heidegger, as “one’s primary way of being in the world, ‘“the
presupposition for” and “medium” of thinking and acting’” (5). Flatley himself describes stimmung as mood, “a
kind of affective atmosphere . . . in which intentions are formed, projects pursued, and particular affects can attach
to particular objects” (19). Manzanar is both reader and interpreter of moods and conductor or shaper of moods.
Jonathan Flatley. Affective Mapping: Melancholia and the Poetics of Modernism. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2008.
108
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MAGICAL REALISM AND GLOBAL WARMING
Yamashita tropes global warming by employing magical realist techniques in her novel.
Specifically, an orange growing on the Tropic of Cancer in Mexico travels north to the United
States and, as it travels, it takes the Tropic of Cancer with it. Several critics have commented on
this magical realist aesthetic, but such a categorization requires several caveats. Tropic of
Orange is, in some ways, a realist text, but—as Iyko Day puts it—Yamashita “reworks the Real
into a narrative whose fantastical elements are not pure fantasy; neither is its blunt realism an
earnest display of social documentary” (172). 109 Most critics have commented on the text as
largely magical realist, a term that has several related-but-competing definitions. Tekdemir
collects several of them in an endnote to her article on magical realism and Tropic of Orange,
which she calls a “local adaptation” of the genre (51n5, 53n13). Some of these definitions treat
magical realism as itself a literary or narrative technique. Others, like Tekdemir’s own definition
of choice, treat magical realism as a set of techniques or a genre. She describes magical realism
as “an odd, matter-of-fact integration of reality and fantasy, an almost taken-for-granted intimacy
between the extraordinary and the familiar” (42). Tekdemir characterizes magical realist texts as
often having a “fixed narrative perspective” (45). However, in the postmodern city Yamashita
represents, “direct communication is illusory” because “people and machines impede easy access
to information in/of the city” (Tekdemir 47). Magical realism functions especially to give voice
to marginalized groups of people (Tekdemir 44). Yamashita’s emphasis on individuals, as
opposed to groups of people, is what makes Tropic of Orange unique as a magical realist text.
Tekdemir notes that Tropic of Orange does not, like many magical realist texts, focus on a
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Amy C. Tang, on the other hand, asserts that “Tropic of Orange is not a realist novel at all” (70).
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community. Rather it focuses on seven characters who have some relationship with each other
but are—nonetheless—distinct individuals with clearly-defined voices and unique narrative
styles (Tekdemir 45). These seven characters do, however, function as stand-ins for
communities.
Bagoña Simal-González offers a more inclusive definition of magical realism, which may
exclude Tropic of Orange. According to Simal-González, “[m]agical realist fiction can be
simply described as encompassing those literary texts where the realistic and the fantastic coexist
with no apparent contradiction” (124). Throughout her essay on magical realism in AsianAmerican fiction, however, Simal-González, frequently refers to “moments” of magical realism.
Reading her definition and her usage together, then, Tropic of Orange may not be a magical
realist novel, but—rather—a novel with moments of magical realism. Like Amy C. Tang,
Simal-González suggests that Tropic of Orange can be helpfully understood as magical realist,
but that—by its nature as a postmodern pastiche text—it must also be understood as—for
example—detective novel, a disaster novel, and an immigration novel (Simal-González 141,
Tang 70). In addition to these magical realist elements, however, there are also other fantastic
elements that I would characterize as more mythical than magical-realist. While the magicalrealist moments seem to comment on some aspect of global climate change, the mythical
elements seem more concerned with the wealth disparity between the global north and the global
south.110 My argument chiefly concerns how magical realism is used to represent the

The mythical elements have a less direct connection to the novel’s commentary on global warming. Arcangel is
a five-hundred-year-old mythological figure who pulls a truck filled with oranges off the road by running a rope
around the truck’s axel and then hooking the ends of the cable into holes in his sides (ToO 75). He also fights a
personified NAFTA. Rafaela transmogrifies into a snake to fight a transmogrified dealer in human organs who has
turned into a jaguar. In these moments, the fantastic and the realistic hardly “coexist with no apparent
contradiction” (Simal-González 124). These sections seem to employ narrative tropes from genres different from
magical realism, such as myth, legend, and folk tale. These sections, though eschewing realism, also address
national and continental themes and conflicts, rather than the tension between global and local that I see the magical
realist passages commenting on.
110

143

consequences of global warming, not the fantastic figuration of conflicts between north and
south.
What is initially magical about Yamashita’s magical realism, and how that aesthetic
addresses climate change, has to do with space. 111 In the novel, an orange from Gabriel’s halfbuilt home on the Tropic of Cancer in Mexico travels to Los Angeles, “utterly transforming the
entire geography of North America” as it travels (Lee 88). When the orange is taken North,
“[t]he Southern Hemisphere is pulled into the North” (Day 173). The pulling of the South into
the North has been read by most critics as an allegory of the northward flows of capital and
bodies in the 1990s.112 Yamashita’s direct references to global warming early in the novel
demonstrate that the northward flows of capital and bodies is not simply a mysterious aftereffect
of trade agreements. As the planet warms, El Niño produces more severe droughts and floods in
Central America (Lustgarten). The droughts and floods lead to periodic resource scarcity. Some
of consequences of this scarcity include political instability in the regions effected and more
people struggling to gain access to basic necessities like food and water. The people travelling
northward from Central America, then, are, in many cases, fleeing the consequences of climate
change in the forms of economic precarity and political violence.
Global warming and climate change come up early in the novel, but they are not made
“magical” until Gabriel’s Monday chapter. In this chapter, Gabriel makes several phone calls in
his office in Los Angeles. One of these calls is to Buzzworm, who tells him about deaths in the
“transvestite camp” due to the recent flash flooding: “We got a wall of rain. And I mean a wall
of rain. Flood conditions. Dumps a whole foot in five minutes. I timed it, so you know I know”

John Blair Gamber argues that “Tropic of Orange maintains a deep concern with representations of geographic
space, particularly in demonstrating the failure of maps and cartography generally” (128).
112
While I agree with these readings, I do not think they focus enough on the ways in which the northward
migration of the Tropic of Cancer literalizes the trope of climate change in global warming discourse.
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(ToO 41). Gabriel is hesitant to write about this problem and asks what else Buzzworm has for
news. Readers should remember the downpour from the previous day in Emi’s chapter. What
Emi experienced as an inconvenient occurrence related to her job and Gabriel experienced from
the comfort of a restaurant has killed the some of the city’s most vulnerable population. The
novel does not dwell on the inequalities in how much risk various populations assume when
confronted with erratic weather caused by climate change, but the implicit message here is that
the well-off, middle-class, employed characters are much less likely to suffer the consequences
of global warming than the poor and other invisible populations. They are therefore
fundamentally less aware of the risks weather anomalies present.
While flash-flooding is hardly magical—indeed, it’s all too real—the conversation
between Buzzworm and Gabriel soon shifts from the bizarre (though not unheard of) weather to
impossible behavior by the sun. Buzzworm also tells Gabriel that “The sun’s up. I mean up.
Like it’s never gonna go away. And by my synchronization, it’s near going on seventeen
hundred. Daylight savings my ass. This is like Alaska” (ToO 42). When Gabriel leaves the
building he finds that “the rush of heat and humidity outside the glass doors was sudden and
oppressive (ToO 45). The sensation does not seem magical at all—of course it’s hot in Los
Angeles at “about four o’clock in the afternoon . . . mid-June” (ToO 37). The heat, however, is
not all that is strange: “I realized how strange this was: in the middle of towering thirty and forty
floor buildings there was not a single shadow . . . the sun had aimed its rays straight down into
the downtown canyon. At this hour it seemed impossible” (ToO 46). Because the earth’s
rotational axis tilts most closely to the sun on this day, the sun appears higher than usual
(“What’s a Solstice?”). To produce no shadows, however, the sun would have to be directly
overhead, which only happens at the Tropic of Cancer on the summer solstice. Since Los
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Angeles is not on the Tropic of Cancer, what’s so “strange” is not so much that there would be
no shadows at four o’clock in the afternoon but that there would be no shadows in that particular
place. The weather effects indicate that the Tropic of Cancer has somehow magically moved
north to Los Angeles or that the earth’s axis has somehow altered! The effects of deteriorating
ozone and the build-up of greenhouse gasses is made metaphorical as the characters’ sensations
of the sun literally getting closer to the place addressed in narration.
The novel does not present an authoritative figure to interpret the strange goings-on for
them. In the absence of such a figure, characters experience weird weather events but struggle to
articulate why such events affected them the way they do, losing confidence in the evidence of
their own senses. The next day, Emi rescues Gabriel when he is in a hurry and his car has
broken down. Gabriel tries to articulate what Rachel Adams calls the “strange mutations in
regional weather, flora, and fauna,” but Emi does not feel the same sense of weirdness (Adams
260, ToO 62). He tells her, “I mean the length of the day. The weather. The light for godsake.
Time. It’s got something to do with time. Place. Damn! . . . Every which way you turn, the sun
is in your windshield” (ToO 62). Gabriel tries to repeat what Buzzworm noticed to Emi, but she
just jokes about Gabriel’s disorientation and changes the subject of conversation. To Emi, who
“love[s] to shift gears,” the flash-flooding-immediately-followed-by-sun is not bizarre at all
(ToO 61).
On Tuesday afternoon, Rafaela starts noticing bizarre spatial anomalies and, like Gabriel,
has trouble making sense of the events to those around her. For instance, while cleaning the
house she notices several crabs even though the house is nowhere near a beach. When asked if
the crabs are normal, Rodriguez, a local handyman working on various projects at the Mazatlán
house, responds, “Of course not. Who ever heard of such a thing? It would take a man many
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hours to walk to a beach. But a crab!” (ToO 64). Rodriguez apologizes profusely to Rafaela for
reasons that are unclear at the time (ToO 63). Doña Maria mentions that she has never seen a
crab in the area either (ToO 66). When Rafaela returns from the hotel, where she picked up a
package from Gabriel, she gets caught in a downpour that disorients her, and she sees hundreds
of crabs in the rain (ToO 70). When she finally gets back to the house, she sees that the wall
Rodriguez was working on appeared to be stretched and appeared to be curved slightly, which is
not characteristic of Rodriguez’s regular methodical work (ToO 70). The orange is gone; we
learn in the next chapter that it was picked up by a vendor Arcangel dreamed about (ToO 75).
Arcangel takes the orange after his feat of strength on the highway and heads north (ToO 75).
The chapter starts the strange migration of wildlife occupying inland areas have not been known
to inhabit and then shifts to emphasize the literal stretching of space with the description of the
warped wall. Part of what is interesting here is that Rafaela knows, as most people do, that
inland Mexico is not the natural habitat of crabs, but she notes their indisputable existence and
doubts her own knowledge of the place. She defers to other authorities to make sense of the
animal habitat oddity, though the authorities she consults are older people who have been in the
area for a long time who assure her that her initial disorientation was on the mark: there should
not be crabs in central Mexico.
As the novel progresses, the spatial distortions (and other distortions) seem to lose their
obvious connections to global warming and are more directly associated with oranges. Spatial
distortion becomes associated with a different set of oranges—a load spiked with concentrated
narcotics—when Buzzworm buys an orange from a street peddler and talks to a scared young
man (ToO 85). Readers remember Buzzworm speaking to this cocky young guy in his previous
chapter, but now the “Kid” is “turning several shades of green” and “blubber[ing] something
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about curving bullets” (ToO 85). The “Kid” insists he “‘saw the bullets is all . . . like slow
motion . . . They curved by me sudden-like’” as if “‘space curved’” (ToO 85, 86). Buzzworm
seems to believe the young man’s bizarre testimony. It’s not clear how the spatial anomaly in
this section relates to the novel’s larger commentary on global warming in which spatial
disorientation is often directly linked to the effects of global warming. Instead of global
warming being figured in this instance of spatial distortion, one set of oranges seems to cause
spatial calamity like the orange connected to the Tropic of Cancer causes spatial calamity when
it moves north.
On Wednesday and Thursday, characters experience global warming as temporal
distortion and as an unaccountable deformation rooted in the bodily experience of space. In Los
Angeles, a semi jackknifes on the Harbor freeway when a driver eating a spiked orange crashes
into it, exploding, and the homeless take over the abandoned cars. In Mazatlán, on her way to
visit Doña Maria, Rafaela notices the “pregnant bulge” in the fence Rodriguez built, a bulge that
in the afternoon seems more pronounced than in the morning (ToO 115). Rafaela panics when
she finds herself in the company of Doña Maria’s son, the trafficker in children’s organs. She
cannot seem to gauge how far away Gabriel’s house is after dropping Sol off at Doña Maria’s
house: “the more she ran, the farther it seemed to be” (ToO 119). Rafaela’s panic manifests
itself as a feeling of heaviness. The distance back to Gabriel’s house seems overwhelming, and
she returns to Doña Maria’s house to retrieve Sol. At this point, the reader is unsure if Rafaela’s
narrated sensation is a magical realist stretching of space—the literal stretching of the field
between Gabriel’s and Doña Maria’s house—or merely the perceptual distortion of bodily
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panic.113 What is at stake in this confusion is how the novel asks readers to make sense of spatial
anomaly. We are faced with two options: to interpret spatial anomaly as a magical happening
within the diegesis or as merely a strange effect experienced by individual characters, like a
hallucination.
The mounting spatial distortion is exacerbated the next day, Thursday, by temporal
distortion as well.114 The characters experience temporal distortion, but this distortion is also
passed on to readers. While readers are faced with a choice about how to interpret the
characters’ experience of spatial distortion, the experience of temporal distortion is passed on to
readers because the HyperContexts structure diegetic time for readers, and that structure
becomes warped. This distortion is hinted at on Tuesday afternoon, when Rafaela goes to the
local hotel to retrieve the faucets Gabriel has sent to his Mazatlán house. When she picks them
up, the clock reads 11:45, but she knows it must be much later than that (ToO 68-9). The
narrator of Buzzworm’s chapters begins the first Thursday chapter “[t]he world teeter-tottered”
(ToO 137). Buzzworm experiences the distortion “as a vision thing,” but he notices that “[t]ime
stood still momentarily. Time stood still eternally. Whatever it was doing, it was standing. Just
standing. Buzzworm was sure of that” (ToO 137). Buzzworm notices that—at noon on
Thursday—his watches stop momentarily at 12:00 and every station he listens to on the radio
momentarily held a single note; “[t]hen it was back to normal-like” (ToO 137). In these
moments, the part of the day where the sun is highest seems to stretch just as the land stretches in
other parts of the novel. The sensation of the hottest part of the day extending is a metaphor for
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The confusion mounts the next day, and it is likened to the confusion with the crabs earlier in the novel. Rafaela
notices and feels the distortion of space, but she cannot pin down whether this distortion is—indeed—a bizarre
physical anomaly or an affective, bodily response unique to her alone.
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While most critical accounts of Tropic of Orange’s magical realism address the spatial distortion, few seem to
notice the novel’s temporal distortion.
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global warming’s gradual, incremental takeover of our experience of both space and time as they
relate to weather.
Buzzworm experiences odd spatiality and temporality, but the oddness is narrated as odd
for Buzzworm, not the reader. The temporal distortion in Rafaela’s chapter is experienced by the
reader, however, not just characters. In this way, the novel invites readers to share in the
experience of spatial and temporal distortion felt by the characters. Bizarrely, Rafaela’s
Thursday chapter picks up exactly where the Wednesday chapter leaves off. Rafaela picks up
Sol because she “missed him” even though, as Doña Maria points out, “It’s been less than five
minutes” (ToO 148). Rafaela replies, “No. It’s been an eternity. I can’t explain it. I really
can’t” (ToO 148). In one sense, Rafaela’s response is a mom’s hyperbolic response to being
away from one she loves. In another sense, Rafaela has somehow lost about twenty-four hours
between the end of her last chapter and the beginning of this one, if we follow the structural logic
of days governing the passage of time in the novel. Are we meant to take the seven days as
actual days in the diegesis or not? This section of Rafaela’s narrative casts doubt on whether the
other characters’ chapters are really on separate days or not. The narrator comments on Rafeala
reflection on her own sense of place:
She had come home to México to be by herself, to be somewhere familiar. Everything
was as she had always known it to be and yet nothing was. Had she never noticed? The
elasticity of the land and of time. This sensation of timelessness, of yawning distances,
of haunting fear, of danger. Perhaps it was just here . . . And ever since the orange—that
orange—had disappeared. (ToO 149)
Rafaela’s reaction to the oddity of spatial and temporal distortion has much to tell us about the
phenomenology of global warming, and her response is like—though not identical to—the
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reader’s response to reading a text that distorts space and time. Rafaela approaches the
landscape and climate of Mazatlán as something she thinks she knows--“somewhere familiar”—
as we all approach landscapes and climates that we’ve spent years in. Anomalous, though
sometimes barely perceptible, alterations in those landscapes and climates are difficult to pin
down as anomalies at all. As someone returning to Mazatlán, Rafaela falls victim to postmodern
doubt, unsure if the landscape she is momentarily estranged from has always been this way or if
it just seems so. In short, because of the barely perceptible changes and moments of weirdness,
she cannot know for certain whether the landscape or she herself has changed. Her response is
akin to what Rob Nixon calls “slow violence” (2). Nixon defines “slow violence” as “violence
that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across
time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all” (2). Indeed,
Rafaela obviously feels more disoriented than violated, but the dispersed nature of the changes to
landscape and time cause her to doubt their actuality, to consider them as a product of her own
inability to recognize stability. The reader is hardly better off. Because the narrator does not
definitively root the spatial and temporal distortion anywhere—leaving open, rather, the
possibility that Rafaela has simply panicked, that the distortions are a product of her personal
experience and not an objective phenomenon—the reader cannot root these distortions in the
world of the text generally or in the personal experience of a character.
Rafaela’s experience reflects the spatial and temporal warping caused by the movement
of the orange as it travels north. On Friday, Rafaela flees from Doña Maria’s son and then
decides to take a bus north when she sees Arcangel, who has the magical orange with the
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translucent strands signifying the Tropic of Cancer wound around him. 115 When the bus stops,
she is abducted by Doña Maria’s son in the black Jaguar as Sol and Arcangel continue heading
north. As the bus drives further north, the “time” of day quickly passes from noon to afternoon
to evening and night to dawn the next day (ToO 186). In Rafaela’s next chapter, her “Saturday”
chapter, the action picks up from when she was kidnapped on “Friday” as she fights Doña
Maria’s son, who has transformed into a jaguar (ToO 220).116 Gabriel, who has traveled to
Mexico researching a story about the traffic of human organs, finds Rafaela on the road and is
surprised that he can see his house from the spot where she has been dumped, even though he
figures he has at least an hour left to drive before he should have reached it (ToO 223). In this
section the magical qualities of the orange, a product of and synecdoche for global warming,
comment most directly on the disparities between the global north and the global south. Global
warming, in the form of the orange, push the Tropic of Cancer north, both in terms of climate
and landscape, transforming northern Mexico into southern and central Mexico. Global
warming, in the form of the orange, also pushes people north in huge groups.
The temporal distortion that Rafaela experienced as an effect of global warming shows
itself to be a corollary to spatial distortion. The time it takes to do things expands and retracts,
much like the spaces occupied by the novel’s characters. For example, even though Rafaela and
Sol had been riding north in the bus for several hours before being abducted, Rafaela can still see
the same scenery by Gabriel’s house out the window (ToO 183).117 Bobby, whose chapters had
hitherto been characterized by stark realism, encounters spatial distortion when returning to Los
Looking towards his house, she encounters further spatial distortion: “[b]ut it could not all be this close to the
hotel. Even without the burden of Sol in her arms, it was at least a twenty-minute walk, and yet Gabriel’s place
seemed to be creeping up, step by step toward the hotel” (ToO 152).
116
She herself is transformed into “a muscular serpent,” and the third person narrator notes that “the sound of her
screams traveled south but not north” (ToO 220).
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According to Vint, “the highway’s growth is effected by the gravitational force of the lines emanating from
Arcangel’s orange” (410).
115

152

Angeles from the border. He finds getting back to Los Angeles easy—“Never got to L.A. so
fast” (ToO 230). When he gets off the packed freeway, he finds that getting home “Takes hours.
Streets stretched and shrunk this way and that. Someone put this city in the washer/dryer.
Shrunk 50% in places. Then ironed it out 200% in others” (ToO 230). In Rafaela’s “Sunday
Chapter,” she somehow reunites with Bobby (even though he was on his way to the Pacific Rim
Auditorium in Los Angeles the last time readers read about him (ToO 253). The dreamy
passages that follow emphasize their intimate closeness and their use of the strands connected to
the orange to facilitate such intimacy, but the strands also separate them even as they bring them
closer together. Rafaela asks, “Will you wait for me on the other side?” and it is not clear if she
means the other side of the thread, the U.S.-Mexico border, or if she is dying (or some
combination of the three) (ToO 254). The global warming surrogate brings them closer together
but also creates new impassable boundaries through its distortions of space.
Global warming is present in the novel in passages where characters actually describe
and discuss the effects of climate change, as well as in passages that refer to the magical orange
and its effect. Since the novel takes place over only seven days, its representation of climate
change is reliant on the characters’ experience and discussion of aberrant weather within the
diegesis and the magical treatment of space and time occasioned by the novel’s magical orange.
These are not the only ways that Yamashita comments on global warming in the novel, however.
Besides incorporating global warming into the manifest content of the novel and representing it
figuratively through the magical orange, Yamashita treats style as weather in her formal practice.
To best understand how Yamashita’s formal choices function as a commentary on global
warming, I first demonstrate how she uses the HyperContexts to mimic the effects of at the level
of style.
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CLIMATE, PLACE, AND STYLE
Critical discussions of magical realism offer one way to hone in on Tropic of Orange’s unique
formal practice and what it has to do with climate change. While Tropic of Orange may seem to
be a magical realist novel, one of the qualities that makes it a local adaptation of magical realism
(as opposed to a canonical or archetypal example) is the use of multiple narrative perspectives.
Accompanying the multiple perspectives in Tropic of Orange are multiple, distinctive voices.
Multiple narrative voices allow Yamashita to comment on climate change by crafting chapters as
unique conceptual spaces. As the novel progresses, readers adapt to the shifting perspectives and
voices, aligning certain perspectives and voices with chapters about certain characters. The
HyperContexts at the beginning of the novel serve to prepare readers for these shifts (and to help
the reader keep the narratorial codes associated with each character straight). The
HyperContexts consists of a paratextual grid after the table of contents and before the first
chapter. This grid’s vertical axis lists each of the seven protagonists while the horizontal axis
lists each of the seven days of the week. The logic of the HyperContexts suggests that each of
the seven characters has a chapter devoted to him or her for each day of the week—the novel
itself taking place over seven days. It also suggests that the chapters can be grouped in various
ways—by day or by character. There are, for example, seven Tuesday chapters and there are
seven Buzzworm chapters. Reading the novel linearly means shifting back and forth between
several narrative techniques, codes, styles, and voices while learning to understand how the
techniques, codes, styles, and voices are grouped according to the action surrounding specific
characters.118 Each character’s set of chapters, however, conform to a much more stable set of

According to Tang, “as the significance of the specific genres fades into the background, what strikes us most
forcefully is the novel’s own narrative movement between them” (87).
118
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techniques and styles. For instance, Bobby Ngu’s chapters (2, 12, 15, 26, 34, 40, 49) are all
written in much the same style. As Tekdemir notes, the stylistic variations Yamashita employs
are unique to each set of chapters, as if the characters themselves are representing themselves in
seven different ways (46). Close scrutiny, however, reveals that the narratorial codes associated
with each character’s chapters serve to complicate the notion that these codes are, indeed, unique
to a single character or that a single chapter or set of chapters is “about” a single character. To
make this clearer, I will briefly describe the narrative perspectives and voices associated with
each character’s chapters. To understand how Yamashita uses style in each character’s chapters
as a corollary to weather, it is essential to first understand how the chapter-sets are
distinguishable in terms of style.
Several characters’ chapter-sets adhere closely to the logic of the HyperContexts. These
chapters follow through on the implication that the chapters are, in some essential way, about
their character and their character’s experience. Gabriel Balboa’s chapters are narrated with an
aesthetic nod towards detective fiction’s frequent use of first-person perspectives. As Amy C.
Tang puts it, “Gabriel . . . speaks primarily in the first-person voice of Raymond Chandler’s
hardboiled fiction and the film noir detectives it inspired, until he morphs into the late twentiethcentury incarnation of the noir detective, a hacker modeled on the hero of William Gibson’s
cyberpunk novel Neuromancer” (85). Gabriel’s chapters report on Gabriel’s thoughts as he
reasons out several mysteries presented to him in his career as a journalist. These thoughts are
accompanied by several conversations between him, Buzzworm, Emi, and other characters with
whom he comes in contact and spends time.
Arcangel’s chapters are narrated in the fashion of myth. Tekdemir associates the “fixed
narrative perspective” of these chapters with magical realism as a genre (45). The distance from
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characters’ thoughts is more pronounced in Arcangel’s chapters, which are all about narrative
action, not interiority. Tang describes Arcangel’s chapters as “bring[ing] to the novel the
linguistic hybridity, historical perspective, and Chicanismo of U.S.-Mexico border fiction” (86).
His chapters mix third person omniscient narration with italicized verses that recall epic poetry.
Bobby’s chapters are narrated by an ambiguous narrator in a style that is immediately
distinguishable from others in the novel. The first Bobby Ngu chapter begins “Check it out, ése.
You know this story?” (ToO 14). The narrator tells Bobby’s story directly to an implied
reader/listener in the second person. Although the narrator never identifies himself/herself, the
narrator discusses Bobby’s doings at a distance but in voice we take to be like Bobby’s, if not
Bobby’s exactly. One of the effects of switching perspectives and voices from chapter to chapter
is a shifting of narrative proximity. Bobby’s chapters are the most intimate in the novel and
present a marked contrast between those that come before and after. Tang describes the
narration in Bobby’s chapters as characterized by “necessity” (85). Bobby’s background is
related as follows: “Bobby’s story. It’s a long story. Gotta be after hours for Bobby to tell it.
And then, he might not.” (ToO 15). The short sentences and sentence fragments characterize the
voice in these chapters, and they all stick closely to Bobby’s experience.
Like Bobby Ngu’s chapters, Buzzworm’s chapters employ a style characteristic of oral
communication. According to Tang, these chapters “evoke the modern urban novel” (85).
Unlike Bobby’s chapters, however, Buzzworm’s do not identify a specific implied reader. The
distinction amounts to the difference between second person narration in Bobby’s chapters and
free indirect discourse in Buzzworm’s chapters. While Buzzworm’s chapters have moments of
second person narration, the free indirect discourse that characterizes them is marked by several
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of the features of African American English (multiple negation, article dropping, “g-dropping,”
etc.), and these are the same features that characterize Buzzworm’s direct discourse.
Several characters’ chapter-sets deviate from the logic of the HyperContexts. These
chapters do not follow through on the HyperContexts’s implication that the chapters are, in some
essential way, about their character and their character’s experience. Tang points out that
“Tropic of Orange does not present its different genres clashing, or even intersecting. For
despite the novel’s central conceit of geographical collapse, the characters’ generically defined
worlds remain distinct, even as the characters themselves begin to cross paths” (86). As I will
show, this is not actually true. Tang continues: “[p]astiche in Tropic of Orange seems aimed
primarily at foregrounding a constant oscillation between genres rather than commenting on any
one in particular; generic boundaries serve mainly to demarcate the different conceptual spaces
across which the narrative can be seen to travel” (87). This is accurate to a degree, but Tang’s
formulation does not account for the prominent instances of boundary transgression in the novel.
As I noted earlier, several critics have noted the porousness of borders in Tropic of Orange—not
just geographical borders, but also the borders between self and other, human and non-human
(Chuh 621, Gomber 122). The “conceptual spaces” in Tropic of Orange have their own native
style, but other styles invade these spaces. These native styles, I argue, function as a kind of
weather to the conceptual space of the chapter, or, more accurately, to the characters’ chapter
sets. The style/weather is, for the most part, distinct to each character—as Tang notes—but not
always, mimicking the weather shifts of climate change. The overarching code by which we
measure what weather is appropriate or native to the chapter sets is governed by the
HyperContexts.
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Another way of understanding how the HyperContexts function like weather report in the
space of each chapter-set is through Heidegger’s rich understanding of moods. For Jonathan
Flatley, Heideggerian stimmung—moods—“are not transitory of fleeting elements of everyday
life, but are foundational and primordial” (21). They are prior to cognition, not environmental
side-effects (Flatley 21). Indeed, they are more like environment itself, except that we do not
exist in them, nor they in us (22). One is always disposed or attuned in one way or another, so
[t]he world never presents itself to us as some kind of value-less set of facts or perceptions—
things always appear to us as mattering or not mattering in some way” (Flatley 21). Moods are
like narrative styles in the sense that they are often unnoticed as moods—or as styles—until they
are disrupted (Flatley 22). None of the seven styles of narration in Tropic of Orange is
particularly avant-garde, defamiliarizing, or experimental in itself. The style in each of the first
seven chapters corresponds to a familiar set of codes we use to understand narrative fiction, and
the HyperContexts set up expectations for how these codes will operate for the rest of the novel.
Rafaela’s chapters are narrated from a third-person omniscient perspective, which clashes
at points with the logic of the HyperContexts.119 The HyperContexts would lead readers the
believe that the Rafaela Cortes chapters (1, 10, 18, 24, 30, 38, and 45) are in some essential way
devoted to the character Rafaela Cortes. 120 The omniscient narrator of these chapters certainly
focuses, for the most part, on Rafaela and—to a lesser extent—her son Sol, but readers are also
privy to the unspoken thoughts of Gabriel (with whom Rafaela talks on the telephone) and Doña
Maria, a neighbor near the house in Mazatlán whom Rafaela frequently comes in contact with.
But the omniscient reportage of characters’ thoughts in what are ostensibly Rafaela’s chapters is

Tang aligns the narration in Rafaela’s chapters most closely with “the magical realism of Latin American
Fiction” (85).
120
Each chapter has a title and a location but no explicit connection to a specific character outside of the
HyperContexts.
119
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messy, obstructed by the narrator’s play with distance from the action. Some portions of the
chapters about Rafaela employ a perspective that is far from the action while other portions are
closely focalized through a single character (who is not always Rafaela). 121 When the narrative
focalization appears to adopt Rafaela’s perspective, the reportage of thoughts becomes even
more complicated because the focalization suggests that the character, not necessarily the
omniscient narrator, is speculating on another character’s thoughts, as in the following example
from early in the novel when the reader learns about how Gabriel came to buy a house (a money
pit, actually) hundreds of miles from Los Angeles, where he works:
This project had already been going on for eight years. It had begun one summer when
Gabriel felt a spontaneous, sudden passion for the acquisition of land, the sensation of a
timeless vacation, the erotic tastes of chili pepper and salty breezes, and for Mexico. And
there had been one additional attraction: the location. It was marked exactly by a sign on
the highway shoulder beyond the house: Tropic of Cancer. In Gabriel’s mind the Tropic
ran through his place like a good metaphor. (ToO 5)
Rafaela is talking to Gabriel on the telephone when readers are presented with this background
information. The style might suggest zero focalization, an ontologically stable assessment of
Gabriel’s thoughts and feelings, but the next paragraph, which uses the same style, proves that
the narrative perspective is limited, that the knowledge available is contingent. The narrator tells
readers that “[e]veryone could tell he was green and took advantage of it . . . [n]obody
remembered the grandmother who supposedly came from right around there” (ToO 5). The
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For instance, the following sentence is clearly focalized through Doña Maria, even though it takes place in
Rafaela’s chapter: “[m]aybe Gabriel had been trying to achieve a rustic old México look what with that heavy dining
table, the big leather chairs, and that giant mirror framed by a colorful Quetzalcoatl, not Doña Maria’s personal
preference; she liked what she called a French Mediterranean look” (ToO 65). These are clearly Doña Maria’s
subjective, contingent reflections (“maybe” is an obvious indicator) even if they’re presented from a third person
perspective; interestingly, however, the style does not shift to a more conventional free indirect discourse.
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intimate knowledge about Gabriel’s thoughts and feelings, a trademark of omniscient narration,
is hyperbolically extended to include what “everybody could tell” and “remembered,” but the
word “supposedly” registers a distinct note of skepticism (ToO 5). The above passages are
focalized through Rafaela, and re-reading the block quote above in light of this insight reveals an
ironic attitude towards Gabriel’s fanciful appropriation of what he takes to be Mexican culture.
The irony and skepticism expressed in the narratorial focalization through Rafaela’s perspective
ends abruptly, however, when readers are informed that the grandmother in question was “a little
girl kidnapped by the grandfather and taken north,” a fact that “some people pretended to
remember” (ToO 5-6, 6). The authority with which the fact of the kidnapping is related is
contrasted with the skepticism of “supposedly” in the previous sentence and the pretending in the
sentence that comes after. Yamashita is clearly shifting distances from the narrative action,
getting closer and then farther away, endowing her narrator with omniscient authority and then
subjective contingency even within the same paragraph. These shifts are significant because they
upset the expectations set up both by the familiar codes we use to interpret narrative fiction and
the logic of the HyperContexts. If we understand the space of the chapter—the space of the
chapter as a set—metaphorically, or at like a geographic space, then the stylistic “weather”
becomes anomalous when the codes and expectations are systematically broken.
The logic of the HyperContexts is subverted further when Rafaela meets Arcangel. Their
stories become intertwined in several ways. They both inhabit the same chapters on Thursday
and Friday; the chapters are not really devoted to either of them. When the chapters are not
devoted singularly to each of them, their narration becomes stylistically enmeshed. Both
characters talk to one another, so their direct discourse occupies much of the narrative space.
The styles that were formerly unique to Rafaela’s chapters and Arcangel’s chapters appear in the
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same chapters. “Rafaela’s” Friday chapter starts with a poem, epic in its vision, written by
Arcangel (and italicized to ensure the reader does not mistake the stylistic idiosyncrasy) (181-2).
“Archangel’s” Friday chapter mixes stylistic features of his past chapters (italicized poetry, an
epic catalogue, omniscient narration) with stylistic features from Rafeala’s chapters (close
attention to what Sol is doing, free indirect discourse) even though Rafaela is no longer “in” the
chapter because she had been kidnapped in her “own” chapter. These examples, I argue, point to
a muddying of the weather/style we are supposed to associate with Rafaela’s chapters. The
chapters give the appearance of being stylistically unique and consistent, as well as conforming
to the logic of the HyperContexts, but, like global warming, the chapters quickly shift weather
and are subject to anomalies and incursions of weather usually associated with other places.
What we find is that these chapter-sets are not “generically bound worlds” in the last instance,
but worlds that are subject to stylistic disturbance (Tang 90). The stylistic mixture also suggests
that the characters do not merely interact and experience their worlds as individuals. The
experiences of what appear to be discrete entities prove to be collective experiences (within the
limited scope of the novel).
The narration in the chapters that are ostensibly about Emi, like the narration in Rafaela’s
chapters, complies with and disrupts the one-character-per-chapter logic of the HyperContexts.
Narrated using “idioms from the television shows she produces,” her first chapter (chapter 3),
begins with dialogue-heavy narration that is clearly from a third person perspective but becomes
limited to Emi’s perspective, bordering on free indirect discourse, before the narrative distance
expands to include Gabriel, and Emi leaves the narrative scene altogether, effectively exiting
“her” own chapter (Tang 85). The chapter starts with simple descriptions of Emi’s actions and
reportage of her and Gabriel’s conversation at a restaurant (ToO 18-9). We then learn that “She
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had started dating Gabriel because he was Latino, part of that hot colorful race, only to find out
that, except for maybe his interest in tango (and even that was academic), he wasn’t what you
call the stereotype” (ToO 19). As in Rafaela’s chapter earlier, the “maybe” here marks the
discourse as contingent, rooted in character instead of omniscience. The specific insertion of the
phrase “part of that colorful race” links the discourse to Emi’s consciously provocative
stereotyping of Gabriel and his romanticizing of identity and cultural heritage. When Emi says
the wrong thing, the narrator tells us that “he didn’t even seem to be listening” (ToO 23). The
chapter, which is ostensibly about Emi and her thoughts, gradually shifts to actually be about
Gabriel and his thoughts.
A shift in focalization in “Emi’s” chapters signals the disruption of the one-character-perchapter logic of the HyperContexts. The next few sentences discuss Gabriel’s unwillingness to
argue with Emi. Gabriel is the subject of these sentences, but his actions are not narrated; rather,
we find out about what he knows and thinks (ToO 22). The shift in focalization is not
pronounced, however, because the subsequent narration consists of dialogue. The narrative
center of gravity is ambiguous until Emi fields a call on her cellphone about a crisis at work,
after which she tells Gabriel “I’ll call you this afternoon” and leaves the restaurant (ToO 24).
The next two paragraphs demonstrate a clear shift in perspective:
Gabriel stared down at the pappardelle con fungi al vino marsala, the fragrance of wine
and rosemary rising, the delicate slices of wild mushroom limp and appealing coyly to his
senses just under and between the firm ribbons of pasta. But this was passé. So what
was in? Probably burgers.
Someone was knocking at the glass in the window pane next to his table. He
looked out. It was Emi. (ToO 24)
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The action is not merely about Gabriel; its narration is focalized through Gabriel. The beginning
of the quoted section relates Gabriel’s actions after Emi has left the restaurant. The end of the
paragraph indicates Gabriel’s internal reflections. The experience of noticing “someone”
knocking shows that the narrator is relating Gabriel’s experience here. The initial lack of
recognition about where the knocking is coming from indicates the perceptual limits associated
with first-person narrators, but it’s clear that Gabriel is the one perceiving—not Emi—even
though we are in “Emi’s” chapter. This kind of shift—starting with narration that moves, almost
imperceptibly, from a third-person narrator who is not Emi to a third person narrator who is
clearly limiting the experience narrated to Emi’s experience (and sometimes borrowing her
voice) to narration that is clearly relating experiences and thoughts that can only be Gabriel’s and
then back to narration about Emi’s experience—this shift happens throughout the novel. Finally,
Gabriel is not the only character whose perspective takes over Emi’s chapters. After Emi has
been shot (which happens in “her” chapter, 44), the narrative perspective governing her chapters
seems to shift to Buzzworm (ToO 250). Like Rafaela’s chapters, the weather/style that
characterizes the conceptual space of Emi’s chapters is not unique to Emi’s chapters. Indeed,
Emi’s chapters contradict the logic of the HyperContexts by demonstrating that significant
portions of “her” chapters are completely unconcerned with her as a character.
Manzanar Murakami’s chapters present the “epic vision” of what appears to be an
omniscient narrator’s perspective, a perspective that cultivates a notable distance between the
narratorial gaze and any characters’ thoughts (or the novel’s action) (Tang 85). Amy C. Tang
points out that “the novel repeatedly asserts the superiority of his panoramic view over the
limited perspectives of the masses teeming beneath his feet” (82). This perspective, however,
aligns closely with what we as readers are led to believe is Murakami’s own aloof, disinterested
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perspective. Nonetheless, phrases like “Manzanar wondered” and “Manzanar pressed on . . .”
reveal the narration to be from a third-person perspective (ToO 121, 122). Still, Gayle K. Sato
theorizes that the narration in Manzanar’s chapters reproduces what Manzanar sees:
Manzanar’s moving line of vision is the primary trope throughout his chapters in Tropic
of Orange, for his visual mapping of everything he sees, his seeing everything, and his
insistence on the rightness and wellness of wanting to see as much as possible are what
constitute the mode of being through which he worked his way out from a position of
absent presence in U.S. society. (Sato 130)
The third-person narration oddly picks up Manzanar’s perceptions, even closely mapping his
feelings, but does not relate them in free indirect discourse. Manzanar rarely speaks, so his
direct discourse and his voice are hidden; his reflections and feelings are tirelessly reported by a
voice that is not Manzanar’s own. These chapters have little to do with Manzanar’s experience,
however, because they report what happens around Manzanar, not what happens to him. The
effect is paradoxical, that of an omniscient first-person narrator or a third-person narrator who is
both limited to narrating Manzanar’s perceptions and, at the same time, omniscient (because
Manzanar seems to have a super-human capacity for perception. In terms of experiencing the
effects of global warming, Manzanar is both global in his seemingly omniscient perspective and
local in his embodiment. This is clear in the novel’s description of Manzanar. Tropic of Orange
also uses the literalized global warming trope to comment on the effects of automobile-related
pollution. As Chiyo Crawford notes, the narrator’s description of Manzanar Murakami
emphasizes how at-risk he is as a resident of Los Angeles, with its notorious pollution problems
(92). Manzanar is described as having a “blackened appearance like a chimney sweep” from his
life on the streets of Los Angeles and from working near freeways (ToO 110). The simile
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Yamashita employs here is significant. The environmental damage caused by the burning of
gasoline and diesel are here likened to coal in the nineteenth century, fossil fuels all. The
narrator alerts us to Manzanar’s victimization by anthropogenic climate change, but Manzanar’s
perspective never actually dwells on Manzanar’s person beyond this one local description.
Tropic of Orange roots the unnatural migration of the Tropic of Cancer in the flow of
commodities north to satisfy American overconsumption habits. Crawford points out how Emi,
the novel’s most conspicuous consumer, is often unaware of weather in the novel, as if she
refuses to see the connection between her consumption and climate change (97). Iyko Day
describes Tropic of Orange as “an allegory of capitalist ruin” wherein the intersection of
characters from “varying racial, economic, and citizenship classes” reveal “capitalism as a
dynamic ecology” (172). Some of the connections that the text amplifies between “human,
technological, and spatial dimensions” are environmental relations produced by capitalism (Day
173). Jessica Maucione reads Tropic of Orange as an example of literary ecology that focuses
on human reinhabitation of alienated capitalist places as sites of potential postcapitalist
rehabilitation (90).
The novel seeks one solution to global warming in the mid-90s fascination with
recycling. A narrator tells us that “Manzanar imagined himself a kind of recycler” (ToO 56). At
one point in the novel, Buzzworm censures Gabriel: “around here, brother, we recycling your
pulp as beds” (ToO 42). Besides the actual textual references to recycling, recycling is also
embraced as an aesthetic. Sato describes Manzanar Murakami as a sonic recycler (128). Tang
suggests that Yamashita’s project as a whole is a kind of recycling (71). Yamashita employs
pastiche as manner of recycling literary styles (Tang 71). However, it’s hard to imagine
recycling defeating major global environmental problems except as a part of a much larger
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collective project. While recycling is mentioned a few times in Tropic of Orange, the larger
project of collective response to environmental disaster is addressed with more emphasis on the
novel.
Ultimately, the end of Tropic of Orange functions allegorically as a critique of
consumerism and free market capitalism. The magical moments that pointed towards the bizarre
effects of global warming fuse with the mythical effects that comment on the great divide
between north and south. In the novel’s final scenes, weather and climate become subordinate
themes to the novel’s interest in figuring working class migrant values versus privileged middleclass American values. The climax of the novel occurs when Arcangel (as “El Gran Mojado”)
fights SUPERNAFTA. SUPERNAFTA gives a speech to the huge crowd before the fight
linking human freedom to the free flow of capital (ToO 257). El Gran Mojado replies that “The
myth of the first world is that / development is wealth and technology progress. / It is all
rubbish” (ToO 259, italics in original). These seem to be the novel’s ideological takeaways. The
aesthetic border-crossing and code-breaking become subordinate to the aesthetics of a
spectacular sporting event. Big speeches and good-versus-evil storytelling serve to align great
differences with one of two camps. After the speeches, Arcangel gives Sol and the magic orange
to Bobby, who is sitting ringside, before the fight commences (ToO 261). El Gran Mojado and
SUPERNAFTA destroy each other and everyone leaves the auditorium (ToO 262-3). After the
end of the fight in chapter 47, the novel backtracks to narrate Bobby’s experience arriving at the
fight and purchasing a ticket from a scalper (ToO 266). Inside, Bobby has a vision of Rafaela,
who keeps pointing to the magic orange (ToO 267). When Sol gives her the orange, she makes
Bobby cut it. He cuts it, slicing the line corresponding to the Tropic of Cancer, but he insists on
holding the two pieces together, even though he does not know why. As the line stretches tighter
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and tighter and becomes more and more difficult to hang on to, Bobby finally lets it go (ToO
268). Bobby Ngu stretches and contorts his body, clinging to the strands that symbolize the
imaginary borders and boundaries that separate North from South, the human from the
nonhuman, and other binaries.
But if we consider the orange (and the line connected to it) as a symbol of climate at the
Tropic of Cancer, then Bobby is the figure that ends up managing responsibility for the northern
existence of a southern climate. How are we to read this? It’s true, as other have noted, that
Bobby accepts the imaginary boundaries as a matter of course, almost obliviously, not
understanding how his labor is being exploited, for example (class division). In holding these
strands together, he also puts in a great deal of work, much like he does at his various jobs,
abusing himself to ensure that his family can have access to education and consumer goods that
he did not have access to. He understands, earlier in the novel, that the work he puts in to be able
to buy commodities for his family cannot replace the time they want to spend with him, so the
effort he exerts to make money is weirdly like his unthinking effort in holding the threads that
connect unknown elements to each other. He asks what these strands are supposed to connect.
Is it his unthinking consumerism that ultimately makes Bobby someone who drags the symbol of
southern climate into the North? Is his letting go at the end a gesture of renunciation of the
commodified lifestyle that has led to the acceleration of climate change? I read it as a moment of
epiphany. Bobby comes to consciousness of the effort he puts in to purchase what he does not
want, ultimately destroying what he does want. The letting go at the end of the novel is the
letting go of a set of consumerist values, a letting go of the American dream. In putting in so
much effort to manage the strands emanating from the magic orange, Bobby cannot embrace his
family. He can only do that when he lets go.
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The novel spares us moralizing, but it is clear that Bobby’s letting go is to be aspired to.
If we are to take the orange as a synecdoche for global warming, as I have been doing throughout
this chapter, then the effects of global warming are neutralized when the object itself is destroyed
at the end of the novel. The effects are neutralized, that is, unless Bobby insists on holding the
cords together that emanate from the halved orange, the cords that have dragged people and
weather from Mexico to the United States. Bobby holds onto the cords representing man-made
boundaries out of habit until he becomes aware of how unnecessary these boundaries are. While
holding the strands that represent the Tropic of Cancer, he becomes like all consumers who
practice consumption habits that ultimately displace people and weather and insist on man-made
boundaries. When he lets go of them, the implication is that he disperses with the insistence on a
north versus south binary, with all its political ramifications. He is empowered individually in
that moment to reject American society’s harmful distinctions. The style of the chapter remains
the one characteristic of all of Bobby’s other chapters. It would also seem that he singlehandedly ends global warming in that moment, but his idiosyncratic narrative voice keeps its
authenticity.
The chapter-sets function as spaces where voice functions stylistically as a kind of
weather that pervades the chapters. Disruptions of the voices characteristic of each chapter-set
are easily noticeable and allow Yamashita to mimic the epistemological underpinnings of climate
change. Yamashita addresses the problem of climate change in the early chapters of the novel
directly, but her later chapters address it through magical realist aesthetics and using the
conceptual space of the chapter as a metaphor for regional space wherein style functions as
weather. Global warming is both a topic directly addressed by the novel and a process mimicked
through narrative form. After the initial chapters of Tropic of Orange, the style native to each
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chapter changes like anomalous weather. The logic set up by the HyperContexts—that each of
seven characters would have one chapter devoted to them for the timespan of a week—
deteriorates as the characters converge and “pollute” each others’ chapters. In this way,
Yamashita presents a formal corollary to the effects of climate change. The spaces of chapters
experience aberrant stylistic “weather” and what, at the beginning of the novel, seemed to be
separate and discrete proves to be blurred and connected. The blurring and connection culminate
in the allegorical fight between free market capitalism and the working class. The various styles
coalesce into a myth that absorbs individual narratives into itself.
Because each of the characters in Tropic of Orange experiences climate change and its
effects differently, I do not think there is a clear message about how climate change affects
people collectively except that it affects them collectively. Some characters experience the
magical occurrences in the novel merely as weirdness or inconvenience. Others experience those
same occurrences as catastrophe and threat. These experiences are highly dependent on class,
geographical location, and gender, and they are all linked in some profound way to capitalism.
The blending of styles and worlds shows how some are relatively insulated from climate risk but
not entirely so. The blending also shows how the most vulnerable populations are most in need
of collective response to protect themselves from the worst effects. Finally, Yamashita’s
aesthetic is shows how the separate worlds of characters is both illusory and a fact of privilege.
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